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PREFACE
This work grew from two observations. The first was that there was some-
thing deeply wrong with inferential role theories of lexical concepts. These
problems had something to do with “compositionality”: lexical concepts are
required for the construction of more complex, phrasal concepts, and infer-
ential role theories cannot fulfill that role: something else was needed. I
thus originally planned to study the relation between lexical semantics, and
inferential role semantics in particular, and the principle of compositionality,
defending what has been called the“atomistic hypothesis”of lexical concepts.
According to this hypothesis, the level of lexical expressions in language(s)
falls quite close to the point at which semantic features, otherwise expressible
with complex expressions (e.g., definitions), dry up, so that lexical concepts
(meanings of single morphemes) become semantically unanalyzable.
This research problem was further suggested to me by the fact that my
thesis adviser, Professor Gabriel Sandu, was also involved in the study of
compositionality. The execution of this plan, in the form of a discussion of
atomistic theory, is reported in the first two chapters of this thesis.
In going through the objections raised against the atomistic lexicon, I
noted that linguists had made pretty strong claims that, unless we assume
lexical semantic decomposition, we miss something important in terms of how
our language and thought work, at least whith respect to what is known as
‘explanatory adequacy.’ This is, in my view, one of the most severe problems
that the atomistic theory is faced with. It is also a problem that could, it
seems, be tackled empirically.
I thus became involved in these linguistic matters, with practically no
intuition about the outcome. What I understood when I began to pene-
trate this complex of issues was that causatives represented a particularly
important type of linguistic evidence with respect to this controversy. I thus
ended up studying them in an attempt to find a way to construct linguistic
explanations (not descriptions or stipulations) from a theory that contains
the atomistic lexicon as one of its components but does not use e.g. stip-
ulative meaning postulates. This work is reported in the two subsequent
chapters of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4). These chapters comprise the bulk
of the study, as from very early on I decided to concentrate on the problem
of causatives, leaving many other problems of atomistic theory for further
study. My hypothesis is that causativity is part of the ‘logical syntax’ of a
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single sentence rather than being an aspect of its lexical semantics. Some ad-
ditional questions concerning atomistic grammar are touched on in Chapter
6.
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to thank Virpi Kalakoski and Pentti Laurinen for their support and inspira-
tion. Ernest Lepore, Urpo Nikanne, Alessandro Lenci, Saara Huhmarniemi,
Christoffer Gefwert and Otto Lappi read parts of the manuscipt and pro-
vided valuable feedback, and without this help many mistakes would have
been left unnoticed. Some of the ideas that are presented here have also been
presented elsewere: I thank all of those who have been exposed to them and
have given their input in the form of critical comments. Many thanks also to
Joan Nordlund and Stella Frank, who provided help on matters of English
grammar, and to Maija Salo, who checked the references.
Helsinki, November 2003
Pauli Salo
iv
ABSTRACT
What is the constitution of the meaning of morphemes (lexical concepts)?
According to most theories, such meanings have a molecular or holistic inter-
nal structure: prototypes, exemplars, semantic networks, complex schemata,
scripts, and even classical definitions. Recently, however, contrary opinions
have arisen in cognitive science suggesting that lexical concepts are not se-
mantically structured. Let us call this theory “lexical atomism.”
It is argued in this thesis that, once certain conceptual issues have been
clarified (Chapter 1), lexical atomism might indeed provide a more suitable
alternative (Chapter 2). The theory is nevertheless problematic in that,
among other things, most theories of grammar apparently require a decom-
positional account of the lexicon, and the atomistic version offers too much
stipulation rather than explanation. This problem is solved in this thesis by
providing a version of the minimalist grammar that encompasses the atom-
istic lexicon, does not use meaning postulates, and suggests a solution to
certain problems in minimalist theory (Chapters 3, 6). It is then shown that
this proposal suffices to explain the key properties of causatives without de-
compositions (Chapter 4). The hypothesis put forward in this study is that
causativity is part of the ‘logical syntax’ of a single sentence rather than part
of any of its lexical elements.
v
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A-position argument position
A
′
-position non-argument position
ABS absolutive Case
ACC accusative Case
0ACC zero-accusative
AgrO agreement projection (object)
AgrS agreement projection (subject)
CAUS causative
DAT dative Case
DO direct object
DP determiner phrase
FUT future
I inflection (T + Agr)
IP inflection projection
INE inessive Case
IO indirect object
LF logical form
LLF lexico-logical form
LGB Chomsky (1981a)
LOC locative Case
NOM nominative Case
NP noun phrase
PASS passive (morpheme)
PAST past tense
PP prespositional phrase
PRO anaphoric empty pronominial
pro empty pronoun
SEM semantic Case
T tense (/aspect)
TP tense projection
VP verb phrase
X0 lexical head
X
′
intermediate projection
XP maximal projection
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Compositionality, grammar and causatives
A grammar determines the relation between sound and meaning. Given that
truism, what are the principles that relate sound and meaning, say, in the case
of human language(s)? One candidate is the principle of compositionality,
requiring that the meaning of every complex expression is determined by the
meanings of its constituents, their syntactic mode of combination, and by
these only. For example, the meaning of the expression brown cow must be
determined by the meaning of brown, the meaning of cow, and the syntactic
rule [NP [AP . . . ] [N . . . ] ] under which they have been combined.
This principle has provoked a lot of discussion in recent years, and several
aspects of it are currently under scrutiny. I will begin by reviewing these,
and will then focus on the more specific problem discussed in this thesis.
Firstly, the fact that the principle was important in guiding the devel-
opment of certain influential semantic theories, such as those of Tarski and
Montague, might have lead to specific assumptions concerning semantics that
are dubious on various grounds. This is the position argued most forcefully
by Hintikka and his associates (Hintikka & Kulas, 1983, Hintikka & Sandu,
1999, Hintikka, 2001) and some linguists (Chomsky, 1975), who have argued
in favor of non-compositional semantics of various types. According to these
theories, the meaning of a complex expression is not (always) determined
by the meanings of its constituents and their syntactic mode of combination
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(only).
The second question arose more or less as a reflection of the first problem,
when it was proven that for each such non-compositional semantics it is
possible to develop a compositional version that is in a certain important
sense equivalent to the former, meaning that in addressing the pros and cons
of different semantic systems it ought not to be the compositionality principle
that matters (Hodges, 1998, Zadrozny, 1994, 1997; see Janssen, 1997 for a
review). In fact, one could conclude that the principle is, in a sense, “empty,”
meaning that, from a purely formal point of view, it does not matter whether
one assumes compositionality or not.
That debate still continues, reflecting the deeper and more general prob-
lem of determining precisely what role the principle of compositionality should
and ought to have in the formulation of semantic theories, in the domain of
both mathematics and the empirical sciences.
There is a third issue that has to do with the principle of composition-
ality and which, at least when considered only casually, seems to differ from
the two mentioned above. Fodor and Lepore used the principle to argue
that meanings of morphemes must be semantically unstructured,1 contrary
to the currently prevailing assumption in cognitive science(s) that they are
semantically structured.2
Although Fodor and his colleagues use the term“compositionality”in their
arguments, it is not clear what they intend this word to refer to if compared
to the usage of logicians and linguists. It indeed turns out that quite a
different principle - and quite a different host of issues and problems - is at
1See Fodor (1975, 1981a, 1998a, 2001), Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes (1980), Fodor
& Lepore (2002), Kintsch (1974), Margolis (1998), among others. Yet proponents of the
atomistic position are still few if compared to those developing any theories of inferential
role semantics.
2Internal structures could be analysed in terms of prototypes (Hampton, 2000, Kamp
& Partee, 1995, Searle, 1958, Smith & Medin, 1981, Rosch, 1973a), complex cognitive
schemata (Barsalou, 1992, Kintsch, 1998), definitions (Aristotle, see Charles, 2000, Weitz,
1988; Carnap, 1937), images or image-prototypes (Rosch, 1973b, Russell, 1919), semantic
networks (Findler, 1979, Quillian, 1968), family-resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1958), recog-
nitional verificationist capacities (Peacocke, 1992), even in terms of a whole theories (Gop-
nik, 1988, Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, Keil, 1987, Murphy & Medin, 1985) or conceptual
roles more generally (Block, 1986, Cruse, 1986, Field, 1977, Harman, 1982). Virtually
every theory in this list belongs to the class of inferential/conceptual role semantics, since
they construe concept identity in terms of its relations to other concepts.
Clearly the claim in this study, or elsewhere, could not be that lexical concepts lack an
internal structure: it claims that they lack internal structure in terms of relations to other
concepts.
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stake in Fodor’s case. For instance, the principle of compositionality, which is
a restriction on the determination of the meanings of complex expressions, in
itself says nothing about the meanings of primitive vocabulary (e.g., Horwich,
1998, p. 159-160). Fodor and Lepore have, of course, recognized this problem,
writing that “the main problem of lexical semantics” is that “though we’re
sure that language is compositional, we don’t know what the claim that it is
amounts to” (Fodor & Lepore, 2002, p. 119).
Therefore, I will unpack this usage of the term“compositionality”as care-
fully as I can, showing where the difference lies, what consequences it has,
and how this double usage of the same terminology causes confusion that
could and should be avoided.
Very roughly, Fodor and Lepore use the term “compositionality” to re-
fer to the construction of complex concepts in a way that is, in a certain
sense, empirically sound (namely, it explains properties of the constructing
of complex expressions such as systematicity, productivity and reverse sys-
tematicity). This principle is only weakly connected to the compositionality
principle in the more traditional sense cited above. When the terminolog-
ical aspects are clarified, however, it turns out that Fodor has been right:
“compositionality,” in one sense, places severe restrictions on the theory of
(lexical) meaning.
I will recapitulate Fodor’s arguments briefly, keeping an eye on the con-
ceptual clarifications obtained earlier, and will end agreeing with his theory
of a ‘semantically unstructured lexicon.’ The reason I wish to go through
these arguments here once more is that lexical atomism, although entirely
plausible in my opinion, clearly represents a minority view. For example,
the entry on “concepts” in The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences
(1999) does not even mention it. I have the impression that it strikes most
linguists and psychologists as plain wrong, but this negative attitude might
emerge, I believe, not so much from the empirical content of atomistic theory,
but from a misunderstanding of what is at stake.
Taking all that as an introduction to the main problem of my thesis, I
will then turn to some of the problems inherent in Fodor’s atomistic position.
Some of these are discussed without any pretense of offering a solution, the
idea being merely to note their existence and possible relevance to the issue
at hand. Instead, I will concentrate here on a problem that could be called
the problem of explanatory adequacy : lexical atomism appears to be a true
non-starter from a linguistic point of view, as argued by several linguists.
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Indeed, only few linguists, if indeed there are any, have accepted lexical
atomism as their working hypothesis: most theories conjecture that“semantic
decompositions” are part of the identity of lexical elements. This reflects
the fact that, compositionality, systematicity and productivity aside, there
is linguistic evidence that strongly suggests, or so it is argued, that lexical
elements must have a semantic decomposition so that they are constituted,
at least in part, by a set of analytic inferences.
The empirical evidence is then, in short, contradictory: one strand point-
ing lexical semantic decomposition, another to atomistic lexical entries. Both
of these appear to me initially plausible, which thus creates what I believe to
be a sufficiently interesting and important problem to merit a study of this
magnitude.
After making sure that Fodor’s evidence is reliable, its conclusions valid
and the concepts used in the argument are sufficiently well-defined (Chapter
2), I will show how to incorporate atomistic theory into the recent Mini-
malist Program (Chomsky, 2000b, 2001) in such a way as not to pose any
undefeatable threat to the demands of explanatory adequacy. Secondly, I
will suggest how and why this theory can solve certain problems currently
under study inside the Minimalist Program, exploring its consequences and
some new problems it invokes (Chapter 3). I will argue that, contrary to
what most linguists seem to believe, lexical atomism might be an interesting
and useful empirical hypothesis. More specifically, I will first show how the
proposal can solve the problem of explanatory adequacy in connection with
causatives, as it is this class of linguistic expressions that has evoked the most
forceful objection to the atomistic lexicon (Chapter 4). Beyond that, I will
argue that the hypothesis gains independent support as well, since it can be
used to solve a number of other, currently open problems in linguistic theory
(Chapters 3, 6).
The very idea of minimalism, to turn to the linguistic part of this the-
sis, is easy to explain, although it is much more complicated to execute in
practice. It is clear that some properties are necessary in a grammar of
human language(s), such as that it must interact with meaning and speech
production, and that it must involve productive recursive processes. Let us
call the former“legibility conditions.” The minimalist programme (Chomsky,
1995, 2000b, 2001) explores the possibility that this is also sufficient (Strong
Minimalist Thesis), and that many of the previous assumptions covering the
computational processes of human language(s) (CHL) are in fact redundant,
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CHL being “perfect” in one sense or another. It is also assumed that CHL
is “optimal” in terms of some cost function defined over its computations or
complete derivations.
Following these broad guidelines, I assume, like many others before me,
that (1) X-bar theory is redundant and reduces to the“bare phrase structure”
(§3.3); (2) there are no purely formal heads and projections (Agr-less the-
ory); (3) the basic relation of agreement is represented by Agree, Move being
instantiated by additional morphological requirements (§3.5); (4) language-
specific variation is explained in terms of overt morphological properties of
the lexical elements, and (5) optimality must be local in nature.
Other and more controversial assumptions are as follows: (6) the the-
matic argument structure itself is not part of any lexical element, but emerges
from the principles of their mutual interaction (§3.3, 4.3); (7) the notion of
causative vP projection is simplified (§3.3); (8) the Strict Lexicalist Hypoth-
esis is revised by deriving, not stipulating, uninterpretable formal features in
the lexicon, such as categorial features and structural Case (§3.6, 3.7); (9)
the theory is presented in a representational (Bouchard, 1995, Brody, 1995)
not in a derivational manner, although some derivational aspects remain; fi-
nally, (10) morphology is given an even more crucial role than it has had in
many previous proposals (§4.5, 4.9, 6.4) and, (11) following Chomsky (2001),
head movement and related evidence concerning word order is excluded from
narrow syntax and assumed to be part of phonology and, more importantly,
the process of linearization (§6.1). All these properties are minimalist in that
they follow from the “legibility conditions.”
Finally, I assume that the lexicon is semantically unstructured (§2) - a
property that is itself minimalist in spirit, though not in terms of the Strong
Minimalist Hypothesis.
Of these, the status of the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis (8) is presumably
the most controversial. I will follow the strategy suggested by Chomsky
(2000b, 2001) that categorial features of XPs derive from a functional head
F that heads them in configurations F-XP, with the improvement that F is
taken to be a cluster of semantically interpretable relational properties of LF
(following, in essence, the proposal given in Wunderlich, 1997). Structural
Case is derived along similar lines. A ‘structural theory’ of formal features
is thus developed in this study. It postulates, roughly, that we can explain
the emergence of purely ‘formal features’ in terms of structural properties
of ‘thought,’ or whatever linguistical relevant representation carries meaning
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(such as Logical Form).
This particular minimalist framework is then applied to the properties
of causatives (§4). My hypothesis is that causativity is part of the ‘logical
syntax’ of a single sentence rather than an aspect of its lexical elements. I
will show, in particular, that the theory does not need to stipulate meaning
postulates in order to explain causative relations at the lexical level. Some
additional linguistic phenomena are also discussed in Chapter 6, and it is
shown that it is as good as any theory, if not even better if we hold on to
the minimalist hypothesis that it explores progressively. Several languages
are investigated, together with more controversial constructions such as the
much studied Romance causatives.
1.2 Assumptions concerning compositionality
The principle of compositionality is used in various forms for various pur-
poses, some of which are not comparable enough to warrant common termi-
nology. In this section I will discuss such terminological issues, analyzing,
first, the traditional sense of the compositionality principle, showing why it
is only very weakly connected to issues pertinent to the analysis of language
and thought. I then turn to several distinct but related principles such as
those of abstractness and systematicity, and the thesis of the internal struc-
ture. The so-called “trivalization problem” of the compositionailty principle
is also addressed.
According to the most traditional definition of the term, compositionality
requires that meanings of complex expressions, called “hosts,” are a function
of the meanings of their constituents, or that they are “determined”by them:
(1) The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of
its parts and their syntactic mode of combination, and of these only.
There is some discussion about whether the explicit principle of com-
positionality should be attributed first to Frege: I will discuss this matter
briefly at the end of this section. Clearly, (1) is what Tarski (1935/1956)
had in mind when he developed a compositional interpretation of first-order
predicate calculus, a nontrivial undertaking due to the fact that certain ex-
pressions, namely those containing variables, have parts - open formulae -
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which do not have meaning and hence whose meaning cannot, strictly speak-
ing, be a function of the meanings of their constituents. To implement (1),
Tarski assumed that open formulae do have semantic attributes that can be
used to determine the semantic attributes of their hosts, ending up with what
is today taken to be the “standard” interpretation of the predicate calculus.
Montague (1974) defined compositionality as the requirement of homo-
morphism between syntax algebra and semantic algebra, both to be under-
stood as“structures” in the mathematical sense, a slightly less general version
than (1). Closely related, if not identical, is the definition in terms of syntac-
tic and semantic rules, requiring that for each syntactic rule there corresponds
a semantic rule to make these two structures homomorphic (see Bach, 1974).
There is also a slightly weaker way to define (1) by requiring what could
be called the “Substitution Condition,” according to which substituting con-
stituents of a meaningful expression for their synonyms yields synonymous
expressions. Intensional contexts are typical counterexamples of the Sub-
stitution Condition and hence also of compositionality (Pelletier, 1994). A
language with no synonyms is hence ipso facto compositional no matter what
(Westerst˚ahl, forthcoming).
The only difference between (1) and the Substitution Condition is that
the latter does not require that the constituents have meaning, whereas (1)
requires this since, to be defined at all, a function must have a domain.
This is often called the Domain Rule and hence, if we assume the Domain
Rule these definitions become equivalent. This equivalence shows how weak
principle (1) is: it does not even require an interpretation, since synonymy
is both sufficient and necessary. For relevant discussion on the various forms
of (1), see Hodges (1998) and Hodges (forthcoming).
The principle of compositionality does not say anything about the type
of required function between the meaning of the host and the meanings of
its constituents, for it is only its existence that matters. Any additional re-
strictions, such as that the function must be effective and systematic, should
not be confused with (1).
Compositionality must be distinguished from another closely related prin-
ciple called the principle of abstractness. Consider the following statement
on the compositionality principle from the literature on cognitive science:
Nothing is constitutive of the content of a primitive linguistic ex-
pression except what it contributes to the content of the complex
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expressions that are its hosts; and nothing is constitutive of the
content of the complex expressions except what it inherits from
(either its syntax or) the lexical expression that are its parts.
(Fodor, 1998b, p. 50).
The latter part is what is captured (arguably) by the functional principle
of compositionality: meanings of the constituents determine the meaning of
a complex. But what about the first requirement? This stipulates that the
content of an expression is at most what it contributes to the (infinite num-
ber) of complex expressions it is a constituent of. This is not the functional
principle of compositionality (1), but a “principle of abstractness,” as it is re-
ferred to in the technical literature, requiring that if two constituents e and f
differ in meaning, then there must exist at least two non-synonymous hosts
that differ only in terms of e and f. This is a condition of synonymy: two
constituents cannot differ in meaning if they do not contribute any meaning
difference to any of their hosts.
Abstractness can be used to“extend”the semantics of a given system. For
example, it is possible to begin with the ordinary meanings of sentences, the
abstract meanings of their constituents, and, absurdly, even the meanings of
the letters in the words. It has been proved that this can always be done, even
so as to keep compositionality (Hodges, 1998, Zadrozny, 1994; see Janssen,
1997 for a review).
Principle (1) is not obviously connected to the ability to “understand”
the meanings of complex expressions,3 since it is easy to understand such
even if they are not determined compositionally, and vice versa, there are
compositional systems that cannot be understood by any finite being, for
instance if the meaning function is not effective. For much the same reasons
(1) is not connected to language learning: linguistic systems that do not obey
the principle of compositionality are equally learnable, while a system that
3The following well-known citation serves as an example of an attempt to connect com-
positionality with understanding: “Since the set of sentences is infinite and each sentence
is a different concatenation of morphemes, the fact that a speaker can understand any
sentence must mean that the way he understands sentences he has never previously en-
countered is compositional: on the basis of his knowledge of the grammatical properties
and the meanings of the morphemes of the language, the rules the speaker knows enable
him to determine the meaning of a novel sentence in terms of the manner in which the
parts of the sentence are composed to form a whole” (Katz & Fodor, 1963, p. 482; Katz
remarked afterwards that they realised the influence of Frege only later, see Katz, 1972,
p. xxiv).
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is not recursive but is still compositional is not.
Often the principle of compositionality is connected with ‘systematicity’
between syntax and semantics.4 A ‘systematic’ relation between syntax and
semantics is nevertheless obtainable without (1). Compositionality alone
does not even entail systematicity. A formal language with semantics may
obey what Hintikka has called a “parallelism thesis” - viz., that syntax and
semantics go“in tandem”maintaining a systematic relation to each other (see
Hintikka & Kulas 1983, §10) - even if the system does not obey the principle
of compositionality. Game-Theoretical Semantics is a good example of such
a system: it is not compositional, but clearly the relation between syntax
and semantics is ‘systematic.’ I will return to one definition of systematicity
later, in section 1.4.
Sometimes the term “compositional” is used in yet another sense than
(1), which derives from from Frege but is very common in cognitive science
literature. What I have in mind is something like the following:
Frege’s notion of sense, as applied to complex expressions, in-
volves a very narrow criterion of identity. Frege says that the
sense of a complex expression, including a sentence, is composed
out of the senses of its constituents. ‘Composed out of’ is a
metaphor; but it is used deliberately by Frege to convey some-
thing stronger that the non-metaphorical ‘determined by.’ The
value of a number-theoretic function is determined by the argu-
ments of that function; but the number which is the value can be
conceived otherwise than as the value of that function for those
arguments. To say that the sense of a sentence is composed out
of the senses of its constituent words is to say, not merely that, by
knowing the sense of the words, we can determine the sense of the
sentence, but that we can grasp that sense only as the sense of a
complex which is composed out of parts in exactly that way; only
a sentence which had exactly that structure, and whose primi-
tive constituents corresponded in sense pointwise with those of
the original sentence, could possibly express the very same sense.
(Dummett, 1973, pp. 378-279).
4Hirst (1987) and Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane (1988) define compositionality
to mean that meanings of complex symbols are ‘systematically’ determined by their
composition.
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The notion of compositionality, or “composition,” mentioned above does
not have much to do with the relations between language/thought and mean-
ings, but instead is connected to the “narrow criteria of identity.” According
to this principle, parts of thoughts, or linguistic expressions, are constitutive
components of those thoughts/expressions, and that this is (in part) what
makes thoughts more fine-grained than their meanings, again a distinct prop-
erty of compositionality and abstractness. Hosts can be made of constituents
in a very literal sense, having an “internal structure,” but although composi-
tionality presupposes “constituents,” constituency relations may be abstract
and need not imply concatenation or the co-tokening of the expressions, for
instance (see van Gelder 1990, Hintikka & Kulas 1983, §10 for a discussion;
see also the discussion in Fodor, 1998a, pp. 40-42).5
If we go back to the main content of (1), one part of the elusive dis-
cussion about this principle has to do with the observation that it is, in a
sense, a “trivial property.” This is so because, given some semantic system
- a language L, meanings M and an interpretation µ: E → M that is not
compositional, it is nevertheless possible to develop another system (E′, M′,
µ′) that is compositional and related to the first system in a way that makes
the two “equivalent” in a mathematical, if not empirical, sense. Whether the
system is compositional or not is thus merely a matter of notation, and lacks
substantial content.
Empirical inquiry is another matter altogether, however, since it is tar-
geted on an explanation that is, on the whole, the most elegant, general
and simple - somewhat vague but unquestionable properties called for in
the domain of naturalist inquiries - and not confined to formal equivalency.
Thus, compositional and non compositional systems are not“mere notational
variations,” but involve substantial questions of this type as far as empirical
sciences are concerned. Whether compositionality should be assumed is a
different matter: here I claim only that it would not be empirically mean-
ingless to assume it one way or another, given that there might be empirical
reasons requiring settlement of the matter.
In short, I define the term “compositionality” as synonymous with prin-
ciple (1).
5According to Fodor (Fodor, 1998b, §9, 10, Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988), a fundamental re-
quirement of the constituency relation when combined with classical cognitive architecture
is that it is a co-tokening relation.
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The rest of this section is devoted to purely terminological and historical
issues concerning the origins of the principle of compositionality: readers who
do not wish to engage in these matters could well skip the whole passage.
Recently, there has been some discussion about whether or not it was
Frege who invented the modern version of compositionality. In Sense and
Reference, for example, he wrote that “subject and predicate [. . .] are
indeed elements of thought; they stand on the same level of knowledge. By
combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought” (Frege, 1948,
this quotation are from Ludlow, 1997, pp. 569-570). These citations support
the view that Frege would have accepted, at least during some periods of
his career, the principle of semantic compositionality. Indeed, according to
Gareth Evans, “Frege was the first to formulate a systematic theory of mean-
ing for a fragment of natural language; systematic in that it sought to provide
an explanation of how the significance of complex expressions, particularly
sentences, depends upon the significance of their parts” (Evans, 1982, p. 7;
Frege surely was not the first to discuss the composition of words into sen-
tences and the relation of this composition to the formation of content, see
Humboldt, 1836/1988, §17).
Yet not all authors think Frege adhered to the principle of compositional-
ity. Some suspect he adhered to the principle of context dependency instead
(Janssen, 1997, Sluga, 1980). According to Janssen, he might have accepted
the principle of compositionality in his later writings, even though he had
abandoned it earlier. The source of the debate lies in a cluster of Frege’s
conjectures, one of the most prominent appearing in Grundlagen, that “one
should ask for the meaning of a word only in the context of a sentence, and
not in isolation.” Other similar remarks are scattered around Frege’s work
(see, e.g., Burge, 1986).
Frege’s contextualism could also be interpreted as a methodological doc-
trine that placed emphasis upon the notion of truth, or even as a direct
statement of compositionality. According to this interpretation, the meaning
of a word cannot be anything other than what it contributes to the sentences
it is a part of: if “you [...] identify the meaning of a word with its contribution
to the meaning of the entire proposition, compositionality will hold virtually
per definitionem” (Hintikka & Sandu, 1999, p. 226). According to this read-
ing, again, Frege’s remark on “contextualism” is actually a statement of the
principle of compositionality, or at least it entails it. Similarly, Tyler Burge
characterized Frege’s methodology along the following lines: “Our interest in
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the denotations of words is derivative from our interest in the denotations of
sentences. That is, word denotation is important because and only because
of the importance of some feature of sentences that is central to logical the-
ory and functionally dependent on word denotation” (Burge, 1986, p. 101).
These remarks do not point to the principle of contextuality, and it seems
to me that there is no real problem in taking Frege to have at least antic-
ipated (1). As the above citations show, it is not difficult to find textual
evidence of this claim. My own interpretation, which I admit must be based
on quite a superficial understanding of Frege’s writings, is that Frege might
have accepted the principle of abstractness, in addition to compositionality,
by taking word meanings to supervene on sentence meanings.
1.3 Compositionality, natural languages, con-
cepts and logical metalanguages
Compositionality presupposes a notion of “language.” For the purpose of this
study, especially the latter part, it is crucial to distinguish several senses of the
term “language”: natural languages, concepts or semantic representations,
and logical metalanguages.
By “natural language” I mean I-language in the sense of the biologically
encapsulated generative mechanism involved in understanding and produc-
tion of linguistic utterances, to be contrasted with “E-language” which basi-
cally refers to an infinite set of expressions. From the perspective of cognitive
science, E-language is a highly derivative notion, but on the other hand, it
is this notion that is crucial to the compositionality principle in the sense
defined in section 1.2. This is so partly because the “semantic interpretation”
involved in the case of I-languages is, most likely, highly indirect (see Pel-
letier, 1994, among others): linguistic expressions are, after all, also used in
complex social settings to do, and mean, various things.
Several cognitive scientists have argued, on the other hand, that there
exists a separate level of semantic representations or concepts, with expres-
sions that are individuated, in part, in virtue of their semantic interpretation.
These putative semantic representations are linked with natural-language ex-
pressions by some means or another; indeed, one such proposal is presented
in this study. These connections are crucial when one speaks of “lexical con-
cepts,” for instance, combining one notion (“lexical”) from natural language
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and one (“concept”) from the level of concepts.
Finally, the meanings of natural-language expressions are often analyzed
by translating them into a suitable “logical metalanguage.” They are often
again understood as E-languages, but it is not always clear, or it is left
intentionally unspecified, if the logical metalanguage used is meant to be
psychologically realistic or not. Expressions written in such a language might
be read in the material mode, representing aspects of the subject matter itself
rather than aspects of the psychologically realistic representations of that
subject matter.
As an illustration, let us take a lexical element such as opentr. It is, first
of all, a grammatical lexical element containing a variety of features that are
relevant to linguistic computation. Its usage is partly under our voluntary
control, and such usage might be subject to intricate social-cultural practises.
In poetry, for instance, it can be used in highly novel and ingenious ways, and
basically, one could use it in any way one wants to. In a given situation, it
might maintain a highly idiomatic, specific, or surprising meaning. That is all
about its status as a “lexical element,” a formal symbol which is put into use
in a social setting. However, despite its usage, it also seems to have a certain
“core meaning” which remains identical in an infinite number of linguistic
expressions at which it is a constituent part. The intuition is that open, first
and foremost, expresses some meaning that is different from, say, close and
which we could, furthermore, categorize by perception or demonstrate by
using our body. At that level one speaks of concepts (see Fodor, 1998 for an
example).
Finally, opening is an event that happens in the world and bears cer-
tain relations to other events. Such facts and their mutual relations can be
described in logical metalanguage (2a-b):
(2) a. If Erebus opened the door, then the door opens
b. Opentr.(Erebus, door) −→ Openintr.(door).
Such expressions are often regarded as “analyses of the meanings” of the
corresponding natural-language expressions, a practise that is perfectly rea-
sonable if one keeps it in mind that the thesis that such expressions are not
mere descriptions of facts of the world, or descriptions of the “logical struc-
ture of the world,” requires much argumentation. I will return to this topic
over and over again, for the issue of “lexical decomposition” has to do with
precisely this distinction.
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My own view, which emerges as I proceed, is quite close to Fodor’s in
that I assume, the finite amount of idiosyncracy aside, that the grammar
of natural language(s) reflects grammar of concepts quite transparently, but
that the grammar (or “logical syntax”) of logical metalanguages, which is
often considered to capture the properties of either one, does not in fact
adequately reflect many properties of natural languages or concepts.
1.4 Assumptions concerning productivity and
systematicity
In this section I will discuss more thoroughly two important principles of
languages and thought: productivity and systematicity. I will argue that they
are both important and characterize human languages and thought, but that
they are not identical in content with the principle of compositionality. A
definition of systematicity, as a property that is also relevant to the empirical
data discussed here, is given.
A universal property of human language (and thought) is its ability to
grasp a ‘discrete infinity,’ the ‘creative aspect of language.’ One must nev-
ertheless assume that the mind/brain is finitely constituted and, within a
selected range of problems, solves them in a finite time. Then we face the
tension of explaining how a finite being is capable of grasping such a discrete
infinity. When speaking of any mental resource allowing us to ’grasp infinity,’
I will speak of“generative capacity,”or on some occasions of“representational
generative capacity” if there is semantic interpretation involved.
According to Fodor and Lepore (Fodor & Lepore, 1996, p. 254-255), the
study of such generative capacity must involve two components as follows:
(3) (Effective syntax.) A representational generative capacity includes
“an effective compositional function, which maps a finite basis of sim-
ple mental representations onto an infinity of complex mental repre-
sentations together with their structural descriptions”
(4) (Effective interpretation.) A representational generative capacity in-
cludes “an effective interpretation function, which maps arbitrary
mental representations, simple or complex, onto their semantic in-
terpretations.”
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It follows from these properties that the syntactic and semantic properties
of an infinite number of hosts must be determined by some finite set of ‘basic
axioms.’ Since semantic interpretation must be finitely specifiable, it must be
sensitive to the structure of mental representations (Fodor & Lepore, 1996,
p. 257). Some authors seem to identity “compositionality” with as weak a
property as the conjunction of (3) and (4).6
Assumptions (3) and (4) are not very restrictive, in a certain sense. I
assumed that a human being is a finite being, and that the semantic inter-
pretation must constitute an effective procedure, constituting a finite number
of facts, assuming the structural description of mental representations as in-
puts, yielding an infinite array of meanings as output. According to these
assumptions, any piece of knowledge, or any collection of beliefs as long as it
is of finite cardinality and the process eventually ‘halts,’ might enter into the
determination of meaning for a representational system. Pelletier (1994), in
fact, argues that we should loosen the functional principle of compositionality
(1) into the conjunction of (3) and (4) exactly in this sense.
Earlier, the productivity of language was explained by relying upon the
Markov models, an old associationist idea now resurrected by many con-
nectionists. Markov models handle infinity by allowing loops, and they are
constituted of a finite amount of information. This class of models is already
powerful. Hence productivity alone does not lead one to assume constituents :
additional properties, such as unbounded dependencies, must be taken into
account to prove that loops are not sufficient to capture the properties of the
generative capacity under study (Chomsky, 1957). This is often, if not al-
ways, neglected in literature discussing the prospects of connectionism. How-
ever, in order to attain what Kant characterized as the property that “every
concept must indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in
an infinite multitude of different possible representations” (Kant, 1787/1993,
B39) we need to assume that the “effective compositional function” cited by
Fodor and Lepore is based on non-causal constituency relations.
It is not uncommon to assume that the principle of compositionality is
related to “systematicity.” Systematicity, I will argue, is a strong condition
imposed on the nature of the meaning function: in other words, it indi-
cates how the meaning of complexes must depend on the meanings their its
constituents (namely, systematically), not just that it depends. This is the
principle that matters most in the present context.
6See Schiffer, 1987, p. 179, Baker, 1988, p. 3, Cresswell, 1985, p. 138.
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Prima facie, there are three senses of “systematicity” found in the litera-
ture that must be distinguished:
(i) systematicity as a property of behavior to be explained;
(ii) as a property of a representational generative capacity; and
(iii) as a property of generative capacity (syntax).
The general idea in the literature on cognitive science has been to ex-
plain the systematicity of behavior in terms of systematic representational
generative capacity, although it often happens that one takes systematicity
to involve “compositionality.”
Systematicity of behavior (i) refers to the fact that cognitive capacities
emerge in huge ‘clumps’: only in a finite number of cases do (certain) cog-
nitive capacities emerge in finite sets.7 This property alone would seem to
correlate with the explosion of grammar, and thus with creativity of lan-
guage and thought. However, these ‘clumps’ are not just any clumps, but
they are systematic: they are related to each other in their form and content.
For instance, learning Erebus is not, in the typical case, related to learning
Charon is in the park, it is related to learning expressions such as Erebus is
in the park. This characterisation, of course, presupposes an understanding
of systematicity.
Productivity already entails one aspect of systematicity, since it requires
that the form and content of the hosts and their constituents are related
to each other in a way that is effective, thus it cannot be ‘random.’ This
is how the term “systematicity” is sometimes used in linguistics: there is
a systematic rule for correlating the meanings of complex expressions with
the meanings of their constituents. According to this definition, idioms are
not systematic. Many morphological processes, although systematic from a
formal point of view, are not systematic semantically.
Sometimes a stronger property seems to be at stake. The idea is, for
instance, that sentences containing some constituent, such as Erebus, all
involve Erebus, the meaning of Erebus, in their truth conditions, in some
way or another. In Fodor’s words,
7For example, if the learner learns to use the expression Erebus, he or she has often
learnt, by the same token, to use an infinite number of other previously unlearnt expressions
Erebus loves Charon, Erebus loves Erebus, Erebus and Charon love James, depending upon
the catalogue of other expressions the learner has already mastered. Generally, these
clumps are astronomical or infinite in extension.
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[...] the things that the expression (mutatis mutandis the con-
cept) ‘brown cow’ applies to are exactly the things to which the
expressions ‘brown’ and ‘cow’ apply. Likewise, the things that
‘brown cow in New Jersey’ applies to are exactly the ones that
‘brown’ ‘cow’ and ‘in New Jersey’ apply to [...] It says (to re-
peat) that the semantic value of thought (/sentence) is inherited
from the semantic values of its constituents, together with their
arrangement.” (Fodor, 2001, p. 6).8
What Fodor is describing here is not only that the semantic value of
thought is inherited from the semantic values of its constituents, but that
the semantic value of the host is inherited from the semantic values of its
constituents in a particularly strong way. One could say that the inheritance
is completely “transparent.” We could derive such transparent systematicity,
I argue, by assuming that the meaning of black cow (that is, black cows) is
constituted by the meanings of black and cow, thus by the properties of being
black and being a cow, and by nothing else (see Fodor, 1998a, p. 99; Fodor &
Lepore, 2002, p. 15). If this were the case, then it follows that the expressions
“apply” in exactly the same way that Fodor intended. A non-systematic form
of a relation between the constituent and the host, on the other hand, would
be such that, for instance, it is Erebus’ favorite pet that figures in the truth
conditions of a sentence that has Erebus as its constituent, assuming that
Erebus means Erebus; more complex cases are easily imaginable. What has
happened here is that the semantic rule for computing the meaning of the
complex host from the meanings of its constituents is “complex.”9
One way of understanding this requirement is to be found in Wittgen-
stein. According to him, “The reality that corresponds to the sense of the
8In Fodor’s vocabulary, “[c]ompositionality is the name of whatever exactly it is that
requires this kind of thing to be true in the general case.”
9Mathematicians and logicians have approached the property of “systematicity” from a
similar perspective. Their endeavour is relevant not only to the capturing of the content
of the property of “systematicity,” but also to the fact that systematicity, if characterised
differently, could save the compositionality principle (1) from being formally vacuous (e.g.,
Zadrozny, 1994). The general a priori strategy has been to try to restrict the class of
appropriate functions in (1) so that only“systematic”functions are allowed,“systematicity”
connoting “simple” or “natural.” The nature of such a function and the restrictions that
might enter into it depend upon the nature of the totality of meanings. For instance, if it
is possible to deal with the relevant function in algebraic terms, one could propose that
the function ought to be a polynomial of some degree, or to be as “simple” as possible
(Zadrozny, 1997).
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proposition can surely be nothing but its components parts, since we are
surely ignorant of everything else.” (Wittgenstein, 1961, 20. Nov. 1914). In
other words, if I interpret Wittgenstein correctly, transparent systematicity
can be defined thus:
(5) (Strong transparent systematicity.) (i) The content of the constituent
is a constitutive component in whatever is the content of its host; and
(ii) the content of the host is constituted by nothing else than the
contents of its constituents and their rule of combination.
Constituency on the level of syntax is, according to the principle of sys-
tematicity, here interpreted as constitution on the level of meanings, and this
is all there is in the constitution of the meaning of the host. By this I mean
something like the following. First, if brown means being brown, and cow
means being a cow, then whatever brown cow means must be something from
which the properties of being brown and being a cow cannot be detached.
Second, brown cow is nothing else than being brown, being a cow, plus their
logical type of combination. According to this principle, a brown cow cannot
fail to be brown, but it cannot fail to be a cow either.
It seems that this is how language basically works, at least to some extent.
It is easy to see that this property satisfies the core property of systematicity.
Let K be the set of expressions containing brown as its constituent. Then
each of the entities represented by the expressions in K are constituted by
the property of being brown, and hence all truth conditions of sentences
involving the constituent brown involve the property of brownness. It follows
that the word brown more or less now also “applies” to whatever it is that
these expressions mean. If we take this constituent away, substituting it with
another nonsynonymous constituent such as green, then the hosts denote
different entities, one for something that is brown, the other for something
that is green.
It seems that this notion is sometimes associated with “compositionality.”
However, compositionality states that the meaning of the host containing the
constituent Erebus depends upon the meaning of Erebus, and it does not have
to depend on the meaning of Erebus in any systematic way. Suppose that
old means old, bachelor means bachelor, and old bachelor means caterpillar.
This is “unsystematic” behavior, yet I could still imagine a ‘contribution,’
trivially a sort of compositional dependency.
However, systematicity is a strong principle in the sense that it entails
20
compositionality: part (i) explicates a certain kind of dependency, part (ii)
states that this is the only kind of dependency. It also entails abstractness,
since there cannot, then, exist superfluous meaning properties: meanings of
constituents all end up constituting the meanings of the hosts, and nothing
else constitutes them. On the other hand, compositionality and abstractness
do not entail systematicity. Abstractness requires only that for any two
nonsynonymous constituents there exists a corresponding nonsynonymous
host.
Given these entailments, it is well worth trying to reverse the explanation
by assuming compositionality, abstractness, computability and some other,
still unknown independent property or several such properties, and to derive
systematicity instead. One could claim that this is what Fodor is after in
his desire to make ‘compositionality’ (with its somewhat unknown properties)
explain productivity and systematicity. I have not managed to establish such
a reductive definition, and I certainly think, though cannot of course prove,
that it is systematicity in the sense of (5) that is fundamental.
Systematicity and productivity are important because they are principles
that entail a number of peculiar properties of the mind/brain, quite unique in
the biological world. Our language and thought are both productive and sys-
tematic, even to an extent that has led some authors to claim that thoughts
are essentially systematic and productive (Cocchiarella, 1986, Clark, 1991,
Evans, 1982 and Peacocke, 1992). However, systematicity is surely an empiri-
cal problem as well since, if thought is systematic by virtue of its constitution,
then it remains to be explained as how human beings, and presumably other
species as well, can entertain thoughts (see Hadley, 1994, Phillips, 1999; see
also Braine, 1963, Bever, Fodor, & Weksel, 1965). Evans (1982) argues that,
although there may be thoughts (say Martian thoughts) that are not system-
atic, our cognitive generative capacity - language and thought - does seem
to obey it (p. 104, note 22), so that we should take it as an “ideal, to which
our actual system of thoughts only approximately conforms” (p. 105). This
is the position of Fodor, too, who writes: “Systematicity seems to be one of
the (very few) organizational properties of minds that our cognitive science
actually makes some sense of” (Fodor, 1998a, p. 98).10
10The crucial aspect of this principle is, according to Peacocke (1986), not that it bars
imperfections in systematicity as such, but only that if, and when, such imperfections
appear, they are not themselves conceptual and not part of the theory of concepts (see
pp. 50-51).
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Systematicity is, to summarize the discussion so far, both a surprising and
an undeniable feature found in the biological world: language and thought
seem to obey it. However, I do not argue that systematicity alone is sufficient
to explain the semantics of conceptual or linguistic representational capaci-
ties, since indeed it is not. Logical connectives, insofar as we take them to
be ‘constituents’ of expressions, are presumably not systematic in the sense
of (5). Or is that which is not green constituted by the property of being
green? Idioms and linguistic constructions such as N-N combinations (drug
campaign) are clearly not systematic, and there are many others as well. Cn-
sider a theory that states that all linguistic expressions mean Bill Paxton.
This is not ruled out by systematicity (nor by compositionality), since the
property of being Bill Paxton (the meanings of the constituents) surely con-
stitutes the property of being Bill Paxton (the meaning of the host). Some
pleonasms seem to come to close to this property, such as yellowish yellow,
so a constituent could mean the same as its host. Hence, I conclude that
systematicity is necessary, but not sufficient. I will not discuss these prob-
lems or the often complex linguistic phenomena they invoke here since, for
the present purposes, it suffices that some fragments of language and thought
are productively systematic.
In other words, I do not claim, but nor do I deny, that systematicity as
defined in (5) is an all-encompassing organization principle of the language or
thought. My sole claim is that a proper semantic theory of language and/or
thought must invoke sufficient means to explain the phenomenon of produc-
tive systematicity, and it is this that requires one to postulate more abstract
atomistic lexical elements. Systematicity is a principle that, although it does
not explain everything, explains something important.
Yet another property is what Fodor calls “reverse compositionality.” This
refers to the generalization that if somebody masters a host expression, he
or she ipso facto masters its constituents. That is, if one knows the linguistic
properties of pet fish, one also knows the linguistic properties of pet and fish,
including their meaning. If this were the case, as it appears to be, then
lexical elements are not allowed to contain semantic properties that they do
not contribute to any of their hosts. In other words, hosts contain all the
information there is to determine the constituents, much the same as in the
case of, say, chemical molecules.
Systematicity entails both compositionality and abstractness, but about
reverse compositionality? If the content of a host is constituted by the content
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of its constituents and their mode of syntactic combination, then whenever
one tokens a host constituted in part by its meaning, one must ipso facto
token its constituents. Thus, reverse compositionality also follows.
In Concepts (1998), Fodor considers the well-known problem, mentioned
earlier, that the compositionality principle (that is, principle in the sense of
(1)), “can be trivialized” but that “there is a hunt on for ways to make the
notion rigorous” (p. 94). Recall that the “trivialization problem” is that any
interpreted language that is noncompositional can be provided with compo-
sitional semantics such that the two systems are otherwise equivalent. For
example, it is possible to design a meaning function that gives some meaning
to each letter in the alphabet and determines, compositionally, the mean-
ings of each word and sentence. That interpretation can satisfy abstractness
as well. However, this trivialization problem is not serious in Fodor’s case
since, as we have seen, it is not just principle (1) but also systematicity (5)
(i-ii) that count, and the trivialization problem does not ipso fact trivialize
systematicity even if it trivializes compositionality.
Consider the meaning of cat. Suppose we have an interpretation that
assigns meanings to the letters and correctly predicts that the meaning of
cat is the property of being a cat, along with the rest of the lexicon. Then,
according to systematicity, the meaning of cat must be constituted by the
meaning of c, the meaning of a and the meaning of t, not just that it must
be a function of them. However, there is hardly any plausibility in such a
claim. For instance, it implies that all entities the name of which contains
the letter c are constituted, in part, by the same property, viz., the meaning
of c.
More generally, there are stringent constraints on the axioms that deter-
mine the syntactic and semantic properties of the entities of the represen-
tational capacity, and thought compositionality alone is a trivial property
(you can obtain it always by letting every other parameter vary freely): it,
in connection with the rest of the critical properties such as systematicity, is
not ipso facto trivial (Janssen, 1997).
To summarize, systematicity and productivity are important properties of
the representational capacities of man, and possibly to some extent of some of
the beasts, that must be explained. They are unique and surprising features
of the biological world, produced by unknown evolution and implemented
by some kind of neurobiological mechanisms. Thus, that explanation might
ultimately invoke some biological or neural properties, but for the present
23
purposes it suffices to assume (1)-(5), either as descriptive or explanatory
principles, meaning that, as there is so much stringent data to back up these
principles, they are not likely to be “reduced” away or to lead us completely
astray.
It is not claimed here that the notion of systematicity and productivity
is all there is in composing complex expressions and their meanings out of
their constituents, but its role cannot be denied either: it explains something
about the general picture, but allows departures from it.
1.5 A note on the thesis of “internal struc-
ture”
Many cognitive scientists claim that thoughts have an internal structure.11
Sometimes the fact that mental representations, logical forms, or items in
a generative capacity have internal structure are confused with claims of
compositionality, synonymy, systematicity of the above kind, and effective-
ness of interpretation.12 Rather, compositionality presupposes a notion of
constituency.
It is useful to divide the assumption of an “internal structure” into two
different assumptions. The first is that there are constituents, together with
some characterisation of what they are and how we ought to study them (i.e.,
what constitute their diagnostic properties). This is presupposed practically
everywhere in cognitive science literature, connectionists notwithstanding, al-
though here it must be remarked that there is no agreed-upon test to detect
constituents of thought as compared to the much more firmly established
notion of constituency in the study of natural language(s). The other as-
sumption is that mental representations, say representations of I-language,
11For instance, Fodor writes: “Propositional attitudes are complex objects; propositional
attitudes have parts [. . .] The constituents of the belief that John is bald include: the
part that expresses the property of being bald and the part that specifies John” (Fodor,
2000, p. 15); for classical theories of thought based on this assumption, see Newell &
Simon, 1963, 1972, Newell, 1990, Schank & Abelson, 1977; such a position was explored
by Bolzano, Frege (senses), Carnap (intensional isomorphism) and some linguists from
more modern eras, such as Cresswell (structured meanings) and Lewis (1972), although
for different reasons than the ones that primary occupy me.
12Here is one statement which, I believe, confuses these aspects: “Any item is appropri-
ately said to have a compositional structure when it is build up, in a systematic way, out of
regular parts drawn from a certain determinate set; those parts are then the components
or constituents of the item.” (van Gelder 1990, p. 356).
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are individuated based on these constituents (and their properties).
In sum, the idea of having an “internal structure” is to coordinate as-
sumptions concerning constituency and those concerning identity at the level
of syntax. Systematicity and compositionality, in contrast, coordinate con-
stituency and content.
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Chapter 2
Lexical atomism
2.1 Introduction
A semantic theory is required to effectively map the expressions in a lan-
guage, or more generally in a representational capacity, onto their meanings.
Needless to say, such mapping must be “correct” with respect to empirical
data. Productivity, systematicity and reverse systematicity are obvious prop-
erties one likes to explain, but there are others as well. In this chapter I will
recapitulate Fodor’s arguments showing that systematicity and productivity,
together with some other empirical evidence, suggests that the meanings of
lexical elements could not be analyzed in terms of other words or phrases,
or, in the case of a stronger theory, in terms of other concepts, verbal or
non-verbal.
The core idea behind the argument is easy to explain. Think of a word,
or any expression, in a language. Since the usage of an expression is, to a
great extent, under our voluntary control, the usage of some such individual
expressions might be regulated by intricate socio-cultural practises, which
are infinitely complex. Such practises are, in turn, easily conceived of as
comprising of “semantic features.” Hence the meaning of that expression is
complex and, therefore, is constituted of lexical features and relations; from
this perspective lexical atomism looks trivially false. The general idea behind
what follows is that such features (of word usage for example) are idiomatic:
they are part of a single expression considered in isolation. Another way of
looking at language is to consider expressions as both (i) being composed of
constituents (compositionality, systematicity) and (ii) being constituents of
an infinite number of other expressions (abstractness, productivity). Many
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‘idiomatic meaning properties’ of expressions do not satisfy these conditions,
meaning that, if we look at language as a whole, such features are to be
explained by invoking another kind of theory, say a non-productive and non-
systematic theory of language use. The “compositional theory” provides a
theory of basic recursive capacity, whereas the theory of language use, if
there were such a theory in the naturalist sense of the term, provides some-
thing in addition. Since we know that language is productive, and that the
syntax and semantics of an infinite number of expressions cannot be consti-
tuted of idiomatic properties, the need for a compositional theory is obvious.
Similarly, since language can be used in most ingenious and novel ways, a
theory of language use is required as well.
In what followsm the names of concepts are written by using capital
letters, and words are referred to by writing them in italics. For example,
the expression pet fish expresses the concept PET FISH, which means pet
fish. PET FISH is a name, thus an alternative would be to say that pet fish
means the concept XYZ, which means pet fish.
2.2 The compositionality argument
Many cognitive scientists and philosophers have claimed that concepts are
constituted of “statistical” conceptual roles. For example, concept A might
be constituted of concept B such that the conditional probability of being A,
given it has feature B, is less than 1. This is the basic idea of the prototype
theory. Indeed, it is near certain that organisms have (representations of)
prototypes and exemplars, exhibiting correlational (appearance) features in
the process of categorization, for example.1
Suppose X is a concept and [A X] is an intersective concept, such as PET
FISH, formed from A (PET) and X (FISH). Intersective concepts constitute a
representative example of transparently systematic and productive concepts.
1The ‘prototype theory of concepts’ is nevertheless more a collection of related theories
and ideas rather than a single, homogeneous theory. According to some proponents of the
theory, concepts are represented as typical exemplars of the category, while others think
that prototypes are statistical averages of individuals that fall within a concept; still others
think that a prototype is an image, or that images can constitute one aspect of a prototype.
For a classic presentation of different versions of this theory, and of some crucial evidence,
see Smith & Medin (1981) and Tversky (1977). My interest here is the more specific claim
suggesting that prototypes, bundles of statistical conceptual roles, constitute meanings
(concepts)
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The problem is that the statistical features of A and X are not related in any
lawful way to the statistical features of [A X]s. The fact that a typical pet
fish lives in a bowl is in no way predictable from the properties of typical pets
and typical fish. Why would the combination of a dog-looking creature (a
prototype of pet) and a salmon-looking creature (a prototype of fish) yield a
small goldfish swimming in a bowl (a prototype of pet fish)? The derivation
or ‘composition’ of the semantic features of complex concepts cannot be based
on the semantic features of their constituents if those semantic features are
statistical conceptual roles, because there is no way of predicting correctly
such semantic features of the complex concepts from the semantic properties
of their constituents. Such prediction is impossible, in turn, because the
putative typical features constituting the meaning of complex concepts are,
in the general case, random with respect to the typical features of their
constituents. Thus, in Fodor’s words,
What makes something a typical member of the set of Xs needn’t
be, and generally isn’t, what makes something a typical member
of some arbitrary sub- (or super-) set of the Xs. And even when
it is, it’s generally a contingent fact that it is; a fortiori, it isn’t a
necessary truth that it is; a fortiori, it isn’t a linguistic truth that
it is, since, I suppose, linguistic truths are necessary whatever else
they are. (Fodor, 1998b, p. 60).
Presumably, the easiest way of seeing why typical features behave ran-
domly is that typicality is based on extensions of the concepts and their
intersections. A pet fish typically lives in a bowl because of the fact that
a large slice of the extension of ‘pet fish’ is intersected with the extension
of ‘lives in a bowl.’ However, the fact that the concept PET FISH has the
extension it has, and the fact that the concept LIVES IN A BOWL has the
extension it has, and hence the fact that their intersection is what it is, are
all randomly distributed and not covered by any kind of laws.
On some occasions the prototypes of intersective concepts do correctly
predict the prototype(s) of their host(s). This might have led some authors
to believe that there is no problem in composing prototypes. For instance, a
typical red house could be taken to be a composition of typical red plus typical
house. In this and similar cases the world behaves in a way that the prototype
theory would predict. This is how we put typical red houses together: namely,
by spraying typical red paint over a typical house. However, it is accidental
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that this is so. Imagine a world, or a religious country, in which the law
allows only skyscrapers to be painted red. Then a typical red house would
not resemble a typical house: a skyscraper is an untypical house. Yet despite
these facts a typical red house would still be a house painted red.
Thus, the human mind is not restricted to the semantic power avail-
able from prototypes and their ‘composition,’ or to the power of any kind
of statistical conceptual roles, but has access to more systematic and more
abstract semantics. I will turn to some empirical examples that illustrate the
argument further below. Meanwhile, we are left with a theory in which the
features associated with a concept cannot be statistical, but they must be
jointly necessary and sufficient. This theory works well for an infinite number
of concepts / linguistic expressions (red cat), non-trivially for another infi-
nite set of expressions (good cat), and does not work at all for a finite set of
expressions, namely, lexical concepts (good, cat, red), since lexical concepts,
according to current consensus, lack complete definitions. Nevertheless, def-
initions are both systematic, productive and compositional.
There is a long tradition according to which the meanings of morphemes
are analyzed in terms of other, somehow more primitive concepts, and these
features “define” the word in question. Suppose a community of speakers
would have it that the complex word pet fish was abbreviated to pish. Then
the meaning of pish would constitute a definition, and thus pish and its
definition pet fish would be synonymous. Moreover, both pish and pet fish
would be mapped onto the same underlying complex representation, say [pet
fish]. The classical theory that relies on definitions states that this is, in fact,
what is true of most lexical concepts: their meaning is given by a definition,
and the lexical word itself is some sort of “syntactic abbreviation.”
The problem with this proposal is that it has been proven to be very diffi-
cult to find complete definitions for most lexical words. Although pet fish has
a definition, words such as love, knowledge and kill seem to resist complete
analysis. It is possible to approximate their meaning by using phrases, such
as cause to die, but that never seems sufficient. Moreover, it was because
definitions were so hard to find that cognitive scientists turned to the proto-
type theory in the first place. According to the above argument, however, the
meanings of morphemes cannot be analyzed in terms of statistical features
or by prototypes. What kind of features are they constituted of, then, if not
statistical or necessary ones?
A feature is either necessary or impossible, or something in-between, but
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there is nothing else to work with. Therefore, one could argue, lexical con-
cepts lack all kinds of semantic features and must thereby be semantically
unstructured (Fodor, 1975, 1981a, 1994a, 1998a, 2001, 2003, Fodor, Fodor, &
Garrett, 1975b, Fodor et al., 1980). In other words, there is no “conceptual
analysis” of lexical concepts, contrary to what almost everybody apparently
assumes nowadays.
I will now turn to some empirical issues in order to illustrate the argument
with concrete linguistic material. Consider the following examples (from
Jackendoff, 1990, p. 102):
(6) a. * a telephone pole was all along the road
b. a telephone pole was along the road
c. the telephone poles were all along the road
According to Jackendoff, the PP all along the road at the end of sentence
(6)(c) derives from the conceptual constituent on the road with the feature
[+distributed]. This results in a corresponding change in the respective sur-
face forms, converting along the road into all along the road. This feature
encodes the fact that something is “distributed” over an area, as in the above
examples, while [-distributed] means it is placed in an “ordinary location,”
both with respect to the argument of the function, in this case on. Thus,
all along presupposes that “the subject in some sense extends over the whole
space subtended by the object of the preposition” (Jackendoff, 1990, p. 103).
It is certain that there is a difference between the interpretation of the
above sentences, and that it might have something to do with facts such as
whether something is distributed or not. On this, I agree. However, for this
machinery to explain the contrast in examples (6)(a-c), the appearance of
the feature must be combined with some other constituent in the conceptual
structure, in this case the telephone pole, the “conceptual” subject. We must
therefore include a feature that corresponds to the subject and codes the
fact whether the entity represented by the logical subject is distributed or
not. In that case, the explanation of the phenomenon results when the two
features interact. If the features “match,” the conceptual structure results in
a semantically well-formed expression (given the correspondence rules which
map conceptual structures onto natural language expressions). If they do
not, the result is deviant.
We thus need a mechanism to determine the feature [+distributed] for
any “logical subject” on the level of conceptual structures (again, it does
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not matter how we represent these subjects on this level). If we look at
language from the perspective of individual expressions, there is no problem:
we may assume that telephone poles are not typically distributed. On the
other hand, we cannot always look merely at individual expressions. In order
to obtain a compositional explanation, the feature must be derived from its
constituents. In this case, the meaning of pole and the meaning of telephone
must suffice to determine the fact that, when they are combined under the
relevant syntactic rule, what they denote is indeed not distributed. In general,
given two expressions X and Y under the relevant rule of combination, we
must be able to determine whether [X Y] is typically distributed or not. The
problem is that there are no laws which could determine the distribution of
features such as [+distributed] insofar as they are typical. For instance, a
telephone pole can be distributed if destroyed appropriately:
(7) the thunder and lightning smashed the telephone pole into a thou-
sands pieces; consequently, the telephone pole was all along the road.
This sentence is semantically well-formed, since the telephone pole, which
is typically not distributed, could, in appropriate circumstances, be so. Con-
sidered from a slightly different perspective, the problem is that one cannot
predict that a concept X has a feature [-distributed] just because it contains
the constituents TELEPHONE and POLE, since the concept expressed by
phrase (8) contains both constituents but the entity is still distributed:
(8) the telephone pole that was smashed into thousands of pieces [+dis-
tributed]
Thus, since there is no way to predict the typicality of such features from
the constituents (viz., whether telephone poles really are typically distriubted
or not), the data cited above cannot be explained in the way Jackendoff pro-
poses if we are interested in the productive and systematic aspects of language.
True, the sentence is understood as anomalous, but that seems to be a matter
of non-productive, idiomatic and accidential fact concerning that individual
expression, or whatever it refers to - in this case modern telephone poles.
Pustejovsky, who presented strong arguments in favor of a decomposi-
tional lexicon involving both definitions and prototypes and uses similar data
to support his arguments (e.g., 1998), indeed accepts the fact that the effects
of semantic features can be “overruled” in a suitable context. He thus in-
troduces the notion of “semanticality” (corresponding to syntactic grammat-
icality), which comes in degrees, and claims that the attribution of typical
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semantic features to the lexical component explains judgements on such “se-
manticality.” What thus looks like an untypical situation from the perspec-
tive of truth-conditional semantics (e.g., distributed telephone pole), fails
on “semanticality” according to Pustejovsky’s theory: from this perspective,
Pustejovsky is attempting to explain truth-conditional untypicality (or in
some cases truth-conditional tautology) by using lexical decomposition and
compositionality. According to him, when untypicality is first detected by pu-
tative “generative semantic representations,” context could then be brought
in to help by providing a suitable interpretation. For instance, the fact that a
book is typically used for reading can be used to predict a feature mismatch
in sentence (9).
(9) ??Erebus began the book by kicking it
Because the putative “semantic system” informs the speaker/hearer that
the sentence is unsemantical, the pragmatic module begins to seek an intel-
ligible interpretation. Pustejovsky’s point is that knowledge of the world is
“transferred” here into the lexical component of the semantic representations
depending on its salience (typicality).
Similarly, when semantic representations do succeed in generating well-
formed expressions, they are given meanings that represent only typical cases.
For instance, if a book is used for reading, and this information is part of
the lexical entry for book, then a sentence such as Charon began the book, ac-
cording to Pustejovsky’s theory, reads ’Charon began to read a book.’ This
sentence is not, however, synonymous with the original sentence. Clearly, the
sentence can may mean that Charon began to write a book, to bake a book,
and so on. The putative ‘semantic system’ gives a sentence one interpreta-
tion, viz., the most typical or ‘default’ one, but there is a more abstract truth-
conditional interpretation available as well. The compositionality argument
explained above shows, if interpreted according to Pustejovsky’s assumptions,
that this latter more abstract truth-conditional interpretation, which is nec-
essary in any case, is not possible if prototypes are used, hence prototypes
are not sufficient.2
2Whether Pustejovsky’s more specific assumptions are correct is another matter. For
instance, it is possible that the more abstract truth-conditional semantics is part of the
‘generative interpretation’ of a sentence and its semantic representations, and that Puste-
jovsky’s mechanism, which produces the ‘default readings,’ is secondary and relies upon
background information - the data Pustejovsky presents does not distinguish these two
proposals.
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What I will assume in what follows, contrary to Pustejovsky’s proposal,
is that a putative generative mechanism that provides interpretations of sen-
tences must always get them right - if there is a ‘subcomponent’ that does
not satisfy these goals I will not attempt to characterize its properties. In
other words, the meaning of Charon began the book should not be ‘Charon
began to read a book’ - if the latter ‘defective interpretation’ is in some sense
‘part of the the former’ I do not care: it is neither sufficient nor necessary
for the true meaning.
Consider the following suggestion (found in Jackendoff, 1991, after Pel-
letier & Schubert, 1989, see also Copestake & Briscoe, 1996, Nunberg, 1979).
The problem is, to repeat, that features such as [+distributed] cannot be
determined from the constituents. Perhaps they are determined by some
universal contextual mechanism; call it, in this case, the “universal grinder”
that, when given a package of semantic features, crunches them to yield a
‘distributed version’ of that entity. Thus, observe the operation of the uni-
versal grinder in the following examples:
(10) a. I raise lambs (lamb: [-substance])
b. I eat lambs (lamb: [+substance])
The verb eat “activates” the universal grinder, at least for some of its
complements. The feature [+substance] is thus controlled by the context
of the expression, and not determined compositionally. The benefit is that,
while telephone pole is now in fact two distinct expressions, with or without
the feature [+distributed], there is still a ‘generative’ mechanism controlling
the distribution of the features.
It is clear, however, that this does not solve the compositionality problem.
The fact that the problem of determining features such as [+distributed] from
the properties of constituents is transformed here to the problem of applying
the universal grinder. Hence,
(11) a. A one-lime long earth-worm was all along the road
b. the TV cable was all along the road,
neither of which show any trace of the application of the universal grinder.
Given the compositional explanation, the triggering of the universal grinder
should be predictable from the constituents, but it is not and cannot thus be
predicted, for the reasons discussed. The assumption of a universal grinder
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could be just a notational variant of the proposal that certain semantic fea-
tures are distributed among the expressions in a certain way.
Before I offer a clear diagnosis of these problems, consider (12) and its
treatment along these lines in Jackendoff, 1997, §3.2 (see also Jackendoff,
1991, Pustejovsky, 1991, Talmy, 1978, Verkyl, 1993):
(12) the light flashed until dawn
The sentence carries a sense of repeated flashing, while there seems to be
no such feature present in the lexical items. The appearance of this feature
is due to the content of the prepositional complement until dawn. Similarly,
the following sentence is unambiguous with respect to whether it carries the
feature [+repeated] or not:
(13) Bill kept crossing the street
The appearance of this semantic feature is thus the result of “interactions
of the lexical meanings with each other” (Jackendoff, 1997, p. 51), exactly
as one would have put it with [+distributed]. The process of combining the
content of the verb and its complement is called “aspectual coercion.” For al-
ready familiar reasons, Jackendoff ends up assuming that aspectual coercion
is a result of a function that executes the required semantic modifications
(i.e. turns an event of flashing into a repeated sequence). The problem then
arises as to when this function is to be applied. For the purpose of composi-
tional explanation, the application of the function must be executed by virtue
of the features of the constituents of the VP (or their conceptual counter-
parts), in this case by virtue of the features of the verb and its complement.
Similar problems now emerge as above. Given some (any) expression as the
complement of the preposition until, one cannot determine whether to apply
some semantic function without basic knowledge of the quite accidental and
idiomatic facts of how things happen to be in this world. Thus (14a) comes
out as ’non-repeated,’ but (14b) carries a different sense, perhaps the sense
of repeated playing:
(14) a. the boy played tennis until dusk
b. the boy played tennis until his career was over
It seems that the VP-external subject has some influence too, as can be
seen in the following pairs:
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(15) a. the plane flew until dawn
b. the flying squirrel flew until dawn
(16) a. the man dove until he died
b. the fish dove until it died
The activation of the function ‘repetition,’ or the inhibition thereof, is
probably at least partly due to the considerable amount of background infor-
mation amalgamated in the interpretation of the expression(s). This shows
again that there are no laws when it comes to typical properties: accidental
features of the world that could well be otherwise enter into the determination
of these phenomena.
I think the following is a better way of capturing what is going on. First,
in using compositional semantics, one computes the meaning of expressionas
such as the man, the fish, or whatever is the “logical subject” of the sentence.
Then, given meaning, a considerable amount of background information, say
information about fish and men, is combined in the process. The end result,
a combination of two kinds of information, meaning and beliefs, nevertheless
presupposes meaning. One cannot have information about fish without be-
ing able to think about them first. My suggestion is, then, that these two
components, a theory of meaning and a theory of belief fixation, must be
kept distinct. Nevertheless, they are both involved in the “interpretation” of
expressions. For instance, assume that a generative capacity that generates
‘default interpretations,’ as assumed by Pustejovsky, exists. Such a system is
neither sufficient nor necessary for the composition of the true, rather than
the default, meaning.3
It is tempting to argue here that these failures of systematicity and pro-
ductivity merely represent a hostile attitude towards pragmatics, as if one
would not allow any kind of pragmatic knowledge - knowledge of the causal
texture of the world - to enter into linguistic analysis. This objection is cor-
rect in one sense, but false in another. Pragmatic aspects of expressions,
if we admit that the aspects discussed above are pragmatic, are surely not
to be excluded from any investigation executed under the title “linguistic
analysis.” It might even be the case that some of these features result from
computational processes in which it is taken for granted that lexical elements
are associated with semantic features. The mistake is in assuming that these
3It is also possible, but not argued here, that synthetic beliefs rather than meanings
are also involved in the computation of linguistic expressions inside the language faculty.
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semantic features, or the pragmatic phenomena of the types discussed above,
have any bearing on the constitution of the semantic features of the relevant
lexical elements. Systematicity and productivity are effectively cutting prag-
matics out of such a constitutive role inside the lexicon, never questioning its
importance to other phenomena, linguistic or otherwise.
From a slightly different perspective, the point is that, whereas system-
aticity and compositionality are concerned with generating an infinite number
of syntactically and semantically distinct expressions, surely one important
property of human language and thought, pragmatics, and the phenomena
cited earlier reflect more the idiomatic interpretations of such expressions.
There is no question of priority, but simply a difference in the level and type
of explanation.
Recently, there has been some discussion on ‘compositional idioms’ which
is relevant to the issue at hand (Jackendoff, 1995, Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow,
1994, Pitt & Katz, 2000). Consider the following noun phrases:
(17) a. a plastic flower
b. a rubber chicken
According to Pitt & Katz (2000), noun combinations like these contain
a semantic feature [+imitation], which is not derivable from the constituents
(for the reasons given above). Expression (17a) means something like ‘an
imitation flower made of plastic.’ Although such a semantic feature is not
determined by the content of the constituents, the paradigm is productive
and differs in its semantic properties from idioms such as kick the bucket,
as well as from “fully compositional” cases such as swimming mammal. As
feature [+imitation] is not necessary for the interpretation of expressions
such as (17b), and cannot be predicted from the semantic properties of the
constituents alone, the authors claim that the expressions are ambiguous,
one reading corresponding to the“fully compositional” content, and the other
corresponding to the “compositional idiomatic” content. The senses of the
constituents are subject to a function delivering the extra meaning, in this
case via the following ‘idiom schemata’:
(Idiom schemata.) <[NP y x ]> = imitation <x> made of <y> if
<x> is a physical object and <y> is a material substance (Ibid.,
p. 324, p. 423).
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The above idiom schema is general enough, so that no separate dictio-
nary entry is needed for all of the complex expressions. This points to the
fact that violations of systematicity come in degrees.4 However, the interpre-
tation being optional (both “semantically and logically [sic]”), the question
arises, again, as to when exactly such a schema is applied, if not always. For
example, plastic bag is not interpreted as ‘an imitation bag made of plastic.’
This is so because, in our society, bags are usually made of plastic.
I am not drawing an arbitrary distinction between extra-linguistic facts
and semantic facts, moving a lot of the former out of the latter. The fact is
that these faculties, the semantics ‘inside of our head’ and the constitution
of the world ‘out there,’ are really two different entities: for one thing, the
semantics is systematic and productive whereas the world is not. If Erebus
loves Charon, then it does not always follow that Charon loves Erebus, al-
though if one can think of Erebus’ loving of Charon, then one can, ipso facto,
think of Charon’s loving of Erebus as well. The same goes with productivity.
If it is the case that snakes are not dangerous, it does not ipso facto follow
that rattling snakes are not dangerous. The limitation is not in our thinking,
for we could certainly think of any kind of snake as dangerous (productivity);
the limitation is in the world.
Suppose expressions that have a variety of semantic features that are not
predictable from the constituents are, in fact, semantically ambiguous, so
that the actual application of the universal grinder need not be predicted
at all (see e.g., Pustejovsky, 1998, p. 301, note 3 for such a proposal and
Jackendoff, 1997, §3.3 for a conflicting view). We may assume that lexi-
cal semantics is responsible for the generation of the ‘total semantic space,’
or more philosophically, the “logical space,” containing “possible readings”
of the expressions, together with mechanisms to single out those that are
4What does it mean, exactly, that systematicity comes in degrees, as the above example
points out? I think such generalizations arise from some semi-regular aspects of the world.
Consider again the above idiom schemata. It is a fact about the world we live in that,
in most cases, if one takes some physical object and a material substance and applies
the above rule, what results is something very unnatural, sometimes something altogether
impossible. This, I believe, is the “law” behind idiom schemata. However, this already
presupposes the meanings of the constituents and the semantic function associated with
the syntactic combination, hence it presupposes a compositional theory of semantics. The
interpretation then involves the notion of “imitation” because, in our current society, we
construct a lot of such imitations: it is often the most plausible interpretation, again a
matter of pragmatic knowledge concerning accidential properties of the world we currently
live in.
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semantically odd.
In following this idea in order to see where it leads, let us impose the
feature [±distributive] on a primitive item in a “conceptual structure.” For
instance, returning to the example given earlier, there may be one item, pole,
which is [±distributive]. The explanation of the semantic oddity of certain
expressions also comes out naturally: we might set up rules that tell us which
of the possible combinations of features are odd or anomalous, and which are
good or semantically well-formed. Now consider (6a) again, repeated here as
(18):
(18) *the telephone pole was all along the road.
The fact that this is semantically odd (if it is, barring the contextual
overdriving of this phenomenon) cannot be explained by assuming that the
telephone pole or telephone pole has the feature [±distributive]. The explana-
tion relies, rather, on the disambiguation process. There is no compositional
theory to explain why this is so: the destroyed telephone pole was all along
the road does not seem to come out as odd. Thus, whatever the status of
this explanation might be, the phenomenon of semantical oddity, as in the
above, if any, is not of compositional origin. It derives from some other
source. Again, it must be emphasized that, since the disambiguation process
relies upon knowledge of the world due to the fact that the feature under
inspection is only typical of the elements referred to in the lexical concept,
there are special difficulties in finding any laws to describe the process.
I do not claim that one could not take a telephone pole to be not dis-
tributed “as a default.” However, that is not a lawful fact, it is a brute fact
about typical telephone poles. I do not even claim that this argument vi-
olates Jackendoff’s theory, since Jackendoff might well be concerned about
how brute facts of the world, or prototypes, enter into the determination of
semantic deviance!
Consider again the following example (see Pustejovsky, 1995, §9.3; also
Briscoe, Copestake, & Boguraev, 1990, Jackendoff, 1992, Levin, 1993):
(19) a. Charon began the book
b. Charon began to read the book
One can begin ‘a thing,’ the book, as well as an activity, to read. Does
the lexicon therefore contain different entries for begin + NP and begin +
VP? If not, how do we explain, compositionally, the semantics of examples
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such as (19). How does begin + [NP a book ] yield the semantics of beginning
to read a book, viz. an event?5
According to Pustejovsky, the lexical entry for book contains information
about its telic role, that it is used for reading, and in some other cases for
writing. It also specifies its constitution (what it is made of), formal features
(what it is) and agentive roles (how it came into being). Yet again, such a
lexical entry involves semantic features that are only typical. Thus, while
Pustejovsky claims that *enjoy a rock (and related cases) is not well-formed
since rock does not have a telic role, the climber enjoyed that rock is perfectly
understandable. Pustejovsky assumes that in this and similar cases, “rock
itself takes on a new meaning, by virtue of having telicity associated with it”
(Pustejovsky, 1998, p. 294). How, then, is this ‘new meaning’ determined
compositionally from the features of the constituents? This is the question
that matters in terms of compositionality, productivity and systematicity.
Alternatively, as I have pointed out earlier, one could interpret the above
lexical entry as an instruction for a “typical interpretation” of certain syn-
tactic constructions, indicating a likely mapping between them, say in LF,
and their semantics, explicated at some higher level, say that of “conceptual
structures.” Thus, at the conceptual level, we construct all form-content pos-
sibilities corresponding to begin to read a book, begin to write a book, . . . ,
but possibly not begin a book, while the LF contains the syntactic construct
begin NP; the lexical entry thus specifies a default linking between these two
forms, each taken from a distinct representational generative capacity. This is
the position taken by Jackendoff, for instance; insofar as I understand Puste-
jovsky, this is his position too. However, this involves us in a different theory,
one of connecting two representational generative capacities each with their
own, presupposed semantics. Moreover, some significant part of this theory
appears to involve belief fixation rather than meaning. Admittedly, this is a
coherent approach as such, yet it is not what I am after in this study: the
constitution of a single productive and systematic representational capacity
that gets the truth-conditional semantics just right for all sentences.
Nouns are said to undergo a contextual alteration between a range of
senses. The following examples illustrate these effects (adapted from Puste-
jovsky, 1995, §3.3). The lamb is running in the field, Erebus ate lamb for
breakfast (Count/Mass), Erebus broke the bottle, the baby finished the bottle
5In other words, NP arguments like book are “coerced to the appropriate type required
by its governing verb, in this case an event” (Pustejovsky & Bouillon, 1996, p. 135).
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(Container/Containee), the window is rotting, Charon crawled through the
window (Figure/Ground), the newspaper fired its editor, Erebus spilled coffee
on the newspaper (Product/Producer), Erebus travelled to New York, New
York kicked the mayor out of office (Place/People). I think it is illuminat-
ing to consider these alterations as alterations of “perspectives” in terms of
how we topicalize the matter at hand in each of the examples, to borrow
Chomsky’s slogan. In each of the sentences, the context somehow focuses
on one aspect of the content of the noun, such as Figure/Ground. However,
the “disambiguation process” is contextual and pragmatic, involving what we
know about the regularities of the world. In suitable contexts they fluctuate,
as we expect these features to be merely typical.
For example, if Erebus is a brute, he may eat lamb live; or if he had an
exceptionally big mouth, he could eat the whole lamb with one bite. We do
not fail to understand these expressions, nor their truth conditions, having
only the sense of a marked untypical case. The reader may easily find relevant
contexts for any of them that shift the perspective. Thus, it is not possible (or
reasonable) to capture such alterations compositionally in a“representational
generative capacity.” The alterations are not explainable from the properties
of the constituents and their form: rather, they are perspectives provided by
various factors, such as discourse context, upon the more literal content in
which there is as yet no contextual alteration.
Thus, semantic features, when they are only typical, lead instantly to
the proliferation of clear counterexamples when they are considered part of
more complex linguistic representations due to the failure of compositionality.
But if we are to know what is both sufficient and necessary in terms of
bestowing to bestow the true semantic interpretation to linguistic expressions,
such counterexamples could not be allowed. Therefore, statistical features,
or conceptual roles based on statistical features, do not constitute lexical
elements.
One way of reacting to this result, as many cognitive psychologists have
done, is to assume that, since there is obviously no strict compositional mech-
anism available, knowledge of the world is involved in the determination of
the prototype of complex expressions (concepts) (e.g., Hampton, 2000, Mur-
phy, 1988, Smith & Medin, 1981, Smith & Osherson, 1984). In order to know
what typical pet fish look like, one needs knowledge of the world. For in-
stance, in order to find out what are typical properties of the religious rituals
of Eskimos, one would need to go out and look, or to consult an authoritative
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book. The point here is that these properties could be anything, and clearly
are not subject to any laws. They are just random: there cannot be any sci-
ence, any determinate laws, that state what kind of religious rituals Eskimos
must have. This holds for an infinite number of concepts (the meanings of
expressions mentally understood). In effect, in order to know about religious
rituals one needs a mechanism for belief fixation, not only for meaning, but
then these properties do not suffice for semantic laws either. Thus, given the
meaning of its constituents, one can surely understand what religious rituals
of Eskimos means without knowing what kind of rituals Eskomos typically
have. The same goes for the religious rituals of ancient Finns, of Native
Americans, and so on. This is why psychologists have doubted the proto-
type theory: most complex concepts lack prototypes, but they do not lack
meaning, and the two are not coextensive.
According to one proposal, the lexicon first and foremost consists of some
kind of “core meaning” that takes care of the requirements of compositional-
ity, but then in addition there are also prototypes, or other conceptual roles.
Let us call this the “dual theory” (see Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman,
1983, Block, 1986, Cowie, 1999, Horwich, 1997). Since most complex expres-
sions (concepts) lack prototypes, we could claim that primitive concepts are
constituted of (i) core meaning plus (ii) prototypes.
It is clear, however, that this theory is not compositional in the sense
required by empirical evidence. Suppose you have the concept PET FISH,
or know the meaning of pet fish. Recall that, according to a law governing
our language and thought, we therefore also have the expressions (concepts)
pet and fish. Suppose that the meaning of pet fish did not require knowledge
of prototypes of any kind, but that the meaning of pet and fish needed such
knowledge. Then it also follows that, in general, you could know the meaning
of pet fish without knowing the meaning of pet and fish: the latter requires
something that is “extra” with respect to the former. This is clearly against
empirical facts, because one normally understands the constituents if one
understands the complex expression. Thus, prototypes do not constitute
lexical meanings, not even in addition to the “core meaning” (see Fodor,
1998b, §3, 4).
Some psychologists assume that processing complexity characterizes the
distinction between complex and simple concepts, whether they be definitions
or prototypes. Indeed, most psychologists find the evidence more balanced
against the decompositional view (see e.g., Aitchinson, 1987, Fodor, Fodor,
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& Garrett, 1975, Fodor et al., 1980, Kintsch, 1974, Paivio, 1971, Thorndyke,
1975), although some do not (see McNamara & Miller, 1989 for a review).6
There are also authors who think that features of processing time or mem-
ory recall are not proper diagnostic tests for matters having anything to do
with lexical decomposition. This is understandable, since it is possible that
complex concepts are processed in some sort of “chunks.”7
I also found a number of papers citing subjects’ verbal descriptions (inter-
pretations) of certain complex concepts as evidence of the internal nature of
concepts. Typically such evidence is marshaled as evidence of some specific
decompositional theory. David Pitt is explicit on the matter and proposes
that “direct questioning about the semantic properties and relations of ex-
pressions would seem the obvious strategy” (Pitt, 1999, p. 152) for studying
the internal structure of concepts. It is obvious, however, that this is an unre-
liable diagnostic test: such interpretations could reflect subjects’ (synthetic)
beliefs (associated features) as well as the internal structure of their concepts
(constitutive features). This empirical test does not resolve the question at
hand.
2.3 Fodor’s lexical atomism
The semantic theory of natural language and thought must be such as to
determine, or ‘compose,’ the meanings of complex representations based on
the properties of their constituents. Empirical data indicates that this hap-
pens systematically and productively, and that prototype theories violate
both conditions. It also appears that the semantic features of lexical con-
cepts - a finite subset of all concepts - could not be exhausted by giving their
definitions in terms of other morphemes in a language.
This suggests that there is something wrong in the strategy of decom-
posing lexical concepts into semantic features in the first place, hence one
is invited to entertain the possibility that lexical concepts do not have se-
mantic decompositions. In other words, it is suggested that lexical meaning
6One ‘psychological test’ of the internal structure of concepts is suggested in various
studies on (on-line) classification. Such tests are notoriously unreliable for the internal
structure of concepts, however. People categorize objects in the world by relying on
contingent “appearance properties.” The semantic properties of concepts go far beyond
categorization processes (Eco, 1999, pp. 224-336, Geach, 1957, Kripke, 1972, Laurence &
Margolis, 1999, Putnam, 1975, Rey, 1993).
7See McNamara & Miller, 1989, Gonsalves, 1988, Katz, 1977.
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is, at least in part, in some sense ‘inscrutable’ and cannot be analysed by
using other words (/phrases). The meaning of a lexical element cannot be
exhausted by resources available in language, whether in terms of definitions,
prototypes or conceptual roles.
Let us say that lexical meanings involve ‘tacit knowledge’: we ‘know’
about their meaning (not necessarily all of it), but that knowledge is not
‘accessible’ in language, as succintly put by Moore in a famous passage in
his Principia Ethica: “If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that
good is good, and that is the end of matter” (p. 6). This tacit knowledge
might involve other cognitive faculties, such as kinaesthetic abilities, or, as a
behaviorist would put it, even relations between the mind and the world. To
quote Russell: “It is no more necessary to be able to say what a word means
than it is for a cricketer to know the mathematical theory of impact and
of projectiles. Indeed, in the case of many object-words, it must be strictly
impossible to say what they mean, except by a tautology, for it is with them
that language begins” (Russell, 1940, p. 26). If so, this could begin to explain
why lexical meaning is inscrutable, and why“language begins”from its words,
and why philosophical ‘conceptual analysis’ is so hard, if not impossible.
In the context of this theory as a background, ‘semantic oddity’ or ’seman-
ticality’ discussed in the prevous sections represents not a failure of meaning,
but rather a failure of managing to express something that is typical. If there
are regularities in the distribution of typical features among constituents and
their hosts, then, assuming the atomistic hypothesis, it follows that these are
not regularities of meaning, but regularities of the world. In other words, it is
a regularity of the world we live in that if one begins a book, then one often
begins to read it; or that a plastic thing is often something made of plastic.
From this perspective much of lexical semantics, such as Pustejovsky’s gen-
erative lexicon, appears to represent an instance of some sort of generative
ontology rather than generative semantics - a viable research strategy in itself
and of much practical use, no doubt.
I will assume the existence of two versions of atomistic theory from now
on, a weaker and a stronger one, that must be distinguished for the purposes
of this study. In the weaker form (A), the meanings of morphemes cannot be
analyzed or defined by using other words in ‘ordinary’ natural language(s).
For instance, it is not possible to define kill completely in terms of any
kind of linguistic phrase, such as cause to die, a phrase understandable by
the layperson. I will take conclusion (A) as given here. It is apparently
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empirically well supported, and indeed accepted by many linguists as well:
there is a difficulty in defining the meanings of words by using other words
so that, to follow Russell’s phrase, “language begins in its words.”
In its stronger form (B), lexical words are indefinable because they ex-
press primitive concepts (see Fodor, 1998a). Thesis (B) is stronger and more
controversial, since “concepts” is a wider category than concepts expressible
in “ordinary language,” but it is meant to be an explanation of (A). Whether
there are other explanations of fact (A) in addition to (B) is already a difficult
enough problem to warrant more extensive discussion.
I will assume the weaker form (A) in this study. This does not mean that
the stronger theory is rejected, however. I will leave the matter unsettled.
I will manage with (A) here because I will restrict myself to the linguistic
faculty and its interface representations, thus (A) is all I need for the purposes
of this study, and the status of (B) can be left open.
I will now discuss Fodor’s atomistic theory, since to the best of my knowl-
edge it is the only one currently available. The key features of this theory are
discussed, and some of the problems are addressed, especially those pertinent
to the present study. However, I will not attempt to solve all of these prob-
lems here, nor will I offer a complete review of them. My purpose is more
modest: to look at the relevant geography of the problem in order to prepare
a more thorough discussion of one of the most interesting issues. Moreover,
I will not end up by accepting this particular theory as such, although I find
it a very valuable starting-point.
Fodor’s particular version of the atomistic lexicon can be summarized as
follows (1975, 154ff. for i-iii, 1998a for iv, explanations follow):
(i) “the vocabulary of [thoughts] is very rich” so that “much of the
lexical elaboration of surface sentences are also available at the
level of representation where messages are made explicit”and that
“we need a correspondingly complicated metalanguage to repre-
sent their logical form,” “resources of the inner code are rather
directly represented in the resources of the codes we use for com-
munication”;
(ii) conceptual relations between non-logical terms are couched in
terms of meaning postulates, not definitions (nor prototypes);
(iii) there is no level of representation at which lexical concepts
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(morphemes) are represented by their supposed definitions (or
prototypes);
(iv) meaning is denotation and information.
Let us scrutinize each assumption in turn in order to find a starting-
point for a more intricate analysis, to locate potential problems and avoid
misunderstanding.
Item (i) means that there must be a close relationship between the prop-
erty of being a morpheme at the“surface level” and being a primitive element
at the level of semantic representation,“messages.” Many details of (i) remain
to be spelled out exactly to make it empirically meaningful. This, indeed, is
covered in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. The most important aspect of this hypothe-
sis, assumed in this study as well, is that the metalanguage used to analyze
the meanings of ordinary language expressions, or their logical forms, must
come quite close in complexity to the form and content of the corresponding
surface expressions. For instance, it might be the case that the best and
most truthful way to express what the sentence Erebus killed Charon means
is to say that it means that Erebus killed Charon. One could take this as a
“guiding principle” of some sort, and to make it more precise as one proceeds,
allowing for exceptions. Yet I think it is an important guiding principle and
conforms to the minimalist theory of grammar: it states that, basically, to
have a grammar you need thought (LF) and some sensory-motor interface
(PF), and not much else. There are no “intervening complexities.”
Lexical atomism raises the question of explaining the massive produc-
tivity and systematicity in linguistic phenomena visible on the lexical level,
pretheoretically understood. For instance, it is well-known that morpholog-
ical causatives involve a certain systematic and fairly productive number of
semantic, syntactic and morphological properties. We seek to explain why
these properties appear together, and why in certain variations and not in
others. Those who assume semantic decompositional analysis of the lexi-
con try to achieve this goal, and succeed rather well, by assuming that all
causatives share a common semantic element at some deeper below the sur-
face level, say CAUSE. According to this analysis, a causative situation ex-
pressed by a lexical or morphological causative involves two events, the causer
event and the causee event, and at some deeper linguistic level this duality
in metaphysics is mirrored in the often biclausal nature of the corresponding
linguistic representation.
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Fodor (1975), among others who deny the decompositional hypothesis
in favour of the atomistic position, assumed that semantic properties are
couched in terms of (one-way) meaning postulates, hence the item (ii) in the
above list. Thus, the fact that killing entails dying is captured by an impli-
cation that connects killing necessarily to dying. For instance, the meaning
postulate that captures the inference from kill to cause to die, states that,
necessarily, if x kills y, then y dies:
(20) 2(x )(y)((kill(x, y) −→ die(y)).
What is important is the claim that, since there is no complete defini-
tion of kill, these meaning postulates can never form a bi-conditional of the
following type:
(21) (x )(y)((kill(x, y) ←→ . . . die(y) . . .)
This, in turn, means that the meaning of kill is presupposed, not analysed:
for the former clause to have truth conditions, the predicate kill must have
independent meaning. To put it succintly, when such meanings are given, the
meaning postulates thus interpreted and their validity somehow guaranteed,
we have a theory that explains such inferences in terms of properties of the
subject matter itself rather than of the representations of that subject matter.
These are thus “material implications.” Exactly what does this mean?
One idea is that the one-way implications flow, somehow, from the prop-
erties of the subject matter itself, rather than from the representations (or
concepts) of that subject matter. It is a matter of the constitution (or “meta-
physics”) of number three rather than the meaning of the numeral three that
number three is a prime number. In the case of many mathematical con-
cepts it seems correct, as Fodor among others has pointed out, to distin-
guish concepts from the respective subject matter in the sense that a child
who masters the concept of three does not need to master the concept of
prime, much less their necessary connection, so as to allow us to break the
concept-constitutive connection between the concept THREE and the con-
cept PRIME, while leaving their necessary, “metaphysical”connection. Thus,
the psychologically realistic possession conditions for concepts are a useful
device for separating concepts from the subject matter they are concepts of.
The claim is not, however, that these properties are ipso facto “mind-
independent” if they do not flow from meanings or concepts. Rather, they
are just part of the subject matter, whatever the metaphysics of that subject
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matter is. Thus, they may be part of the external world, or part of our minds,
or both, but not part of the apparatus we use to think or speak about them.
A very rough picture of what is going on could be drawn as follows. Cer-
tain categories are presented to us in our “everyday experience,” most of
which are also “lexicalized” and hence part of the input to the language fac-
ulty. The concept of number three is among them. However, these categories
are defective in the following way: they are not accurate mirror images of
the subject matter. How this is possible is the tricky problem of semantics
and its relation to epistemology: I take it to be a psychological fact (e.g.,
three→ prime). Obtaining knowledge of whatever it is that our concepts are
concepts of is thus another line of inquiry altogether, and it is the result of
belief-fixation processes that are described by the meaning postulates. The
interesting problem then remains as to how it is possible to have a priori
knowledge of such subject matter, if not by means of definitions and logic
(analyticity)?8
However, many linguists, including Jackendoff and later Fodor himself
(see also Pustejovsky, 1998), have complained that relying upon meaning
postulates is not explanatory: one can stipulate them in any way, as each
lexical item “is a world unto itself.” Is it not the case that what inferences
hit us as ‘analytic’ is arbitrary? On the contrary, it is very typical today
to find “grammatical reflexes of [analytic?] semantic properties” of lexical
elements. Several types of words are formed systematically in a way that
suggests that the inferential patterns they enter into have resulted from the
semantic features used in their construction, and therefore from the semantic
features that constitute their meaning.
There are, again, several questions that must be carefully separated.
Firstly, how can we have synthetic a priori knowledge at all? This is “Kant’s
problem”: since we know a priori that certain connections between concepts
are universal and necessary, we need to have internal, cognitive resources to
which we have “immediate epistemological access,” rather than a mysterious
ability to ‘see’ necessities outside of our minds. The decompositional theory
8This discussion could be placed in a much wider context: it brings us to what philoso-
phers, at least since Kant, have wondered, namely, how is a priori knowledge possible.
What makes three a prime number and killing entail dying, and why are these concep-
tual connections so strong? More problematically, if they are not based on conceptual
connections (analyticity), as Kant would have argued at least in the case of mathematical
knowledge, what are they based on and, perhaps even more interestingly, how do we know
a priori that such connections are necessary?
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explains the mechanisms of such immediate access rather well: definitions
plus principles of logic suffice. If there are no definitions, however, then this
explanation is not sufficient. I do not have any solution to this problem, but
note that it would not be an attractive line of inquiry to explain all syn-
thetic a priori knowledge in terms of linguistic decompositions. There is no
reason to suppose that the concept THREE would contain all properties and
relations that are entailed by it, less so the lexical element three. Rather,
the linguistic problem is that, in some cases, lexical inference tends to go in
tandem with many linguistic properties to suggest that at least some such
knowledge is of linguistic, decompositional origin. This is precisely where
causatives become important: they differ from numbers, for example, in that
these causative decompositions seem to have grammatical reflexes, and they
tend to be part of the very word-formation process. I will return to this point
later.
This brings us to conclusion (iii), that there is no level of representation
that contains decompositional material for the meaning of words, although
we could ask in what terms we refer to such decompositions? What if we
switch to scientific language from an ordinary language. What if the cog-
nitive faculty providing semantic decompositions for lexical concepts is not
analyzable in ordinary language, only in a technical language? Given the
evidence, we could assume that a decompositional level exists, and yet be
‘inaccessible’ in an ordinary language.
This could be precisely the case with concepts such as the number three,
the decomposition of which is not available in ordinary language, and re-
quires something highly technical. Dedekind explained the origin of his work
on the nature of numbers, including the number three in a letter: “It is a
synthesis constructed after protracted labor, based upon a prior analysis of
the sequence of natural numbers just as it presents itself, in experience, so
to speak, for our consideration.” This labor led to a plethora of technical
concepts devoid of “everyday experience.” We could interpret mathematical
activities such as those pursued by Dedekind and others as what philoso-
phers have earlier called clarification or the analysing of concepts, namely, if
we assume that whatever it is that turns out to constitute the number three
is determined by the faculties of our mind/brain and not by the objective
mind-independent ‘reality out there.’ It then follows that one could represent
those entities without understanding all of their necessary consequences, and
thus have the concept three without having the concept prime. This would
49
not mean that there could not be a decomposition of the number three using
intentional/mentalist vocabulary provided that it is some mentalist faculty
that lies behind its properties. Why cannot this be so in the case of other
lexical concepts besides numbers? Is there a hidden essence in doorknobs
and cars? We could argue that the concept of dogs might be represented as
a complex and abstract non-linguistic ‘definition.’ These decompositions, al-
though they might contain intentional constituents, would not be expressible
in ordinary natural language, a serious possibility due to the fact that many
cognitive functions might well be modularised, their interaction limited to
the “interface levels.” In other words, if most concepts cannot be defined
in ordinary language, this does not yet show that such definitions could not
exist in more technical but still intentional vocabulary.
Thus, consider a grammatical concept such as FINITE SENTENCE. It
might not be completely, let alone correctly, decomposable in ordinary lan-
guage due to the fact that the concepts and principles used by the language
faculty responsible for this concept cannot be accessed in a similar way as the
concepts of everyday experience. A technical, natural inquiry is thus called
for. However, it then turns out that FINITE SENTENCE has a decomposi-
tion: it consists of a TP projection as selected by a certain kind of C, both
individuated by certain kinds of features and mutual relations, as they are
embedded in a complex linguistic theory. Why cannot the same be true of
DOORKNOB? Presumably, not all concepts (intentional states) can be in-
put to the language faculty, hence they cannot be the material our language
faculty begins to “lexicalize,” artificial scientific endeavors aside.9
Jackendoff, for example, claims that most words lack definitions since they
are constituted of non-linguistic cognitive material, such as visual stereotypes,
whose semantic content cannot be captured by linguistic phrases. He argues
that what the inscrutability of the lexicon (i) entails is that “if there are
principles of lexical conceptual composition, they are not entirely identical
with the principles of phrasal conceptual composition” (Jackendoff, 1990, pp.
37-38). He goes on to suggest that there are “nondiscrete” elements that
can fill the semantic residuum left unfilled from phrasal definitions, and that
we could construct lexical concepts “compositionally” from such elements,
9Fodor (e.g., 1998a) remains sceptical: though there exists a highly nontrivial theory
of numbers, it might be questioned whether a nontrivial theory of, say, doorknobs would
be ever forthcoming. Whether such a theory is or is not forthcoming depends, of course,
on what kind of property the property of being a doorknob is. To this question, I do not
have an answer.
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among them one like CAUSE.
Pinker, too, assumes that there is a constrained set of semantic features
that attach to verbs and constrains the set of possible verb meanings, and
although they do not provide a complete decomposition of verbs (assuming
(A)), it is these abstract features that enter into the computation of linguistic
expressions, the residuum being grammatically irrelevant. He does not try
to “come up with a small set of primitives and relations out of which one can
compose definitions capturing the totality of a verb’s meaning. Rather, the
verb definitions sought will be hybrid structures, consisting of a scaffolding
of universal, recurring, grammatically relevant meaning elements plus slots
for bits of conceptual information about things like shrimp, butter, fame,
and so on” (Pinker, 1989, p. 166). The semantic residuum is filled with
“grammatically irrelevant conceptual slots.” He wrote that “linguistic pro-
cesses, including the productive lexical rules that extend verbs to new argu-
ment structures, would be sensitive only to parts of semantic representations
whose elements are members of this set” (Ibid.).
Exactly as in the case of Jackendoff, there is thus a linguistically salient
level of semantic representations (a “special subsystem [. . .] with well-
defined syntax and vocabulary”) that has a decompositional structure, but
“semantic structure translated into a paraphrase need not be exactly synony-
mous with the single word it is designed to represent” (Ibid., p. 168).
In short, some lexical features seem to have grammatical effects, while
there need not be a complete definition leading to strict synonymy in terms
of those features, as Konrflit & Correra (1993) put it: “Decompositions [...]
intend to capture the core aspects of the verb meanings, without imply-
ing that all aspects of the meanings are represented” (p. 83). McNamara
insists, too, that “the apparent nondefinability of concepts places very few
constraints, if any, on theories of semantic representations” because “many
critical semantic components may be perceptual and consequently may not
be expressible in a spoken language,” and because “a word meaning may be a
collection of necessary and nonnecessary attributes that constrain the word’s
semantic and syntactic assignment” (McNamara & Miller, 1989, p. 358).
In sum, these responses, if I am correct, aim to combine the observation
that most lexical elements are not definable (A) with the claim that they still
have semantic decomposition given that they have semantic ingredients that
cannot be expressed in natural language. Lexical concepts have decomposi-
tions that are not expressible in their entirity in ordinary language.
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The problem here is that, as Fodor pointed out (Fodor, 1998a, p. 45),
this does not yet explain why there are ‘cognitive elements’ that cannot be
expressed in phrases. What Jackendoff and Pinker are, in effect, saying is
just that ‘there are aspects of lexical meaning which cannot be expressed
by linguistic phrases.’ Suppose killing is decomposed into two parts, one
representing ‘cause to die,’ and the other begin something X, which is a
“non-discrete element”:
(22) (x )(y) (x kills y ←→ x causes y to die & X).
The claim is that what the language faculty sees here is the right-hand side
of the biconditional, which is converted into a single morpheme kill. ’Cause to
Y’ is the common meaning aspect behind several words (killing, murdering,
opening, sinking), whereas X is the component that distinguishes killing from
murdering (i.e., when Y = die), for instance. The point is that when X is
interpreted according to the conceptual-intentional system, or whatever it is
that produces the interpretation for kill, it corresponds to something outside
of the language faculty, that cannot be explained in linguistic phrases. But it
is evident then that kill, as opposed to other causatives, means just X, which
is something that cannot be decomposed! Exactly why is it impossible to use
phrases to express the “nondiscrete cognitive elements” X that are supposed
to make the meanings of words indefinable? It is because of this that, in order
to explain why phrases are insufficient to capture the complete semantic
properties of words, Fodor claims that words express primitive concepts,
and he thus ends up with the stronger form of lexical atomism (B). More
specifically, he claims that X expresses a primitive concept and is lexicalized
as kill (see Fodor, 2003, pp. 59-80).
In this study, I will not argue in favor of or against the stronger assump-
tion (B), because all of the empirical issues discussed here can be settled
by assuming only (A). To put it in more technical terms, the deepest se-
mantic representation I will ever consider is the “Logical Form,” which is the
interface between the language faculty and meaning. “Lexical atomism” is
formulated at that level. The point is, then, that this weaker theory is still
compatible with (B), and this shows that atomism, whether strong or weak,
is a linguistically plausible/relevant/interesting hypothesis.
Finally, meaning, according to Fodor, is based on information (Fodor,
1994b, 1998a). A symbol token means x just in case it is “nomologically
locked” into a property of x -ness. Being nomologically locked means, roughly,
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that there is a lawful connection between the tokening of something being
x and the symbol. This constitutes Fodor’s fourth thesis that meaning is
denotation and information (iv). I regard this assumption as the most con-
troversial in Fodor’s theory, and thus I will not discuss it here.
In sum, and still on a fairly general level, Fodor claims that morphemes
on the surface level correspond to primitive semantic elements (primitive
concepts), that meaning postulates (strongly held beliefs) ‘explain’ much of
the inferential relations inside the lexical stock, and that lexical atomism is
interpreted to mean intentional atomism so that there is no decomposition of
lexical morphemes that uses intentional vocabulary - not even in a technical
semantic vocabulary that is more developed than the ordinary everyday lan-
guage whose origins lie in our “intuitive” everyday experience. Finally, Fodor
suggests that meaning is constituted of denotation and information: it is a
nomological link between the mind and the world.
The difference between these two explanations, Fodor’s on one side, and
linguists’ on the other, are summarized in the following figure:
theory morphemes linguistic levels concepts world
I kill kill KILL cause to die
II kill cause to die CAUSE TO DIE cause to die
By “linguistic levels” I mean representations that are tokened inside the
language faculty. In Fodor’s case (I), there is no linguistic level or level of
concepts on which the morpheme kill would be represented in terms of a
phrase. The only decomposition takes place ‘in the world.’ Here the picture
is complicated by the fact that what appears ‘in the world’ might be consti-
tuted, in part or in whole, of what hides inside the human mind: in Fodor’s
theory, if and when (1998a) there are such mind-dependent components, they
are not ‘linguistic’ or part of the ‘intentional level.’
Linguists, those cited above and others, adopt hypothesis II, which states
that such decompositions are part of some level of linguistic representation,
that of concepts or semantic representations, at the interface between seman-
tics and syntax, or even inside the language faculty. I discuss such proposals
in Chapters 3 and 4.
I will not try here to find an alternative explanation for the fact that
lexical elements cannot be defined: I will assume that this is so and go on to
study its linguistic consequences.
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2.4 The problem of explanatory adequacy
Lexical atomism has not gained unreserved acceptance among cognitive sci-
entists, quite the contrary. The reasons are many: some are arguably based
on sheer misunderstanding, yet there are others that are more serious.
Prima facie there is nothing wrong with the atomist position: it is in
agreement with productivity, systematicity, and a lot of other crucial empir-
ical data. I believe that the atomist hypothesis should even be taken as the
null-hypothesis: if there is no evidence to the contrary, we should accept it.
It is more surprising, I believe, if it turned out that the meanings of words
could be expressed in terms of other words than if they could not. In addi-
tion, a lot of data, e.g., many phenomena concerning ‘semanticality,’ can be
explained equally well by invoking pragmatics, or some kind of ‘generative
ontology,’ rather than semantics. It is just that there is evidence against the
null hypothesis.
One pertinent and often discussed type of evidence against atomism con-
cerns causatives. I make no attempt to characterize this class of expressions
here, rather leaving it to section 4, but the problem is that one can explain
the semantic and syntactic properties of causatives elegantly by assuming
that the lexical elements that appear in such constructions have a seman-
tic decomposition, in which the one semantic feature represents ‘causation.’
The linguistic computation, word formation and the like, is then sensitive to
this feature, whereas precisely because something representing ‘causation’ is
a semantic feature it can be used to derive some of the semantic properties
as well. By way of illustration, consider the following sentences:
(23) a. Erebus killed Charon
b. Charon died
c. Erebus caused Charon to die
These sentences are related to each other: (a) first implies (b), a fact
that apparently has something to do with the lexical elements kill and die.
Therefore, it is common today, as it was back in the days of Generative
Semantics, to assume that the lexical element kill contains the semantic
feature(s) ‘cause to die.’
How this idea is implemented technically varies, and some of the methods
are reviewed later, but one may assume that (a) is represented at some more
abstract linguistic level much like sentence (c), so that we could take the
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surface expression (c) to express, or to very closely correspond to, the phrasal
decomposition of (a). In other words, sentences (a) and (c) both express the
same underlying proposition or deep structure/logical form, hence they are
synonymous qua linguistic. Then due to some computational operations
taking place in the language faculty, (c) would be converted into (a), thus
explaining why it is related to (b). Even better, it often becomes possible to
explain some grammatical properties of the relevant constructions by using
these assumptions (Hale & Keyser, 1993).
Note that if (a) is represented as (c) at some deeper linguistic level of
representation, then this already violates the weaker formulation (A) of the
atomistic theory, since (c), the putative decomposition, is expressed in ‘ordi-
nary language’ by the simple sentence (c). This is important, for advocates of
decompositional theories have sometimes claimed that their decompositional
structure (c) is somehow ‘technical’ and not, therefore, exactly comparable
to the corresponding clause (c) in the ordinary language but rather to some
formula in the ‘logical metalanguage,’ say: what the qualification “not . .
. exactly” does here of course makes the whole difference, if there is any. I
will return to this matter later. Thesis (B) bans all kinds of decompositions
insofar as they are interpreted as being a description of some level of mental
representation. I return to this matter later, too.
Fodor has replied to this decompositional claim, quite correctly, that it
is possible to explain the grammatical effects by assuming that the semantic
features that appear to take part in the computation inside the language
faculty do not constitute the lexical elements, but are just merged into them,
for one reason or another. One possibility is that they are so merged when we
come into possession of more knowledge of their meanings (§2.3). According
to Fodor, “Saying that lexical items have features is one thing; saying that
lexical items are feature bundles is quite another” (Fodor, 1998a, p. 63,
footnote 14). According to this explanation, it is belief fixation rather than
meaning or analytic inference that accounts for grammatical evidence.
Although this is only a possible strategy, it brings us to the real problem
of explanatory adequacy: why are these semantic features not - if they do not
constitute the lexical elements - arbitrary? Looked at from a slightly different
perspective, the fact that killing entails dying seems to be known to us in an
a priori manner. If it is not based on analyticity (conceptual containment),
what is it based on? More interestingly, from what cognitive resource do we
derive the very justification for this entailment, or the intuitive feeling that
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this connection holds, no matter what? In terms of Fodor’s theory, one has
to say that we may somehow possess a priori knowledge of their metaphysics
(constitution).
Pinker (1989, §5) argued along these lines. First, he claimed that certain
morphological and syntactic properties of verbs seem to be sensitive to their
abstract semantic attributes. Whether this is actually so need not concern us
here. Then he considers the possibility that these semantic attributes exist
because of ‘general mechanisms of belief fixation,’ as would be implied in the
case of Fodor’s atomistic theory. The problem, according to Pinker, is that
this strategy is not explanatory: it does not constrain verb meanings in any
way since “any culturally salient distinction could be used as a dimension
or feature helping to define similarity, and the syntax could reflect those
similarity clusterings” (Pinker, 1989, p. 166). However, one could not and
does not use any culturally salient distinction in that way. It seems to me,
furthermore, that the fact that killing entails dying is not merely a culturally
salient entailment, and there must be a deeper, cognitive explanation.
Chomsky, defending the existence of analytic truths and the decomposi-
tional lexicon (see Chomsky, 1988, pp. 32-34, Chomsky, 2000c, pp. 61-67),
argues, “To the extent that anything is understood about lexical items and
their nature, it seems that they are based on conceptual structures of a spe-
cific and closely integrated type,” so that there is an “a priori framework
of human thought, within which language is acquired,” providing “neces-
sary connections among concepts, reflected in connections of meaning among
words” (Chomsky, 2000c, p. 62-63). He then argues that, for example, as-
suming that the causative system is not a result of the internal structure
of lexical items “establishes nothing unless it is shown that an alternative
approach in terms of some [. . .] theories of belief fixation or semantic
importance” (Ibid., p. 64) can be developed.
If I may return to the case of mathematical knowledge, similar patterns of
inferential relations are found in mathematics. For instance, natural numbers
have properties, like ‘being a prime,’ attached to some of them. These pat-
terns, even if they cover what one could claim to constitute a ‘lexical level,’
are not random, arbitrary or merely conventional (one could argue), but they
must be based on something. This is even more evident in the case of geom-
etry and calculus. For instance, in Kant’s theory - representing an impetus
for much later discussion on this topic - the validity of such judgments was
based on what he called “pure intuitions.” Whatever they are based on, this
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source must be found inside our minds, since otherwise it would be totally
mysterious how we could convince ourselves of their necessity in an a priori
manner, as Kant put it in his Critique of Pure Reason:
If the objects with which our knowledge is concerned had been
things in themselves, we would not have been able to possess any
a priori concepts of them. For where would we get them from?
(A127)
Fodor discusses at length the argument from theories of intuitions about
conceptual connectedness to lexical semantic features or lexical concept-
constitutive inferences (1998, §4). He noted, correctly in my view, that the
main reason for assuming concept-constitutive inferences is because“an infer-
ence that constitutes the concepts which enter into it can be known a priori
to be sound” (p. 69). If such a priori knowledge does not result from the
concepts themselves, how could we otherwise comprehend such inferences a
priori as necessarily true? To the best of my knowledge, Fodor does not solve
the problem and, what is worse, information semantics (Fodor’s assumption
iv) does not seem to be the right kind of theory with which to address this
question.
The example from mathematics is also instructive in the sense that it is
clearly the case that the necessary relations between arithmetical objects do
not have grammatical reflexes other than being ‘evident’ in their meaning,
meaning that they are presumably not to be explained by relying upon the
presence of lexical semantic features detected in the language faculty. The
case of causatives is an interesting class of examples precisely in the sense that
causativity, as a semantic phenomenon, at least seems to involve some gram-
matical reflexes (§4). One could thus claim that such grammatical reflexes
provide an argument in favor of lexical decomposition. It is this argument
that I will attempt to refute here.
2.5 Conclusions
A theory of language and thought requires a theory of meaning such that it
explains how complex expressions/concepts inherent their semantic proper-
ties from the semantic properties of their constituents. This fact alone, when
accompanied by empirical facts concerning such ‘composition,’ appears to
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severly constraint theories of lexical meaning in ruling out those based on
statistical semantic features (prototype theory). Since there is independent
evidence that lexical words cannot be defined by using other words in (or-
dinary) language(s), we are tempted to reason that there might exist some
general difficulty in constituting lexical semantics in terms of conceptual role
theories of any kind.
One part of this problem is to explain that difficulty. Fodor, for example,
suggests that lexical concepts are primitive concepts, and that this explains
why it has been so hard to find semantic decompositions for them. Linguists,
who in virtue of having independent linguistic evidence have assumed that
linguistic decompositions exist, have argued that the difficulties result from
the fact that the meanings of lexical expressions express semantic ingredients
that cannot be expressed by using phrasal expressions (e.g., visual prototypes
and the like). This is not so much as explanation than a restatement of
the basic fact, however; it leaves unexplained why these ingredients are not
expressible by using phrases.
It still remains that there might not exist a linguistically salient level of
representation at which lexical elements would be replaced by their defini-
tions, prototypes, and the like. Given that this hypothesis is rather well-
supported, it is particularly interesting to find linguists who entertain the
contrary hypothesis on the basis of quite intricate data and sound reason-
ing. This had led them to find alternative explanations for the difficulties in
finding appropriate conceptual roles that constitute lexical concepts (i.e., in
terms of definitions and prototypes).
The other strategy, not seriously entertained so far but attempted here in
what follows, would be to keep the atomistic hypothesis and seek alternative
explanations for the linguistic evidence.
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Chapter 3
The minimalist framework and
the atomistic lexicon I
3.1 The minimalist framework
In this chapter I will formulate a version of the minimalist theory such that
it (i) removes the need for semantic decomposition from the lexical compo-
nent of the grammar, (ii) avoids stipulation in the case of lexical inference
and (iii) explains the syntactic and semantic properties of causatives, among
other linguistic phenomena. Hence, the purpose is to propose a framework
that could ‘unify’ two types of apparently contradictory evidence: one from
considerations having to do with systematicity and productivity (§2), one
from linguistic considerations having to do with grammar (§4, 6).
Whether this problem is meaningful depends on whether one takes both
types of evidence seriously. It is apparently possible to ignore either one, or
both, but I believe both are equally compelling and should not be dismissed
through ignorance.
I will begin by reviewing some recent assumptions concerning the univer-
sal grammar, developing some of them further in order to satisfy the goals
mentioned above and especially what has been called the Strong Minimalist
Hypothesis. Some core grammatical evidence is discussed here, but that is
dealt with more fully in Chapters 4 and 6. There is also a computer simula-
tion of the theory, which is not reported here.
A grammar of natural language comprises the pairing of form and mean-
ing. If S is a set of forms s1, . . ., and M is a set of meanings m1, . .
. ., we may take the grammar of some language L to consist of the finite
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specification of pairs <si, mi> for that L. Sometimes our attention turns to
a universal grammar, which is a finite specification of pairs <si, mi> inso-
far as these objects are common to all natural languages, abstracted from
variations between possible human languages. I adopt the latter goal here,
in line with current proposals that seek to find an underlying “psychologi-
cal reality” behind grammars (and language learning from the impoverished
linguistic stimulus available to learners) (Chomsky, 1965). According to this
perspective, the study of natural language(s) is comparable to any natural-
ist inquiry: “The theory of core grammar, at least, is based on fundamental
principles that are natural and simple, and that our task is to discover them,
clearing away the debris that faces us when we explore the varied phenomena
of language and reducing the apparent complexity to a system that goes well
beyond empirical generalisation and that satisfies intellectual or even esthetic
standards” (Chomsky, 1981a, p. 14).
The notion of the “psychological reality” of grammar(s) under this re-
search objective is to be understood as the search for ‘explanatory adequacy.’
This means that we seek to explain the properties of linguistic expressions
among the world’s languages by using the primitives and principles that the
child inherently possesses in order to succeed in learning any of those lan-
guages by using the limited evidence and cognitive capacities available. The
rest of the grammatical rules must be regarded as socio-cultural noise that
is adopted from the environment, although they can, of course, also be stud-
ied, not to mention carefully distinguished from the lawful aspects of the
grammar.
The object of the study is the biologically determined initial state of the
language faculty in which these primitives and principles dwell: hence some
authors speak of “biolinguistics” (Jenkins, 2000). Since the child can learn
any of these languages from scratch, without reliable stimuli or ‘sophisticated
intelligence capacity,’ it follows that the world’s languages must, contrary to
outside appearance, be very similar to each other. Any putative complicated
rule system, as still often postulated in the name of ‘descriptive adequacy’ for
individual languages, already presents insuperable barriers to the learner, as
such systems have done for many generations of adult linguists. How could
the mentally retarded child learn such rules (viz., a language) on practically
one occasion (i.e., a few years) if a single rule already poses difficulties to
adult linguists of many generations, in the past and in the future?
In other words, the development of a generative grammar has been shaped
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by the conflict between descriptive adequacy and explanatory adequacy, de-
scriptive adequacy pointing to deep and perplexing differences between lan-
guages, and the requirements of explanatory adequacy being just the op-
posite. This sense of “psychological reality” nevertheless departs from, but
does not necessarily contradict, other usages (i.e., more functionalist theo-
ries or cognitive grammars). For example, from very early on, the study
of the Universal Grammar, in the context of the generative framework as-
sumed here, took the ultimate goal of linguistics to be the construction of
a “language as an instrument or tool” (Chomsky, 1957, p. 103), whose one,
but not only, use is communication. Theoretical frameworks that empha-
size the actual use of language in its communicative function hence do not
depart from the assumptions made in this study: I likewise emphasize that
role. One potentially meaningful point of departure is the assumption that
we nevertheless attempt to “describe [language’s] structure with no explicit
reference to the way in which this instrument is put to use” (ibid.), hence we
clearly depart at least from the functionalist perspective that makes reference
to extra-linguistic principles and primitives in explaining linguistic data.
According to some recent assumptions in the study of the UG, there is a
module in the brain, the ‘language faculty,’ in which the mind/brain performs
linguistic computation.1 There also exists what has been called ‘conceptual-
intentional systems’ (C-I), integrating linguistic input/output into other men-
tal faculties such as vision, thinking, moving and other ‘belief structures.’
Some aspects of meaning are determined at the C-I level only, but some take
an active part in the linguistic computation. Where to draw the line is an
interesting empirical issue, which is currently open. Suppose we could not
talk: all that would be left - many aspects of semantics and pragmatics, no
doubt - would belong to a realm outside of the language faculty (C-I), and
what we would get in addition when we began to speak in the manner we
1The hypothesis that linguistic processing is modular is supported by moderately strong
empirical evidence. Linguistic computation seems to be localized in the brain, and as such
is separated from the association with meaning: its functioning is independent of general
intelligence, the ability to learn, and so on (Bellugi, Birhle, Neville, Jernigan, & Doherty,
1992, Bellugi et al., 2001, Curtiss, 1981, Linebarger, Schwartz, & Saffran, 1983, Yamada,
1990, Smith & Tsimpli, 1991); its maturation seems to be regulated by a biologically de-
termined critical period (Newport, 1990, Skuse, 1984); finally, linguistic properties are,
as expected, generally different in nature from the semantic properties. For instance, lin-
guistic expressions have a linear order due to the limitations of our articularitory systems,
while meanings do not (there is no such limitation). This creates an empirically meaningful
tension between form and meaning (Chomsky, 1957, §9).
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do, is grammar. Clearly, the same conceptual structures could be expressed
in an infinite number of ways, so we need to keep these two mental faculties
distinct, apart from their interactions.
Much of the difficulty in dealing with lexical atomism and interpreting
that position coherently (§2.3) has to do, at least in my case, with the prob-
lem of locating the putative level of concepts in the matrix of other assump-
tions concerning the language faculty. What we know is that the lexical and
complex elements that appear at the interface between the language faculty
and the conceptual-intentional system are much like concepts as Fodor uses
the word. They may have some additional syntactic properties as they are
handled by the CHL, and obviously quite literally used by the conceptual-
intentional systems as the language faculty is, at least partially, under our
voluntary control. My assumptions concerning the relations between these
systems of representations become evident as I proceed.
A universal grammar is a specification of the initial state of the language
faculty: a particular language is specified by combining properties of the
UG, with some variation included. By “language” I mean I-language, the
generative capacity underlying the pairing of sound and meaning for that
language, to be contrasted with “E-language” representing a set of linguistic
expressions or utterances - a highly derivative notion in the study of the
mind/brain.
In assuming the technical concepts of GB theory and minimalism, I will
likewise assume the general framework underlying these theories, referred to
as the “Principles and Parameters theory.” This theory represents a radical
break from the mentalist grammars of the more traditional sort, including
the Aspects model.
The core idea of the P&P theory is that, in the search for explanatory ad-
equacy, we assume no language-specific rules or constructions: all linguistic
expressions are considered as a result between interaction of various com-
ponents of the UG, language-specific parameters that are set in one way
or another in the course of the maturation of the language faculty, and of
course some random variation as well. I will keep to this radical proposal
here, postulating no language-specific (narrow-syntactic) rules.
Given the recent suggestions concerning the minimalist theory, I assume
that the variation among languages is restricted largely to the morphologi-
cal and phonological components, a narrow syntax (and semantics) being a
component of the UG and its core grammar. This is an important hypothe-
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sis and guides the research through-and-through. For instance, consider the
restrictions in the extent to which predicates are involved in the causative
alternation in English. Given that virtually no such restrictions exist in
Finnish, it follows that such restrictions cannot be diagnostic of properties of
(narrow) syntax: the difference should, rather, be attributed to Morphology.
Linguistic computation is assumed to be purely syntactic. It assumes
formal entities, representations in terms of linguistic levels or derivations in
terms of constructing syntactic objects, as its input, and produces a set of
other formal entities, expressions, as output. In particular, meanings say,
mind-world -relations, do not enter into the determination of linguistic ex-
pressions inside the language faculty. When they do determine aspects of
linguistic expression, they are conveyed to linguistic computation by formal
semantic features at the “interface,” or anything that is “computable” in the
human brain (Chomsky, 2000a, pp. 73-74, 2000c, Fodor, 1981b, Jackendoff,
1997). “If semantics is,” Chomsky writes, “the relation between sound and
thing, it may not exist. If semantics is the study of relations like agency,
thematization, tense, event-structures and the place of arguments in them
and so on and so forth, that is a rich subject but that is syntax; that is, it
is all part of mental representations” (Chomsky, 2000a, p. 73). I will work
with semantics in the latter sense here.
Most of the present investigation is conducted in the framework of the
Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995, 2000, 2001). These theories, in turn,
are direct descendants of the Government and Binding theory (Chomsky,
1981a). Both are variants of the Principles and Parameters theory. When
the details and differences do not matter, GB-theoretical terminology such
as the X-bar notation is used for simplicity, although all of the essentials are
borrowed from minimalism. In the latter part of this thesis, I occasionally use
terms such as “d-structure” and“s-structure,” by which I mean, if interpreted
in terms of current minimalist theory, a logical form viewed from the two
respective perspectives: d-structure correlates with a more core thematic
structure without movement, s-structure with Spell-Out. This heuristic usage
was chosen for the sake of readability when the arguments I discuss were
themselves framed in the framework of the older GB theory, and when the
syntactic details did not matter for the issue at hand.
Moreover, the Minimalist Program itself does not yet represent a coherent
theory, but is rather a collection of new proposals and ideas: as Norbert
Hornstein put it: “Minimalism is not a theory but a set of guidelines for
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constructing grammatical theories” (Horstein, 1999, p. 61). I discuss these
broad guidelines in this chapter, returning to more substantial and technical
matters in sections 3.3 and beyond. Most of the material presented here
comes from Chomsky (1995, 2000b, 2001). The work is organized so that
Chapter 3 introduces the theory and included discussion of only some core
data, whereas Chapters 4 and 6 work more with the empirical material,
namely, causatives in the world’s languages insofar as they bear on the present
issue.
Central to minimalist program is what Chomsky has called the Strong(est)
Minimalist Thesis (Chomsky, 2001, p. 96, SMT):
(24) (Strong Minimalist Thesis, SMT.) Language is an optimal solution
to legibility conditions.
Whether this thesis is true or not is what the minimalist program seeks to
find out. How“perfect” is the human language (Chomsky, 1995, 1-11)? “Leg-
ibility conditions” involve the conceptual-intentional system (C-I) and the
phonological-articulatory-system (P-A), thought and sensorimotor systems,
respectively. P-A is often taken to consist of the level of phonological form
(PF), as it is taken here as well. The properties of these two systems, when
used in an “optimal manner” to implement a natural language, are assumed
to explain all peculiar properties of the UG and, therefore, the properties
of the core grammar of any natural language. We are lead to imagine a
super-engineer who faces the task of building a language faculty under cer-
tain external requirements, trying to find the most minimal and optimal de-
sign to satisfy these conditions, while creating no unnecessary complications
(Chomsky, 2000c).
Some evolutionary hypotheses are clearly implied here as well (see Martin
& Uriagereka, 2000). It could be that a minimal amount of ‘crystallization’
of neural tissue is sufficient to give the organism this ability, supposing it
already has the external systems.
The minimalist hypothesis represents an attempt to reach ‘beyond’ ex-
planatory adequacy by testing the hypothesis that language is, in a more or
less clearly defined sense, perfect and optimal system, involving no unneces-
sary primitives and principles given the legibility conditions. This hypothesis
differs from the weaker goal of trying to find the most elegant and perfect
theory by proposing that, contrary to appearances, the language faculty may
itself be surprisingly optimal.
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Here is another way of looking at the minimalist hypothesis. In the era
of the GB theory, the grammar of human language(s) was thought to be
composed out of various independent modules and their respective princi-
ples, usually formulated in terms of filters, plus certain selected levels of
representations, some of which were internal to the language faculty (e.g.,
d-structure, s-structure, surface structure, logical form). But why do any
such language-specific and highly surprising principles hold? At some point
the answer can be given only in terms of truly obscuring biological facts and
their complex mutual relations: thus, in the present state of understanding
one could only say that “the brain just happens to be (develop in) that way”
- a non-answer, that is. The minimalist program, in effect, is an attempt to
seek a cognitive explanation in terms of interface representations and notions
of optimality. Given the current level of understanding concerning biology
and cognitive architecture, this latter strategy is to be preferred.
Some optimality properties of human languages are rather trivial. For
example, linguistic expressions are not usually duplicated or repeated beyond
necessity. Some such properties are surprising, and certainly real, such as
economy-based restrictions covering the ‘displacement property.’ Clearly,
however, there are imperfections that militate against SMT, and this is what
makes the minimalist hypothesis interesting and surprising, if true. Suppose
that P is such an imperfection, such as formal features (Case, Agreement),
functional projections (Agr), or some weird property of “displacement” itself.
In this case, three options persist (Chomsky, 2000b, §3.5):
(25) (Imperfections.)(a) P is real, and an imperfection; (b) P is not real,
contrary to what had been supposed; or, (c) P is real, but not an
imperfection; it is part of a “best way” to meet design specifications.
Option (a) stands against SMT (24, p. 64). Option (b) is interesting,
for this means that P can be reduced, or explained away, in a way that is
consistent with minimalist guidelines, hopefully in a more elegant manner.
For example, the putative reduction of the X-bar theory to a “bare phrase
structure” represents this choice (to be discussed presently). In the case of
most imperfections, (b) will be assumed in this study. Consider option (c).
The more or less standard explanation for “displacement” in the minimalist
framework has been to try to show that it involves the deletion of formal
features for the sake of interpretability at the level LF. The question then
arises as to why there are such formal features, given SMT. In this study, I
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adopt option (b) concerning formal features in the lexicon and displacement,
and thus I attempt to show that they can be eliminated.
3.2 Minimalist architecture
Let us now turn to the minimalist architecture itself. According to the GB
theory, separate d- and s-structures are assumed to be part of the language
faculty, in addition to PF and LF. However, if language is an optimal solution
in terms of the legibility conditions, then we would expect no such levels of
representations to exist, hence they would be unreal (adopting option b).
This assumption is one key aspect of the minimalist program.
With the s-structure and the d-structure discounted, evidence that has
been explained by relying upon the former and its own representational con-
ditions is now explained under the assumption that some properties of the
language faculty are derivational rather than representational. What this
means is that a linguistic expression is built by CHL in a step-by-step fash-
ion and sent at a certain point to the phonological system (PF), while the
other part continues towards LF and C-I. This point of departure is called
Spell-Out. No conditions that are internal to the language faculty, with the
possible exception of PF and LF, need to be satisfied “all at once,” but
rather the derivation is allowed to proceed on its own course, observing the
given conditions of optimality and Full Interpretation at the interface. Full
Interpretation (FI) requires that the interface level contains only features
that are interpretable by the computational systems accessing these inter-
faces: for example, LF must contain features that are understandable by the
conceptual-intentional systems. Computations that converge from Spell-Out
into LF now represent covert syntax, and the rest is overt syntax. In order
to keep language “usable,” no new selections of phonological or semantic fea-
tures can be made from the numeration after Spell-Out, and only PF and
LF remain as real linguistic levels.2
Let us now turn to the basic properties of the computational component
CHL in order to gain a better understanding of the optimality properties.
Assume that the language faculty involves a computational operation CHL
that constructs linguistic expressions <PF, LF> from an array N(umeration)
2The Y-shaped architecture was sometimes replaced in the later versions of the theory
with more dynamic notion(s) of Spell-Out.
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of lexical choices, each lexical element associated with an index to represent
how many times a particular item can be drawn from the numeration.
Lexical choices are bundles of features, semantic, formal and phonologi-
cal. It is often assumed that these features are already present in N (“Strict
Lexicalist Hypothesis”). A linguistic expression is a pair of interface repre-
sentations PF and LF. The aim is to derive an explanation that takes CHL
to map the Numeration into Exp(ressions) so that the functionality condi-
tion is observed (Thus, CHL: N −→ Exp). The idea is then that CHL must
minimize some “cost function” when it produces the syntactic object, the
derivation crashing if a wrong choice is made.
In the early days, the cost function was thought to screen out the deriva-
tion that had the fewest number of steps and made only local operations.
The Numeration is said to determine the reference set for the computation,
meaning that all possible derivations from this set are taken into consider-
ation when comparing derivations relative to the given cost function. Im-
plementing this idea computationally is almost senseless however, since it
invokes processes that are global in terms of comparing complete deriva-
tions, and therefore extremely complex computationally. Reactions to this
problem have been various, but the general picture seems to be that it would
be fruitful at least to attempt to seek economic principles that are local
and computationally more simple (Chomsky, 2001, Collins, 1997, Frampton
& Gutman, 1999). To a great extent, this explains many recent proposals
concerning the developing minimalist program, and I will likewise restrict
myself to extremely local operations. For example, in Collins’ proposal when
it is a question of deciding which of the possible moves in the derivation of
linguistic expressions are taken to be optimal the computational procedure
uses only local information available at the syntactic object at hand without
comparing any of the potential outcomes. This has what I believe the wel-
come consequence that some of the explanatory burden of Numeration will
be gone.
In pursuing SMT, then, what assumptions concerning CHL must be made,
given conceptual necessity alone? Clearly, language must involve some pro-
cess capable of recursion. Suppose that CHL contains a computational oper-
ation Merge, which takes two syntactic objects, SOi and SOj, and constructs
a new syntactic element, SOi, SOj by merging SOi and SOj. Following SMT,
CHL and Merge will not insert any auxiliary features, such as syntactic labels,
into these representations besides those that are included in N (“Inclusive-
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ness,” Chomsky, 1995, p. 228). Thus, the following figure represents the
Merge operation:
(26) Merge(SOi, SOj)
SOi SOj
However, it seems necessary to determine the head of the newborn SO, so
let us take Merge to merge SOi and SOj into K = [SOx [SOi, SOj]] with x =
i or j. If x = i, then SOi is the head of K. Which syntactic object is actually
the head? One could speculate that this choice derives from the thematic
properties of these elements. Endocentricity is derived, not stipulated.
Are there conditions placed on the application of Merge? For one thing,
one could assume that (pure) Merge can apply only at the root (Chomsky,
1995, p. 248) and that it can form only binary sets, presumably the simplest
and most economical possibility available (Chomsky, 1995, §4, Kayne, 1984,
Larson, 1988, Radford, 1997, §9). For the present purposes, let us assume
that there are no other conditions; this is in agreement with most minimalist
theorizing and presumably consistent with SMT. Thus, the application of
Merge is essentially free.3 The derivation is said to converge if it produces
one syntactic object SO, such that it satisfies the legibility conditions (PF,
LF), does this in an optimal way and exhausts the numeration. Otherwise
the derivation crashes, producing a linguistic expression that is deviant. Of
course, N multiple representations exist for each array of lexical choices, many
of which even satisfy the legibility conditions but not conditions of optimality,
or vice versa.
The operation of pure Merge produces linguistic objects, beginning what
has traditionally been explained as the ‘thematic core’ of linguistic repre-
sentations (d-structures), thus merging the VP internal arguments around
the verbal head. Focusing on these thematically motivated structures of lin-
guistic representations, I will refer to “argument structures” of head verbs.
3In Chomsky’s terms, a “guiding intuition of the Minimalist Program is that operations
apply anywhere, without special stipulation, the derivation crashing if a ‘wrong choice’ is
made” (Chomsky, 1995, p. 231). What about the selectional properties of the elements
drawn from the numeration? One possibility would be to assume that they are observed as
part of Merge, thus Merge cannot merge two objects if their selectional properties do not
match. The other would be to rule out such constructions at the level LF. Chomsky (2000,
pp. 133-134) proposes that selectional properties of elements from numeration can be used
to predict the head of the resulting construction, thus deriving the relevant asymmetry.
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Movement is discussed in section 3.5. The subsequent sections deal with such
argument structures (§3.3) and their thematic properties (§3.4), respectively.
It is at this point that I have to depart somewhat from the standard min-
imalist framework due to the fact that, since I have taken lexical atomism
as my working hypothesis, I cannot invoke lexical semantic features such
as s-selection in explaining the properties of argument structures and their
thematic properties. Argument structures cannot be projections from the
lexicon. Instead, I will argue that their properties and their thematic prop-
erties can be predicated along the lines of the general non-lexical principles
of the UG.
3.3 Argument structures: pure First Merge
The role of the lexcion has become increasingly significant in the development
of the theory of syntax, in particular the framework of the Universal Gram-
mar (Stowell, 1992). Ever since the introduction of the Aspect model, which
still took lexical items to be ‘Bloomfieldian exceptions,’ a large proportion
of the rules of syntactic rewriting were implemented in the lexicon in terms
of syntactical subcategorization frames in order to avoid the duplication of
such information in the base component.
At first, these features were taken to consist of syntactic information, but
later, essentially with the help of certain more abstract rules of the UG, it
become possible to suggest that the syntactic frames could be predicted from
the semantic properties of the lexical items, together with the principles
of the UG (Chomsky, 1986). In fact, it is assumed today that what have
previously been referred to as rules of grammar are now seen as projections
of the semantic properties of the lexicon. Indeed, we have progressed far
from Bloomfield’s conception of the lexicon as “an appendix of the grammar,
a list of basic irregularities” (Bloomfield, 1933, p. 274). This now seems just
what the inscrutability of lexical semantics pretends characterises lexicon: it
is semantically unstructured.
However, what is essential in terms of the present theory is the fact that
argument structures are basically relational: they relate lexical items to each
other. Thus, the fact that kill takes an Agent at [Spec, VP] is not a fact of
killing per se, but a fact about whatever represents the Agent and killing.
It is a fact about the Agent’s being the killer and therefore involves at least
some sort of predication. If this is so, then predication is not intrinsic in
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killing, but it is a more general and indeed fundamental aspect of language
‘across the board.’ A general principle ought to be in operation. Thus, it does
not suffice to grasp the lexical elements in order to master the proper notion
of ‘argument structure’; one must also grasp the way these lexical elements
interact, especially under the influence of the relation of predication. This
basic thought-forming relation is, furthermore, a fundamental part of our
cognitive apparatus and everyday understanding of how objects in the world
interact.
Thus, according to the present proposal, the lexicon has a more abstract
role: lexical items do not assign theta roles to any of their arguments. Rather,
what assigns theta roles is a “pre-syntactic” subcomponent of the Universal
Grammar, which is discussed below. The principles that assign thematic roles
to the lexical elements, again discussed below, is a component that works not
with a single lexical element, but with several in combination.
Let us proceed with the details. What follows is a proposal concerning
how to build the argument structures of heads through the operation of First
Merge, while omitting the issue of movement. The major difference between
this proposal and standard minimalist theory is that I do not assume neo-
Larsonian vP shells and that, in an idealized sense, there are no idiomatic
semantic features that are part of the lexical elements themselves, although
of course these structures are based on semantic, interpretable properties. I
will first present the more formal details, and then return to the semantics.
I will follow Fukui (1995) and Chomsky (2000b, p. 126) in assuming
that intermediate X-bar positions (X
′
) in lexical projections are unlimited
in LF, and Napoli (1989) in assuming that the head of any XP, X being a
non-functional head, is semantically a predicate, and that specifiers and com-
plements are its arguments. The X-bar theory is, to a great extent, a gram-
matical reflection of the cognitive predication relation. Nevertheless, I will
follow minimalist theory in that the X-bar theory is used only heuristically,
and linguistic representations are reduced to a binary“bare phrase structure”
(Chomsky, 1995, pp. 242-249). Lexical elements are not attributed categorial
features at this point, but are assumed to represent abstract properties and
relations, depending on their valency or adicity that is freely attached to any
lexical element: a property is represented by one-place predicates, a relation
by n-place predicates (n > 1). Such lexical elements are never pronounced,
or rather they are pronounced only when they have been assigned some cat-
egorial feature or another. In other words, I will remain neutral concerning
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the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis, returning to it in section 3.6. Thus, I take
words such as envies and enviousness to represent the intensional property
or relation of ‘enviousness’ (see Fodor, 1998a, 1998b, §3, 4, Fodor, 2001),
corresponding to one lexical element at the LLF level and, furthermore, to
one primitive concept at the putative level of “concepts.” A lexical element
lex with adicity n, lexn, is said to project with f 1, . . ., f n empty positions,
giving a linguistic representation (27) of what in the standard logic is ex-
pressed in an atomic formula (28):
(27) XP
f 1 X
′
. . . X
′
f n lex
n
(28) lexn(f 1, . . ., fn)
Lexn is an unsaturated predicate with n empty slots for its arguments:
when all these slots are filled with arguments, the resulting construction has
adicity 0 and it represents a saturated proposition (Higginbotham, 1985) or
full projection (FP). These propositions are, again, intensional entities, and
they differ from declarative judgements (more below). The arguments may
comprise, and in some case must comprise, other XPs of arbitrary complexity,
thus recursion enters into the picture here. LLF structure (29) thus generates
the meanings of expressions such as (30)(a-c):
(29) XP
f i X
′
XP
full projection
X
′
f n lex
n
(30) a. It seems that [XP Charon ferries them across the river]
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b. I think [XP Charon ferries them across the river]
c. It struck me that [XP Charon ferries them across the river]
There are no syntactic labels except for XP, as assumed in the “bare
phrase structure,” although the emergence of XP could be predicted from
the thematic properties of the head (namely, its valency). Thus, apart from
XP, there are no labels (Collins, 2002), and the matter is further sharpened
as we go along. In keeping predicates distinct from arguments, suppose that
in order for lexn to project, it has been merged with an operator “℘” that
indicates that it is an unsaturated predicate. This operator corresponds to
the inverse of a nominalization function (Chierchia & Turner, 1987, Coc-
chiarella, 1985), which converts ‘nominals’ such as killing into unsaturated
predicates such as ‘- kill -’. Otherwise, lexical elements represent saturated
properties or relations. Example (31) thus represents a full saturated projec-
tion/proposition:
(31) XP
f i X
′
. . . X
′
f n X
0
℘ lexn
Let us assume that propositions, represented by LLF representations of
the above kind, are abstract entities that can be instantiated in concrete
spatio-temporal particulars, or events, hence XP can be merged with another
predication operator ℘ and predicated of the events located in T (tense).
If this suggestion is correct, then tensed sentences contain an “overt event
variable” located in the constituent T (for similar proposals, see Chomsky,
2000b, Davidson, 1967, Lepore & McLaughlin, 1985, Higginbotham, 1983,
1985, 1986, Platzack & Rosengren, 1998, Pollock, 1989, Vlach, 1983).4 All
in all, a declarative sentence is represented at LLF as shown in (32).
4Thus, according to Platzak and Rosengren (1998), “Finiteness anchors the event in
time and space, by identifying a point on the time line with the speaker’s here and now”
(p. 190)
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(32) TP/FP
T
℘ XP/FP
f i X
′
. . . X
′
f n X
′
℘ lexn
Here“FP”refers to full projection, but it can be associated with“XP”with
the reservation that it is not yet to be interpreted as a “maximal projection,”
since the number of arguments (X
′
-level projections) and adicity are not yet
restricted in any way. In the vocabulary of the more familiar GB theory, the
highest FP is a TP, the lower is a VP without an internal vP projection (but
with an unlimited number of slots for arguments), but note that, in avoiding
the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis, the lexical elements at the abstract LLF
level do not so far contain any formal categorial features : there is as yet no
V to project a VP.
In line with a recent version of the minimalist theory, I will not assume
Agr projections (Chomsky, 1995, §4), but T may well contain a strong EPP
feature that must be checked. C may contain mood and force, its positions
being the target of A
′
movement, but it is not shown above and will not be
discussed here. Since the lower FP represents a proposition and could be
compared to VP, it is a “phase” in the Chomskyan sense (2000b, 2001). The
status of the upper FP is more complicated, but if we take it to contain an
empty C (which is nevertheless ignored here), then it, too, corresponds to a
phase. Because of these similarities, the above LLF representation could be
labelled, for heuristic purposes, as shown in (33):
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(33) TP
T VP
℘ VP
NP1
(Spec,VP)
V
′
. . . V
′
NPn
(Comp,VP)
V0
℘ lexn
In what follows, I will use these labels when they simplify the exposition,
but the underlying form is to be understood as containing no labels. The
theory makes no reference to these labels, FP notwithstanding. As I allow any
number of intermediate LLF projections, I follow Bouchard (1995, §2.1.2.1),
for example, in preventing all vacuous projection, rejecting the Uniform Two-
Level Hypothesis of Chomsky (1970).5
Assume the positions of arguments are predicted by their thematic prop-
erties, in the manner indicated in several recent works such as that by Hale &
Keyser (1993). Note, however, that I do not take these thematic properties
to be part of the lexical elements, assuming the atomistic lexicon: they are
rather part of the UG. Thematic properties are discussed in section 3.4. Once
they have done their work, they disappear from CHL, leaving only the formal
LLF properties. This is a fairly common assumption: the thematic roles of
the arguments are represented in the ‘deep syntax’ (cf. Baker, 1988, Burzio,
1986, Chomsky, 1995, Grimshaw, 1990, Hale & Keyser, 1993, Jackendoff,
1972, Pinker, 1989, Rappaport & Levin, 1988).
In sum, lexical elements at the LLF level represent intensional entities
such as properties and relations, being first unsaturated and then predicated
from each other: the resulting abstract propositions are further predicated of
5It is also assumed that the dative structure is not flat, due to the assumption of binary
branching at the LLF level. This assumption is supported by a variety of data concerning
binding and quantifier scope, for example (see Fujita, 1996, Kayne, 1984, Larson, 1988,
Levin, 1993, §2).
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events to represent a (tensed) judgement. Syntactically, the resulting struc-
ture (LLF) is close to the Agr-less and double-Spec “bare” LF structures
proposed in recent minimalist theories,6 and could be taken as a certain
abstraction from such minimalist LF with some syntactic properties and re-
lations missing, essentially because of clarity and readability.
LLF representations are comparable to a “formal language” with an in-
terpretation, and indeed the theory has been implemented on a computer
platform. The representations can be easily translated into a first-order lan-
guage and given a fairly standard model-theoretical interpretation, with the
exception that the model is to contain intensional entities, such as redness,
as primitives (Bealer, 1982). Thus, LLF is interpreted, in the core cases,
solely in terms of truth-conditional semantics, abstracting away from lan-
guage use and other pragmatic aspects. This is important, for language is
full of phenomena that are not to be explained in terms of representational
levels individuated, in essence, by their truth-conditional semantics: I will,
of course, return to this topic later. In any case, LLF is only a small part
of what we mean by the “interpretation” of linguistic expressions, but, in
addition to being, or so it is argued, a linguistically active level of represen-
tation, it nevertheless attempts to satisfy the essential properties of concepts
in Fodor’s theory as well (Fodor, 1998a, §2).
Considered from a slightly different perspective, it is a level of represen-
tation that meets requirements from both linguistic data and systematic-
ity/productivity, but it is not a full explanation of either: it is an interface
representation, connecting aspects of both. I will return to these questions
in a more detailed manner later (§6.1), discussing various options concerning
the status of LLF.
A word of caution is in order concerning my usage of the word “lexical
element” in what follows. According to the theory of LLF, a lexical element
is a primitive element that appears either in a predicate position or in an
argument position at the LLF level, and it is neutral with respect to its Case
6Chomsky (1995, §4) proposed a way of eliminating some of the explanatory burden by
applying what has been called a “double Spec hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis,
some heads in certain languages have formal features that can be eliminated twice by
inserting two elements into the two spec-positions inside this head’s maximal projection.
If this analysis is pursued successfully, and applied to a variety of Agr-related data (e.g.,
Pollock, 1989), then it could be shown that elements such as Agr are not real, but (suc-
cessful) fictive abstractions (option b). If there are no Agr projections, then according to
one proposal, the features of the subject are checked at [Spec, TP], and those of the object
at [Spec, vP]. This is the structure that will emerge here.
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or syntactic category. In other words, my “lexical elements” are more ab-
stract entities than those that linguists might have become used to: they are
abstract since they have been tailored to constitute, in part, the interface
between concepts and the language faculty in a way that is consistent with
what we know about lexical concepts, productivity and systematicity. This
means, for instance, that their morphological properties, say restrictions in
causativization, are not encoded at this level. Rather, such restrictions are
part of an independent morphological component (§6.4). Taking such facts
into account produces a more specific and more concrete notion of “lexical el-
ement.” Although these destrinctions are merely terminological conventions,
it is important to keep them in mind in order to avoid misunderstanding and
to remain clear about the (so far relatively narrow) explanatory scope of the
putative LLF-representations.
From a more personal perspective, LLF representation was meant from
the beginning to be a level of ‘propositional thought’ containing everything
that is relevant to the operation of the language faculty. For all I know, propo-
sitional thought does not contain nouns, verbs, or their concatenations, but
comprise more abstract elements of ‘logical subjects’ and ‘logical predicates’;
LLF is a Fregean implementation of elements of the latter type.
3.4 The Θ-theory
In the previous section I spelled out some minimalist assumptions concern-
ing the argument structures, making two novel suggestions. First, I assumed,
but have not yet argued, that there are no vP projections. I will return to
the motivation for this simplification later. Secondly, I argued that the the-
matic properties determining the construction of the core argument struc-
tures around the head predicates (argument structures being syntactic re-
flexes of thematic properties) ought not to be part of the lexical elements,
taken in isolation, but something that appears when several lexical elements
are combined by the operation of pure First Merge.
The purpose of this latter assumption is connected to the atomistic hy-
pothesis: since according to that hypothesis one cannot assume that lexical
elements contain semantic lexical decompositions, general principles of the
UG must be in operation. Prima facie, this seems to be so, for the argument
structures do follow systematic and productive principles.
What follows in this section is a discussion of the more semantic aspects
76
of the theory of argument structures - what the crucial thematic properties
are and how they influence grammar. I will propose, in line with Russell
(1940), Grimshaw (1990) and Tenny (1988), that the aspectual dimension
of the event structures of predicates is an important ingredient in projecting
thematic properties onto argument structures. What emerges is a theory that
takes the thematic theory out of the lexicon and raises it in part to the status
of a general theory of UG, and in part to the level of other non-semantical
grammatical constraints.
In projections with two or more participators (/arguments), these par-
ticipants must be distinguished from each other, as Brutus killed Caesar
differs in its truth-value from Caesar killed Brutus. So far, the difference is
encoded in terms of dominance hierarchy in its lexico-logical form. In model-
theoretical semantics this is usually done with respect to the ordering <f 1,
. . ., f n> of the arguments. However, the problem is that “ordering” is not
cognitively meaningful, although dominance hierarchy (constituency) most
certainly is. Why is Brutus “ordered first” with respect to Caesar, or vice
versa? Clearly, to avoid circularity we must answer this question before we
observe their “order” in the corresponding sentence.
This problem has traditionally been accounted for by postulating the-
matic roles and their syntactic linking. A considerable part of what would
previously have been called part of syntax, subcategorization features in par-
ticular, is today often explained on the basis of such semantic properties
of predicates (Stowell, 1992). If items in the lexicon lack semantic struc-
ture, then one could anticipate that such a task becomes impossible. This
is not so, however. We must only jettison the assumption that the relevant
semantic properties constitute the lexicon. Rather, they must follow from
general principles of UG such that they are not of lexical origin. This, in
turn, requires a theory of thematic roles and their syntactic linking that is
general enough to support such a detachment of thematic information from
the lexical component.
Traditionally, thematic roles have been characterized by notions such as
Agent, Patient and Theme. However, it is well-known that “as soon as we
try to be precise about exactly what Agent, Patient, etc., ‘mean,’ it is all too
subject to difficulties and apparent counterexamples,” as David Dowty put
it in a review on thematic roles (Dowty, 1991, p. 549). I will not use notions
such as Agent, Patient or Theme here.
Instead, consider the ‘aspectual theory’ presented in Russell (1940). Ac-
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cording to this theory, Brutus killed Caesar differs from Caesar killed Brutus
in the sense that, in the former, Brutus engaged in the activity of killing
first, whereas in the latter it was Caesar. This appears to be a remarkable
insight since it turns out that structural argument positions mirror temporal
involvement in the aspectual structure of the event. The rest of the semantic
interpretation, i.e. the notion of Agent and Patient, Causer and Causee, etc.,
are taken in this account to be a matter of “pragmatic interpretation” at the
C-I level, and irrelevant to linguistic computation. Indeed, they appear to be
special instances of the aspectual dimension: the Agent temporally precedes
the Patient in the event, if it is ever to be its “source” or “originator,” and
likewise, the Causer temporally precedes the Causee.
Finding the correct level of abstraction in semantics that is relevant to
linguistic concerns is essential (Bouchard, 1995). As I pointed out earlier, it
is also essential in atomist theory in that it allows one to detach the problem
of syntactic linking from the lexicon.
Assuming that only aspectual properties are linguistically relevant does
not imply that there is no such notion as Agent or Patient. The claim is that
it is the aspectual dimension that enters the computation of representations
at the (L)LF level, the rest being part of the C-I system. In other words,
the language faculty does not ‘see’ whether some constituent it processes
represents an intentional Agent or not.
Moreover, there are languages in which Agents - in the pragmatic sense of
the term - are grammaticalized in various linguistic constructions by various
means, hence the above claim is valid only for the purpose of the individuation
of thematic roles at the LLF level. I do not wish to imply by this that all
computational processes are insensitive to these pragmatic notions.
If (34) is a lexico-logical representation representing the core argument
structure of the predicate lexn, as assumed in the previous section, the tem-
poral order of the constituents 1, . . ., n in the event of lexn-ing is as
indicated by these indices, Subj1 being the first, Obj2 being the second, and
so forth.
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(34) XP
Subj1 X
′
Obj2 X
′
. . . X
′
Objn X
0
℘ lexn
Since I am adopting an aspectual individuation of arguments, let Subj1,
. . ., Objn in any full projection be called a-arguments, “a” from aspectual.
One reason for accepting Russell’s insight concerning the individuation
of arguments (participants) is that many highly obscure thematic roles can
be subsumed under this generalisation. By way of illustration, consider the
following list of “thematic cores” of predicates (Pinker, 1989, p. 73):
(35) a. X causes Y to have Z
b. X acts on Y
c. X acts
d. X is in a location or state or goes to a location or state
e. X causes Y to go to Z
f. X causes Y to go into a state by causing Z to go to Y
g. X goes to Y
All these examples, perhaps (f) notwithstanding, are instances of aspec-
tual individuation, thus they may be subsumed under the same generalisa-
tion. In every case, X’s participation in the event precedes that of Y, and
the same is true of Y and Z.
Keenan (1976) argued, on the basis of a cross-linguistic survey, that agents
and causal forces are universally encoded as subjects. Similarly, following
a wide cross-linguistic survey, Dixon (1994) concluded, “What has always
seemed to me remarkable is that different languages, from all over the world,
show a fair constituency [in that] it is almost always the Agent of AFFECT
verbs, the Donor for GIVING, the Speaker for SPEAKING and the Perceiver
for ATTENTION that are identified as [subject]” (p. 8), so that agents of
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transitive predicates like cut, give, tell and see are“consistently treated in ex-
actly the same way, in all aspects of morphology and syntax, across every type
of human language” (p. 115). A welcome consequence of Russell’s theory,
however, is that we do not need to invoke an obscure notion like “Agency” to
explain these facts, or any of the putative underlying essences, such as the no-
tions of “causation” (cf. Croft, 1991), “intentionality,”“source of self-energy”
(Chafe, 1970), “potency of the agent” (Hopper & Thompson, 1980), “relevant
to the success of the activity” (Dixon, 1994), or “object affectedness” (Pinker,
1989). These are instances of the more general theory, the agent being the
“originator” of the event, hence preceding all other participants, whatever
other characterisations and semantic elucidations are provided by the C-I
system. There is also psychological evidence that novel transitive verbs are
not interpreted causally, and that something more abstract must be involved
(Naigles & Kako, 1993).
To provide further evidence, Hopper & Thompson (1980) showed that
direct objects correlate with a participant that is acted upon or caused to
undergo a change (see also Dryer, 1986), both instances of the generalisation
suggested by Russell. It has also been established empirically that when inter-
preting novel ‘transitive events,’ both children and adults assume the scheme
Agent/Patient, again a subcase of the Russellian generalisation (Behrend,
1990, Clark, 1993, Gleitman, 1990). The insight provided by Russell promises
to subsume all these as special cases.
I will show later that much the same is true of causatives, representing
a bona fide case of the aspectual individuation of arguments (see Comrie,
1985 and Lakoff, 1987, pp. 54-55). In fact, my putative atomistic explana-
tion of “causativity” is already visible here: since causativity is a bona fide
example of aspectual relation - viz., a relation between the causer and causee
- its overwhelming productivity and systematicity in the world’s languages
may be explained as arising from the properties of thematic roles and their
syntactic linking. This amounts to explaining causativity without lexical de-
compositions or meaning postulates: rather, we begin from general properties
of the interface between the language faculty and C-I systems.
If we consider the properties of expressions from the perspective of mod-
ular linguistic computation, assuming the above generalisation, we find that
there is no causation, volition or permission, and no thematic roles that are
visible, only the temporal order of the arguments, encoded in lexico-logical
representations. This means that, in terms of linguistic computation, only
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formal features of the lexico-logical form, on which the aspectual individua-
tion of arguments are “projected,“ matters.7
Let us explore the empirical meaning of these assumptions further. Con-
sider a typical inchoative (36)(a-c).
(36) a. the vase break
b. the vase was broken
c. Erebus breaks the vase
Example (a) involves only one argument. There is no internal temporal
structure to sort out the participators. In (c) there are two arguments. We
predict that the external argument represents a participator who participates
in the event of breaking before the vase. We grasp the transitive break in a
sense involving a volatile agent, in this case Erebus. In terms of modularity,
however, this interpretation and its pragmatic niceties are supplied by the
C-I system (in an indefinitely detailed manner). This agentive interpretation
supplied by the mind is not necessary vis-a`-vis the syntactic properties of the
expressions, as shown by (37)(a-b) below.
(37) a. the wind broke the window
b. the disagreement broke the relationship
None of these involve Agency or volition. Rather, they involve causation
and aspectual order. The crucial parameter seems to be Animacy: if wind
were considered as an animate being, then the agentive interpretation would
again be possible, thus again involving a pragmatic judgement, presumably
part of the C-I. But from a syntactic point of view, (36)(a-c) are identical
to (37)(a-b) in the relevant sense. Finally, (36)(b) involves an implicit or
vacuous cause, to which I will return later.
Consider the fact that not all causatives involve direct or indirect causa-
tion: sometimes the relation between the causer and causee (or the caused
event) is permissive (‘let’) or assistive (‘help’). There are languages in which
the causative morpheme carries all of these meanings instead of the causative
proper, and languages in which some other features of the sentence may al-
ter the force of the causal bond (Comrie, 1985, §2.2, Talmy, 1985). This
7As Pinker put it: “Thematic information goes into determining a verb’s argument
structure, but that is the extent of its influence; the rest of the syntax cannot ‘see’ it
directly” (Pinker, 1989, p. 71; for similar proposals, see Burzio, 1986, Hale & Keyser,
1993, Pinker, 1989, Rappaport & Levin, 1988).
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phenomenon now has a natural explanation. All different cases and slightly
differing causative forces are subsumed under the same linguistic generalisa-
tion provided by Russell. The rest is a matter of C-I.
It has been noted that the thematic role of the external argument is
assigned not by the head verb alone, but rather “compositionally” by the VP
(Chomsky, 1981a, Marantz, 1984). This problem, too, is eliminated under
the present proposal. Consider (38)(a-e) (from Marantz, 1984, p. 25):
(38) a. Erebus threw a basketball
b. Erebus threw support behind the candidate
c. Erebus threw a boxing match
d. Erebus threw a party
e. Erebus threw a fit
The problem is that Erebus receives a number of thematic roles, depend-
ing on the direct object of the verb. However, the problem itself depends on
the individuation of these thematic roles. If this is done aspectually, then
the problem disappears. In each case Erebus participates in the event before
the direct object.
A lexical element may be attached with the feature [+not aspectual],
meaning that it lacks an internal event dynamics, and if an event structure
is important in distinguishing arguments from each other, it follows that
such lexical items may be “combined” in one argument. However, there is
evidence that a structural position corresponding to the second argument
may appear in such a case, resulting in expletive structures - a structure
with an uninterpretable “quasi-argument” (§6.3).
Although the aspectual theory of thematic roles provides potential gener-
alisation, there exists a group of noncanonical verbs that behave differently.
These include verbs of mental states, perceiving and receiving, among oth-
ers. In some cases, predicates have both forms, as possibly in the case of
predicates such as receives/reaches. These are problematic in terms of for
the aspectual theory, and also in terms of the more traditional theory insofar
as such more robust thematic roles are drawn into the linguistic structures
by general rules. On the other hand, given that thematic roles emerge from
the lexicon, these exceptions do pose a somewhat milder problem, for there
is plenty of room for lexical idiosyncrasy and stipulation.
Let us assume that the aspectual individuation of arguments explained
above is canonical, and that the rest are noncanonical, to be explained by
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postulating specific mechanisms of some sort. This is not a meaningless as-
sumption empirically. Pinker (1984, §8) cited evidence to show that children
had difficulties precisely in learning noncanonical verbs such as receive or
strike as if compared to the canonical ones, all conforming to the aspectual
patterns suggested here: this suggests that children approach the individ-
uation of such arguments by assuming that they are ordered aspectually.
According to Pinker, the differences are, in fact, “dramatic,” so that “verbs
that intrinsically violate the canonical mapping [. . .] are virtually nonexis-
tent in children’s speech” (Pinker, 1984, p. 307, see also Slobin, 1984).
Marantz (1982) reports a study confirming a similar pattern: children
had great difficulties in learning noncanonical verbs.8 Much the same is true
of adults. When presented with a novel unknown verb plus a situation in
which agents and patients are present, adults pair, by default, agents with
the external subject, and the patient with the position of a complement,
exactly as is predicted. Dowty (1987) further notes that these noncanonical
verbs are few in number, low in frequency, acquired late, and more common
in elevated than in casual speech.
If the canonical pattern is aspectual, we would expect children to make
another type of mistake: they could easily overgeneralize by creating new
aspectual arguments where adult grammar does not tolerate them. This
phenomenon has been confirmed in several empirical studies (Bowerman,
1974, Braine, 1971 among others). Children overgeneralize in a predictable
way (for similar data from other languages, see Berman, 1982, Figueira, 1984,
MacWhinney, 1985, Slobin, 1985; see also Pinker, 1989). Such errors are quite
persistent, lasting for several years (Pinker, 1989, §7.1.3).
For this reason, let us assume that some predicates belong to the marked
case and are marked with the feature [+noncanonical] to suggest that their
arguments are linked to syntactic positions differently, but also exceptionally.
Given the thematic individuation of arguments based on their aspectual
properties, plus the fact that the lexico-logical form has the relevant struc-
ture, the notion of “thematic hierarchy” can be derived. If there is a causee,
it is always dominated by the causer in the lexico-logical form. If there is
an Agent and a Theme, the Theme is always dominated by the Agent; in
general, if there is an Agent, it dominates Themes, and Goals. The Bene-
factive always appears after the Theme. Thus, it follows that the hierarchy
is not uniform, but depends upon what thematic roles are present. There is
8The study is unavailable, but is cited in Marantz, 1984 and Pinker, 1984.
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some independent evidence that this assumption is correct (as suggested in
Bouchard, 1995, Jackendoff, 1972, Grimshaw, 1990). The proposal is similar
to the UTAH principle suggested in Baker (1988), and adopted in several
works since then (e.g., Burzio, 1986, Chomsky, 1995, Hale & Keyser, 1993,
Rappaport & Levin, 1988), in correlating thematic positions almost one-to-
one with a representational structure. Some differences become evident later.
When we assess the aspectual prominence of some participant in an event,
care must be taken to ensure that the description involves only the event
subsumed under the given predicate, and not some larger context, and that
the properties described thereby are really necessary (constitutive) for the
event under inspection.
For instance, one experimental paradigm, which aims at describing the
direction of causality and hence also the direction of aspectuality in an event,
involves asking subjects to fill in explanations of the event. For instance,
given a verb such as notice within a complete sentence, Charon noticed Bill,
because . . ., subjects were required to complete the sentence after ‘because
. . .’ (Brown & Fish, 1983, Au, 1986). The result was that, with some verbs
(e.g., recognized), the explanation involved some property / event concerning
the patient (Erebus recognized Charon, because she . . .), whereas some other
verbs involved the subject (e.g., amazed)(Erebus amazed Charon, because he
. . .). It was reasoned that the latter verbs involved “object causality,” as if
the causality, and hence the aspectuality, would flow from the object to the
subject, contrary to the theory proposed here. Only the other type of verbs
with “subject causality” would conform to the pattern presented here.
Clearly, as pointed out by Malle (2001), these because clauses provide ex-
planations for the occurrences of the events, and not of the internal aspectual
properties of the event itself. The because clause thus describes another event
and, which is worse, an event that only typically precedes the other event
and is thus not even a constitutive component of the event in question. In
other words, even if Erebus might recognize Charon because Charon is tall,
the very event of recognizing, not the event of being tall, is surely caused by
Erebus by being, in the first place, in a certain characteristic mental state.
Furthermore, Erebus might recognize Charon for countless other reasons as
well; for example, Charon might be exceptionally beautiful, or Erebus might
have paid some attention to her, for no apparent reason.
In order to illustrate another problem involved in the individuation of
the relevant event, let us consider the distinction between launch and en-
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trainment causatives. In both cases the causer causes the patient object to
undergo some action, but in the former, not in the latter, the agent provides
only the initial impetus. The agent in the entrainment causative is involved
throughout the whole event. Example (39)(a) illustrates a lauch causative
(kick), and (b) illustrates an entrainment causative (drag):
(39) a. Erebus kicked the bear
b. Erebus dragged the bear
In both cases, intuition suggests that Erebus somehow “originates” the
event. However, it might be questioned whether this initial impetus is really
part of the event described by the predicate itself. Suppose it is true that
Erebus dragged the bear; then substract the fact that the bear was actually
dragged (moved). What is left is Erebus’ intention, and attempt to drag that
does not, alone, constitute the event of dragging the bear. What constitutes
the actual dragging, then, seems to be the event of Erebus’ and the bear’s
simultaneous movement. If their activities are simultaneous, why, then, does
Erebus participate in the event first, before the bear, as we presuppose in
order to explain the positioning of the arguments inside the argument shell
at the LLF level? In other words, what we observe intuitively as Erebus’
participation in the event before the bear seems to occur outside of the event
boundaries of the actual dragging.
However, although Erebus surely cannot drag the bear if the bear does
not move, the bear could not be dragged unless Erebus, or someone else,
initiated the dragging. In other words, although there is no implication in
the inititation of dragging of actual dragging, actual dragging entails that
someone has initiated it:
(40) The bear was dragged → someone initiated the dragging
In other words, if we presuppose that the event described by the relevant
predicate, in this case drag (as a transitive verb), is true, the event seems
to extend over the boundaries by simulatanous activity of the agent and the
patient.
Similar problems, infinitely complex, emerge when we consider the du-
ration or ending of the event of dragging. Thus, suppose Erebus became
tired and had a short pause, then continued dragging the bear. Does this
constitute one or two draggings? What if the pause was longer?
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It is not a major problem that such matters are, in some sense, inher-
ently complex and presumably part of the conceptual-intentional system,
hence part of linguistic “interpretation” in its widest possible meaning: it be-
comes a problem only insofar as they threaten to make the aspectual theory
empirically tautologuous, or null, by allowing one to manufacture or taint
aspectual properties of events without any constraint, forcing the theory to
be true. I do not believe that Russell was wrong, or that the proposal is
empirically empty: rather, the problem is to set up a battery of diagnostic
tests. For instance, given two participators X and Y plus any verb V, it is
possible to ask whether the informant finds the statement ‘X V Y −→ X pre-
cedes Y in the event of V-ing’ true or not. Even better, it should be possible
to design psychological tests to detect aspectual interpretation more reliably.
This task was not attempted here, however, but was left as an unresolved
open problem. Suffice it to say that such tests could be designed, and that
the proposal is thus at least empirically testable more reliably than here.
Finally, if this is a problem in aspectual theory, it is likewise a problem in a
theory invoking more traditional thematic roles.
Although it seems that obscure thematic roles can be reduced to one
predicate, ‘temporal precedence,’ I will occasionally use the terms “Agent”
and“Patient”to refer to ‘what precedes aspectually’ and ‘what is preceded by
aspectually,’ respectively, when there is no danger of ambiguity. Thus, when
Erebus loves Charon, I say that Erebus is the Agent, Charon the Patient,
although with the intention that these terms refer to aspects of both lexico-
logical structure and C-I.
It could be claimed that the present theory cannot attain strict atomism:
some predicates have an internal, aspectual event structure. This is needed
to construct the appropriate argument structures and XP projections. Hence
one could argue that the problem posed by atomism is not solved, but only
re-stated in new terms.
This argument is based on a misunderstanding. It is not claimed here, as
a decompositional theory would insist, that these event structures are part
of the lexical elements. Take the lexical element representing ‘enviousness,’
for example, and consider (41)(a-c):
(41) a. Erebus envies Charon
b. Erebus is envious of Charon
c. enviousness is a bad personality trait
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Hence the internal event structure arises in some context (a), but is not
present in others (c) - thus it is not a constitutive part of the lexical element
itself, which maintains its identity across (a-c), as assumed. In other words,
aspectual individuation arises according to UG principles in certain complex
constructions, and not as being an intrinsic part of the lexical elements. It is
a principle of interaction between arbitrary lexical items (e.g. Russell, 1940,
Verkuyl, 1989). I will return to the computation of the surface properties,
and the categorial features in particular, of these elements later.
Similarly, one could claim that adicity is already a “semantic feature,”
associated with lexical elements at the LLF level. Yet, again, adicity does
not constitute the root lexical elements, since it may be associated with any
root element freely by the principles of UG.
Finally, some ‘arguments,’ such as adverbs, times, locations, places, in-
struments and so on (generally adjuncts), cannot be individuated by their
aspectual position in the event since they appear to “cover the whole event.”
Suppose an argument can be merged with a “discourse element” correspond-
ing to more robust thematic roles. These discourse elements are symbolized
by “d”, hence [d, e] is a valid representation of an LLF argument. As I pro-
ceed further in the theory of syntactic linking, I will associate these arguments
with a number of syntactic properties, such as prepositions, postpositions,
adjuncts, datives and other indirect arguments. Obviously, these matters
could not be discussed here without more detailed coverage of the theory of
syntactic linking, so I will return to this in more depth later.
If I may summarize the discussion so far, I have presented a theory of
core argument structures with a few novel proposals. First, there are no
vP shells, but the VP (FP/XP) involves an unlimited number of arguments.
Hence, there is no notion of maximal projection at the LLF level. Secondly,
if there are selectional features in the lexical elements for the First Merge to
operate with, they are associated with these elements according to general
principles of UG that rely upon a theory of predication involving, crucially,
an aspectual dimension. The lexical stock is not constituted of such semantic
features, nor are there thematic features in the operation of CHL inside the
language faculty.
In many versions of the standard theory of pure First Merge, the the-
matic properties of lexical elements guide the construction of the VP shells,
the lexical elements containing mutually matching thematic features. For
instance, the predicate love requires an NP with a thematic feature of the
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Patient, thus it is merged with a constituent bearing that feature. Mutual
features“lock”the constituents in their proper positions. This proposal is not
counter to the one proposed here, as long as one assumes that the assignment
of these thematic features to the lexical elements is based on a general theory
of UG. For instance, it could be suggested that the theory of predication is
responsible for the emergence of such features.
I do not argue for this proposal here, and only point out that it is, in
principle, compatible with the one I entertain.
3.5 Agree/Move
Although I am not deeply concerned with the phenomenon of movement in
this study, as it appears to be somewhat irrelevant to the question of the ab-
stract lexicon, I will nevertheless present the basics of the minimalist analysis
of movement. These aspects of the theory of grammar are briefly discussed
on a few occasions later. Furthermore, it is movement, if anything, that has
played a prominent role in the formulation of the minimalist hypothesis. Fi-
nally, it is movement that is important in discussing the status of the formal
features in the lexicon and the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis.
There are empirical reasons for assuming that CHL contains the oper-
ation(s) Move and/or Agree in addition to Merge. The latter establishes
an agreement relation between two elements, the former appears to move
elements overtly or covertly. The following list of examples illustrates the
combined results of overt Move and Agree:
(42) a. Charoni was-φ found ti
b. Charoni seems-φ ti to be found
c. whati seems-φ ti to be found
d. the girli who seems-φ ti to be here
Thus, sometimes expressions appear in surprising locations that are not
expected based on their semantic roles alone. In order to describe this phe-
nomenon, an operator called Move is postulated as part of CHL. Suppose
Move can target an element α inside some syntactic object S and Merge it
to its “edge,” forming a new syntactic object S
′
, as follows (Chomsky, 1995,
p. 250):
88
S
′
α S
H S
t(α)
What are the conditions for applying Move, given SMT? According to
SMT, language is an optimal mechanism for satisfying legibility conditions,
so there ought to be a reason for the existence of operation Move. It is
assumed in minimalist theory that Move can and must be used to eliminate
uninterpretable features from the lexical elements before the construction
is moved to LF, those features being banned due to the principle of Full
Interpretation. Thus, two apparent imperfections, uninterpretable features
and displacement, are in fact only two sides of the same coin.
What remains to be explained, and what I will return to presently, is why
there are uninterpretable features in the lexicon to be deleted in the first
place, and why it is movement, rather than some simple operation Delete,
that can and must be used to delete them.
I assume that some element in S, presumably the head H of S with some
unchecked feature, must “probe” α. I say that such an element will “attract”
α, which is said to be the goal or target. Thus, probing/attract means that
some formal feature is eliminated (Erased) in the process, and it is thus a
“last resort” operation to satisfy Full Interpretation.
What this feature is depends on the specifics of the theory. According to
one proposal, a nonsubstantial head such as v, T or C, can eliminate its formal
(uninterpretable) N feature(s) (EPP feature) by probing an element with a
categorial feature, and perhaps only when they extend the resulting structure
(Chomsky, 1995, pp. 189-190). In other words, only nonsubstantial elements
can probe, and they must probe elements with categorial features (Chomsky,
1995, p. 232). The goal may eliminate its Case feature in the process,
but it is plainly not obligatory because of multiple agreement structures of
various kinds (see Chomsky, 2000b, Carstens, 2001). In this manner, we
hope to reduce EPP to strong N feature of I, wh-raising as the strong N
feature of C, and so on. The features of the goal are not eliminated if they
are interpretable, hence a further head may attract the same element at
some later stage in the derivation, resulting in the effects of successive cyclic
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movement.
In the following example, the subject NP has been probed to delete the
uninterpretable EPP feature of the T, and the object NP has been probed
to delete the uninterpretable EPP feature of v, as shown in (43).
(43) TP
Subji T
′
T vP
Objj vP
ti v
′
v VP
tj V
Between the goal and probe, there must be no elements that could probe
the goal; thus attract/probe must in this sense be local (Chomsky, 1995, p.
311). In the following examples, the locality condition is broken. In (a), it
is the auxiliary that is the closer target for the probe, and in (b) it is the
expletive. The wh-constituent has moved from too far in (c).
(44) a. * fixi Erebus can ti the car
b. * Erebusi seems it is certain ti to be here
c. * howi did Erebus wonder what Charon fixed ti
Furthermore, an element can attract a goal α only if it c-commands that
element. Finally, an element H cannot probe another one if that lies “too far”
inside the structure, to preserve the descriptive correctness of strict cyclicity.
It is generally thought, and empirically much supported, that the probe H
is not able to attract elements in the complement of its own complement,
and can only attract the “edge” (its specifier and head). For instance, the
embedded wh-element cannot rise to check the interrogative EPP feature
of C because a potential landing site has been occupied by whether, and C
cannot target it in its original location.
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(45) * which cari did Erebus wonder whether Charon bought ti?
In his later work, Chomsky (2000b, 2001) assumes that derivation pro-
ceeds in phases, so that when a phase is completed, only the “edge” is visible
for further computation (Chomsky, 2000b, p. 108,“The Phase-Impenetrability
Condition”). The locality conditions are taken to be part of the definition of
Move, as they then reduce the computational complexity of the derivation
considerably (Chomsky, 1995, pp. 266-268).
What does the operation Move actually move? Chomsky (1995, p. 252)
proposes, on both empirical as well as conceptual grounds, that it moves
as much material as is necessary for convergence, and nothing else. This is
reasonable, given SMT. Then, if convergence has to do with the elimination
of formal features in the case of Move, then this operation should move only
those formal features and nothing else, assuming that the formal features
cannot disintegrate in the process (Chomsky, 1995, p. 265). Move is thus
not called “Move α,” but “Move F,”“move (a) feature(s)” (Chomsky, 1995,
§4.4.4). In overt syntax, PF convergence often requires phonological material
to be moved (a form of “generalised pied-piping”), but in covert syntax only
the required features are moved.
This relation - the elimination of some feature or another - was later re-
placed by operation Agree, which establishes the local agreement relation
between the features in question. This means that the core syntactic de-
pendency is explained by relying upon a relation between features: one
is deleted or erased by the other, a precondition being that the features
are identical. Thus, in some cases the elimination of formal features may
proceed by displacement (Move/Agree), and sometimes this is not needed
(Agree)(Chomsky, 2001).
In any case, Move is allowed only for the deletion of some formal feature
or another (“Greed”if the deletion serves only α, “Enlightened Self-Interest” if
it can serve other purposes as well), and since Move involves more operations
than Merge, Merge is applied first if possible. One instance of a case in which
Merge is not possible, and thus Move is instantiated as a “last resort,” is case
when a constituent is required (by virtue of an EPP feature) to occupy a
non-thematic position, barring pure Merge from such a position (Chomsky,
2000b, p. 106).
There is also the question of the timing of these operations, which is
crucial in explaining certain language-specific variations, especially in word
order. In some versions of the theory, Move must be delayed to the covert
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syntax, if possible (“Procrastinate”), and in some versions it is vice versa
(“Earliness”). It seems too early to make a definite choice among these op-
tions: what can be explained in terms of one option can be explained in terms
of the other as well by adjusting some of the many auxiliary parameters of the
theory. Let us assume Procrastinate. Language-specific variation in word or-
der is explained by using the feature checking / elimination and distinguish-
ing between weak and strong features, the former forcing “overt checking”
because of FI at the PF level. If overt checking is not forced, then Pro-
crastinate makes it covert. Since word order is subject to language-specific
variation, and language-specific properties are assumed to be reducible to
morphosyntactic properties of lexical elements, this seems a promising start
- provided that (1) the distribution of weak / strong -features is learnable
and (2) the strategy leads to explanatory proposals, not just to re-statements
of the basic facts.9 As is typical of current minimalist theorizing in general,
many alternatives to this account exist.
Given these technical preliminaries, some deeper questions emerge. Move,
together with Agree, deletes formal features from the lexicon that are not
interpretable (EPP, Case), hence the existence of these operations could be
said to follow from the principle of Full Interpretation. Why, then do such
formal features exist in the lexicon in the first place, given that they appear
to violate SMT? The Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis requires that the lexical
elements appear in the Numeration with all of their morphosyntactic features
in place, but there is no explanation for this principle - more so when it
obviously violates the Strong Minimalist Hypothesis.
Chomsky has recently moved towards a ‘structural explanation’ of unin-
terpretable features. Consider the operation Agree, which obtains between a
probe and a target. The idea is that when an element is probed, say to the
[Spec,TP] position, and when an uninterpretable EPP feature of T is deleted
in the process, the target NP is valuated a nominative Case, and the T is
valuated the φ-features of the NP. Valuation means that the lexical element,
when it appears in the Numeration, contains only an undifferentiated Case-
feature. This feature is then valuated either as nominative or accusative,
9There is no guarantee in the current minimalist theory that conditions (1) and (2) hold.
If there are other aspects (head initial/final parameter etc.) that determine word order,
then learning the weak-strong distinction would easily become impossible. Further, current
minimalist theory does not appear to be constrained enough to count as explanatory: there
is too much freedom in stipulating properties of lexical items whenever some word ordering
is encountered.
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depending on its structural position. Thus, in the following LF representa-
tion, the Agree holds between Subji and T. The EPP feature of T is deleted,
the Subji is valuated nominative Case and T is valuated φ-features of the
subject, as shown in (46).
(46) TP
Subji
NOM
T
′
T
φ
vP
Chomsky, following Marantz, also speculates that categorical features
might emerge similarly. It is this idea that I will continue to develop in
the next section: formal features are reflections of the structural properties
of propositional thought (LLF representations).
3.6 The derivation of formal features
If properties of linguistic expressions are derived from the legibility condi-
tions, it is hard to see a forthcoming explanation of purely formal features,
such as the categorial or the structural Case, prima facie unmotivated se-
mantically. If there is no such explanation, then the minimalist hypothesis
must be wrong in this respect.
This problem is even more pressing in terms of minimalist theory since
the core explanatory strategy of the minimalist program depends on the
uninterpretable properties associated with the lexical elements, mainly since
they are used to explain the displacement property of natural languages.
Martin (1999) noted that, since formal features “are not directly motivated
by C-I or P-A, their existence is surprising if CHL is perfect in the above
sense” (Martin, 1999, p. 1). Pesetsky and Torrego similarly argued that “one
of the most long-lasting controversies in linguistics concerns the existence of
purely formal grammatical features - features utterly without semantic value”
(Pesetsky & Torrego, 2001, p. 364). In the best case, either they are unreal
(b), or their imperfection is only apparent (c).
Chomsky (2000b, pp. 119-126) reasons as follows. First, he points out
that uninterpretable features, as well as the “displacement property,” are
clearly“imperfections”with respect to SMT, as explained above: they cannot
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be explained trivially by relying upon the legibility conditions, the properties
of sound and meaning. He proposes that the displacement property is actu-
ally motivated by its ability to produce more “discourse-oriented” semantic
properties sensitive to surface order, such as topic-comment, presupposition,
focus, and so on, and that the formal features are the mechanisms for im-
plementing such semantic properties. The implementation follows from Full
Interpretation, requiring, as already mentioned, that only semantically inter-
pretable features may be present at the LF level. Thus, if formal features are
present, they must be deleted before the derived expression is well formed. In
Minimalist Program it is assumed that certain configurations delete formal
features, so the CHL is forced to establish such configurations, “displacement”
begin a welcome but possibly also a non-optimal consequence. In other words,
CHL uses formal features to express certain semantic or pragmatic properties
of sentences, and what results are side effects such as EPP.
However, this proposal, even if true and fitting the explanation of struc-
tural Case and agreement, could hardly begin to explain the emergence of
categorial features. This is because the operations Agree and Move that im-
plement feature deletion do not apply to categorial features: the “probes,”
elements that initiate movement, often (or always) lack them (Chomsky,
2000b, p. 123). Even pretheoretically, it is difficult to imagine how the
essence of categorial features could come even close to being “mechanisms to
implement displacement.”
I will argue that an interesting simplification of the minimalist theory
is achieved if formal features such as the categorial and Case features are
determined not as intrinsic properties of the lexical elements appearing in
the Numeration, but as properties encoding structural information about
the respective lexical elements appearing inside whole propositional frames
at the LLF level (the idea goes back at least to Chomsky, 1970). The proposal
is thus a type of ‘structural theory’ of formal features, in the spirit of the
valuation theory of Case (§3.5), for instance. Since the structural properties
of lexico-logical forms are semantically interpretable, Full Interpretation and
SMT are not violated thereby. This simplification supports the atomistic
hypothesis that is assumed and argued for in this study, since when the
lexical elements become more abstract syntactically, much of the appeal of
the semantic features used in explaining the various idiosyncratic properties
vanishes. For example, if give (V) and giving (N) arise from the same lexical
element GIVE, containing no categorial features, that lexical element should
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not encode the fact that give requires three arguments: giving does not
require any.
My explanation is close to that of Bouchard, who proposed what he calls
the principle of Full Identification (Bouchard, 1995, pp. 93-4):
(47) (The Principle of Full Identification, PFI.) Every syntactic formative
of a sentence must have a corresponding element in the semantic
representation. Every formative of a semantic representation must be
identified by a morphosyntactic element in the sentence with which
that representation is associated.
In the present proposal, categorial features are among the“morphosyntac-
tic elements” that are then identified with formal properties of semantically
interpretable representations, or semantically interpretable linguistic repre-
sentations (Logical Form, LF). Categorial features are thus formal in the
sense that they represent formal properties of semantic representations, but
semantic in that those representations are interpretable: they take part in
the compositional interpretation of LLF representations.
Since PFI is a rather strong principle, and it is executed here in a very
literal form in that much of what follows depends on it, it requires some
comment. According to Bouchard, PFI follows from the basic minimalist
tenet of explaining the mapping between form and meanings without going
beyond virtual necessity. We expect syntactic trees and semantic structures
to be, on the relevant abstract level, the very same thing. Uriagereka (1998)
suggests that something like PFI can actually be derived from FI: “CHL can-
not simply disregard linguistic information as some sort of noise; faced with
an item to which it can’t assign any direct meaning, CHL assumes it instan-
tiates functional structure.” I hereby put forward a proposal in which the
“functional structure” amounts to a “semantically interpretable structure.”
These explanations rely strongly on the minimalist hypothesis - from which
the motivation for PFI is thus directly descended.
Another way of looking at PFI is as follows. Suppose an explanatory
adequate theory of grammar involves some purely formal, grammatical ele-
ment F. Why is there such an F? In other words, how is F itself explained?
Quite easily, assuming that explanatory adequacy has already been reached,
one is led to the conlucion that F is just a primitive, biological feature of our
mind/brain, to be explained by a combination of obscuring biological factors,
phylogenetic or ontogenetic. PFI, in contrast, searches for a linguistic expla-
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nation in terms of interface conditions. In terms of explanation, it is the first
choice to be entertained: the biological hypothesis should be entertained only
if the cognitive explanation fails. This is because, currently, such a biological
explanation is not in sight.
I will now proceed with the details. Let us consider any lexical element
lex as it appears in the LLF representation, as currently defined. Suppose we
inspect all of the elements that c-command lex and collect them, or rather
some sort of formal tag from each one (see below), to an ordered sequence
and associate this sequence, called a feature vector, with that element.10 I
will assume that if the element is an operator, such as ℘ (predicate opera-
tor), d (discourse operator), or T (tense), it is copied as such onto the feature
vectors; otherwise symbol “a” is used, as in (48):
(48) TP
T VP
℘ VP
a1
[ +person]
[ +number]
V
′
. . . V
′
an
[ +person]
[ +number]
V0
℘ lexn
This sequence <℘, an, . . . , a1, ℘, T> which is associated with lex
n,
encodes information about the relational properties of the lexical element at
the LLF level. Symbol “a” is taken to contain the agreement / φ-features
of the constituent it represents. The notion of a local feature vector, or “L-
vector,” is defined as containing the two most local symbols in the feature
vector of a given element. Thus the L-vector of <℘, a, . . . , a, ℘, T> is
10C-command is used here in the following sense: A c-commands B if and only if A does
not dominate B and every X that dominates A also dominates B (from Barriers, p. 8).
96
<℘, a>.
My hypothesis is that the feature vector, an encoding of the formal in-
terpretable (L)LF properties, can be used to predict the formal properties of
the lexical element in question in a way that has many otherwise perplexing
properties of language(s) as an automatic consequence. Assume, tentatively,
the following rules:
(49) (Categorial features.) For elements with feature vector <a, . . .>,
associate feature +N, and for those with feature vector <℘, . . .>,
associate feature +V.
(50) (Case.) For elements with feature vector <a, ℘, . . .>, associate
feature nominative Case (NOM), for those with feature vector <a,
a, . . .> associate feature accusative Case (ACC), for those with
feature vector <d, . . .> associate feature semantic Case (SEM),
and for elements with feature vector <a, d, . . .>, associate feature
genitive Case (GEN).
(51) (Maximal Projection.) For each full projection (phase) at the lexico-
logical level, if several primitive constituents have identical L-vectors
or identical indices (identical meaning), then only one of them is
interpreted syntactically.
These rules associate formal but semantically interpretable LLF struc-
tures with morphologically and phonologically interpretable features. The
Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis is rejected in principle, but much of its ideology
is preserved: lexical elements are associated with, not assigned or constituted
by, formal features, according to the abovementioned rules.11
The basic idea of these rules comes from Wunderlich (1997),12 and from
11According to the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis (SLH), lexical elements appear with
their full morphosyntactic features already installed in the Numeration from which the
derivation begins. This principle is essential to the claim that uninterpretable features
explain the displacement property, and it was originally motivated by some perplexing
facts concerning the ordering of adverbs. SLH is not denied or supported by this work. If
SLH is true, then the formal features derived from LLF are assigned to the lexical elements
at some pre-derivational step, the derivation proceeding in much the same way as has been
assumed in the minimalist framework so far, or then these features are checked at the LF
level provided that the more simpler LLF could be used to replace LF (which undeniably
requires more work). If, however, SLH is false, then the Morphological component could
take the feature vectors of lexical elements as its input and provide the correct form to
the PF. In that case, formal features are not true syntactic features and drive no syntactic
operations.
12Wunderlich attributes this idea also to Paul Kiparsky.
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some recent ideas proposed in minimalist theory. The point is that a sin-
gle feature system encodes abstract positions of lexical items and/or their
morphosyntactic properties. In Wunderlich’s system, this has two binary
features, as follows:
[+hr] for “there is a higher role”
[+lr] for “there is a lower role”
The syntactic realization of arguments is restricted to the positions and
forms that are expressible with these features. “There is a higher / lower
role” that encodes structural information. In Wunderlich’s approach, they
are associated with the structural Case as follows:
Dative Case [+hr] [+lr]
Accusative Case [+hr]
Ergative [+lr]
Nominative/Absolutive [ ]
Why should such features exist? Perhaps they do encode the properties
of some (abstract) structure: What rules [49], [50] and [51], together with
the relevant notion of structure (LLF), contribute to this problem is that the
features, in this case the features of feature vectors, do encode real structure,
namely, the lexico-logical form.
Since lexical elements at the LLF level are void of formal features, they
are not“lexical elements” in the traditional sense, but individuated instead by
their semantic properties. This abstraction surely has a trade-off in Morphol-
ogy, stems being abstract, categorial features and other “inflectional” mor-
phosyntactic phenomena (Case, agreement) and at least some derivational
ones (e.g., causativity) being reflect of syntactic structure at LLF (feature
vectors). This means that the “morphosyntactic features,” traditionally un-
derstood but including categorial aspects, are not distinct heads (as assumed
in the more standard minimalist theory), but formal features derived from
the constituents appearing in the feature vector of a given abstract lexi-
cal stem, thus implementing the relation Agree of Chomsky (2000b, 2001)
and related work. However, formal features do of course mirror the syntac-
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tic hierarchy as the feature vectors specifically code it, and it then follows
that, as Chomsky (personal communication) puts it, language has“roots that
are category-netural, and configurations that determine what we informally
called syntactic categories.”
To see how the rules work, consider the derivation of simple intransitive
and transitive sentences. The feature vector is also shown below each con-
stituent. First, an intransitive sentence is derived:
(52) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus
<a, ℘>
N
NOM
V0
℘ run
<℘, a>
V
The feature vectors are as follows: Erebus= <a, ℘> = N-NOM; run =
<℘, a> = V, which generates:
(53) Erebus-n-nom runs-v
A transitive sentence is generated from the following LLF representation
(54):
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(54) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus
<a, ℘>
N
NOM
V
′
Charon
<a, a>
N
ACC
V0
℘ kill
<℘, a>
V
The feature vectors for the NP-arguments are Erebus = <a, ℘> = N-
NOM, Charon = <a, a> = N-ACC, V as above; this generates
(55) Erebus-n-nom kills-v Charon-n-acc
The formal categorial and Case-features are assigned thereby, without the
need to stipulate them at the LLF level. Now consider the ECM phenomenon,
demonstrating that thematic properties and structural Case mismatch in cer-
tain environments. This is a curious phenomenon: a thematic subject takes
the accusative Case. This follows under the present assumptions, according
to which the structural Case depends on the feature vectors of the elements.
Suppose that another proposition is embedded as an argument for a predi-
cate. The following lexico-logical form (56) encodes its meaning:
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(56) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
VP
he
<a, a>
V0
℘ die
V0
℘ want
Under the given rules, the derived expression is Erebus wanted him to die,
where the subject of the embedded clause takes the accusative Case. This
leads to the derivation of expressions such as (57):
(57) a. Erebus wanted him-acc to die
b. Erebus considers him-acc intelligent
c. Erebus ate the fish-acc raw
The special problem created by ECM structures disappears whenever a
language allows this option. Rephrased in more traditional vocabulary, the
matrix verb happens to ‘govern’ the subject of the embedded infinite clause,
because it is nearby and c-commands it in a certain way. There are reasons
to assume, however, that the infinite complement clause could contain a de-
fective T node. I will return to this presently. Instead, consider lexico-logical
form (58):
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(58) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus
<a, ℘>
N
NOM
V
′
book
<a, a>
N
ACC
V
′
table
<a, a>
N
ACC
V0
℘ put
V
In this case, book and table have identical L-vectors <a, a> so that ac-
cording to rule [51, p. 97], one of them is eliminated at the level of syntactic
interpretation. Recall that rule [51] prevents CHL from interpreting lexical
elements at the LLF level if they have identical L-vectors. It is neverthe-
less possible to use the discourse operator (d-operator, see section 3.3) as a
“last resort” since the feature vector of a d-marked argument differs from an
argument that lacks a d-operator, although in that case we must link the
argument with semantic Case by [50], generating (60).
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(59) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
book V
′
PP
d table
V0
℘ put
(60) Erebus put a book [PP on the table-sem ]
Indeed, indirect objects are more formal (and interpretable) in structure
(or, at least have different properties) than direct arguments. This is neces-
sitated by the linking rule [51], which requires that if there are two objects,
then they cannot both have the feature vector <a, a> (ACC). Thus, the
rules predict that ’— XP XP’ is an impossible subcategorization frame (e.g.,
Palmer, 1994, §3.5.1). This entailment is consistent with other grammati-
cal theories, such as Relational Grammar and Lexical Functional Grammar,
none of which allow verbs to have two direct objects.13
The present proposal does not rule out constructions with d-marked sub-
jects and “quirky cases,” such as (61):
13Putting “double DO languages” such as Kinyarwanda aside for now.
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(61) TP
T VP
℘ VP
PP
d Erebus
V
′
Charon V
′
d book V0
℘ put
Icelandic (Zaenen, Maling, & Thrainsson, 1985), Japanese (Ogawa, 2001,
§2.4.4), Spanish (Ferna´ndez-Soriano, 1999) as well as Hindi (Mohanan, 1990),
seem to realize this possibility through dative or PP subjects, and there
are other languages as well that make the phenomenon quite robust. The
following examples come from Chilean Spanish and Icelandic (Holmberg &
Hro´arsdo´ttir, 2003):
(62) A
A
Juan
Juan-sem
le
clitic
quiere
wants
gustar
like
Marta
Marta
‘Juan wants to like Marta’
(63) Hennar
Her-gen
var
was
saknað
missed
‘She was missed.’
Nevertheless, significantly, it is also possible to save a ditransitive clause
as a “last resort” by d-marking the argument in the middle, creating an
IO-DO order aside from the DO-IO order. Both orders are base-generated
in Japanese, the former obeying dative marking (d-marking) and the latter
obeying the d-argument (thus, IO is PP). Moore and Perlmutter (2000) ar-
gue that both cases exists in Russian: dative surface subject and the dative
surface direct object, although they also show that the direct object datives
have some subject properties: this is an important feature to which I re-
turn later in section 4.6 when discussing causatives. Figure (64) illustrates
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d-marking in the middle argument:
(64) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
PP
d Charon
V
′
book V0
℘ put
Furthermore, d-marking the “middle argument” (DO-IO) is essential in
explaining the properties of causatives, in which, as is well known, it is often
the direct object causee that alters its grammatical properties when more ar-
guments are added (Comrie, 1976), and d-marking accounts for such changes
in grammatical properties quite correctly: the accusative causee is demoted
to the status of oblique argument. I will return to this phenomenon more
fully later in my analysis of causative constructions in Chapter 4.
One consequence of the linking rule [51] is that it explains the Case Filter
of the GB Theory, according to which all overt noun phrases must receive
Case and appear in a position that receives Case (at s-structure; see Chom-
sky, 1981b, p. 49ff). If lexico-logical form feature vectors are linked to the
structural and semantic Case, and this mapping is unique since identical fea-
ture vectors are not interpretable syntactically ([51]), then the Case Filter
is predicted: each noun (i.e. a conceptual constituent in the A-position at
the lexico-logical form) at s-structure must receive Case (i.e. have a unique
feature vector attached to Case).
This could be considered from a somewhat more informal perspective.
The purpose of these rules is to associate a propositional thought, or linguis-
tically relevant aspects of it (LLF), with formal features such as category and
Case. However, it is assumed that the process is limited in the sense that
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only certain formal features count, making two expressions indistinguishable
under further processing if those features are identical. This is one and a
particularly strong way of operationalizing the idea that language processing
is modular.
According to the Theta criterion of GB theory each argument in the d-
structure, or members of each A-chain at the LF level, can receive only one
theta role, but each theta role of the argument structure of a predicate must
be assigned to some argument. This condition follows: each LLF argument
is assigned only one theta role (either from being an a-argument, or by being
d-marked). Furthermore, theta roles are assigned from nowhere else.
Another principle that has gained in importance in recent years is Baker’s
“guiding principle,”the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH),
which states:
Identical thematic relations between items are represented by
identical structural relationships between those items at the level
of d-structure. (Baker, 1988, p. 46).
According to UTAH, a substantial part of syntax is to be understood
as a consequence of semantics (of the lexical entities entering into the rep-
resentations). As Baker noted, this principle can be made substantial only
in the context of some substantial theory of “thematic relations” which he
nevertheless left “at a rather intuitive level.” Clearly, however, the empirical
content of UTAH depends on such a theory (see Pesetsky, 1995, among oth-
ers). In the present proposal UTAH is maintained in the lexico-logical form
alongside the aspectual theory of thematic roles (§3.4), but at the same time
it is maintained that such thematic roles are not part of the lexical items or
of their meaning.
There are some differences, however. As in the present case the θ-theory is
a consequence of the individuation of two or more arguments, the principle is
vacuous in the case of just one argument. This argument does not have to be
distinguished, or individuated, at all. Thus, were there only one argument
at the LLF level with an intransitive predicate, there would be no stable
‘thematic position’ corresponding to that argument.
One may ask why languages seem to obey something close to the X-bar
theory. This question is not meaningless, and is considered in the literature
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from several different angles.14 The present hypothesis is that the X-bar the-
ory is essentially correct because there are no syntactic features at the LLF
level, so that the rules operating at that level are insensitive to them. There
are no categorial features there either, because the lexical elements are indi-
viduated by their category-neutral semantic properties (‘concepts’). Rather,
the categorial and Case features are given in the syntactic interpretation by
the above rules. Since lexical elements at the lexico-logical form are free of
syntactic features, such features being associated with them only in the pro-
cess of linking, we may use ‘X’ at that level to denote a variable ranging over
syntactic features - these are assigned independently by rule [49], hence are
not part of the lexical items themselves.
There has been some discussion about why many grammatical relations, if
not all of them, have something to do with the notion of c-command (Brody,
2002, §3). Regardless of whether the approach is derivational or representa-
tional, the idea is to reduce the notion of c-command to some more primitive
notions, such as to properties of the operation Merge. In the present case,
the reason why the c-command emerges is essentially reduced to the principle
of Full Identification: the relational properties of lexical elements at the LLF
level are coded in terms of feature vectors based on the c-command, while the
c-command seems to be the only reasonable choice available. Another pos-
sibility would be to look “downwards,” but this strategy is ambiguous since
the nodes branch at every level, the root nodes notwithstanding. Upwards-
looking is unambigous: each node has exactly one node that dominates it.
Central to the minimalist theory is the so-called EPP feature (Extended
Projection Principle). This was originally postulated in order to give a de-
scription of the fact that finite clauses require, pro-drop languages aside, a
phonologically overt subject. Moreover, there is evidence that even in the
case of pro-drop languages, the syntactic structure contains a phonologically
14According to the standard minimalist assumption, the X-bar theory looks correct
because the computational operations Move and Merge are not sensitive to categorial fea-
tures. Chomsky proposes in Categories and Transformations that notions such as XP and
X0 reduce to the property of projection: a category that does not project is XP, one that
has not projected at all is X0, and the rest are X
′
. Then the X-bar theory is correct in its
essentials because it mimics the distribution of the relevant features determining the con-
struction’s ability to project. Kayne (1994) has yet another view, in that he tries to derive
the properties of the X-bar theory from the Linear Correspondence Axiom. According to
this idea, the X-bar theory may be derived from the properties of the linear ordering of
the elements because linear ordering must be mapped to “asymmetric c-command”. I will
not discuss this proposal here.
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covert subject. A variety of phenomena fall naturally under this princi-
ple, among them predicates with expletive subjects (weather verbs), passives
(obligatory raising of the object), rising constructions and others. In the
minimalist program, EPP is interpreted as a more general condition stating
that certain functional heads, T (or I) among them, require an element in
their specifier position. The idea is that these functional elements bear an
uninterpretable EPP feature that must be deleted in order to satisfy the con-
dition of Full Interpretation, and that moving a suitable probe into such a
position suffices to delete that feature. The fact that finite clauses require a
subject reduces to the existence of the EPP feature of a finite T. The problem
here is that, although the postulation of an EPP feature seems to capture
an imporant generalization, its own presence is a mystery and a source of
puzzlement.
I have expanded the discussion on the EPP feature in two sections: one to
do with the obligatory presence of subjects in “normal finite clauses” and the
properties of personal passives, and the second to do with expletive structures
(§6.1). I will begin with fairly “normal” finite clauses.
Current rules already entail something very close to the EPP principle.
Suppose that only full projections are well-formed at the LLF level, a natural
assumption since they form semantically coherent bundles of features. Con-
sider any finite clause: it has a V0 element which is c-commanded by T. In
between, there must exist at least one argument to compose a full projection
out of V0. If there are n arguments, n always > 0 according to the above
reasoning, and one of them, the topmost one, must have the nominative Case
since its feature vector is <a, ℘>. This is so because its feature vector “sees”
the predicate operator ℘ of the finite TP projection. Nothing of the sort nec-
essarily holds in infinite clauses, since they lack (finite) TP projections (I will
return to “defective T” later on). Thus, a significant part of the EPP prin-
ciple, leaving more exotic constructions aside for now, is simply an inherent
consequence of the rule system developed here.
Let us now consider personal passives. They, too, seem to fall under the
EPP: a passive is something that lacks a thematic subject, and where the pa-
tient behaves as if it were the syntactic subject. Indeed, passives and rising
constructions have been characterised by their “suppression” of the logical
subject. Suppose, then, that the lexico-logical form allows the suppression
of the logical subject: the “vacuous argument” v is installed at the top of the
full projection, replacing the agent of the event, as shown in (65)
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(65) VP
v V
′
Charon V0
℘ found
The vacuous argument v accounts for the intuition that passive verbs are
still, in some sense, transitive verbs, being “detransitivized.” It is just that
they are “defective arguments.” Assume that v is defective and not visible
to the feature vectors of the constituents below it, hence it behaves as a
“non-argument.” Given that v is invisible in the determination of the feature
vectors for Charon, Charon = <a, ℘> = NOM ([50]), the same feature vector
as with v, so again one of them must be deleted due to [51] in syntactic
linking. Assuming v is deleted, then we derive (66).
(66) Charon-nom was found
The problem of “grammatical function changing” disappears, at least in
the case of basic personal passives. This phenomenon simply follows from the
rules given above. Moreover, if a predicate has d-marked arguments, then
the presence of a vacuous argument does not change its syntactic properties,
since the feature vector remains <d, a>. We predict that PPs and datives do
not ‘passivize,’ which is the correct result. The following tree (67) represents
a passive structure with the dative argument:
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(67) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v V
′
PP
d Charon
<d, a>
V0
℘ lex
The original explanation for the EPP feature thus applies to passive con-
structions if we assume that the LLF may contain arguments that are invisible
“from below.” They are semantically present (representing the presupposed
agent), but syntactically invisible. They are syntactically invisible because
of the idea that syntactic properties reduce to the notion of a c-command at
the LLF level, and “defective arguments” are invisible from this perspective.
One important, although not uncontroversial, generalisation of the GB
theory is the “Burzio’s Generalization”:
(Burzio’s Generalization.) A verb that governs an NP Case marks
this NP structurally iff the verb has an external argument.
This generalization now follows, since to have an accusative Case and
hence feature vector <a, a> entails, in the typical case (excluding ECM
structures), that there is also another, aspectually more prominent argument
(the “external argument”) present in the lexico-logical form.
More interesting, and otherwise rather perplexing, consequences follow
immediately and in a ‘natural’ way. Suppose we have a proposition, such as
the barbarian’s destruction of the city, as a d-marked argument of a predicate,
such as was awful. We can then insert a vacuous argument into the position
of barbarian’s. The genitive subject barbarian’s is replaced by the vacuous
argument v, the patient “rising” for the reasons explained above. Yet in
this case, the raised constituent has feature vector <a, d>, linked with the
genitive and, not the nominative Case. This is the correct result:
(68) a. The barbarian’s destruction of the city
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b. The city’s destruction by the barbarians
d VP
v V
′
city
<a, d>
V0
℘ destroy
Furthermore, assuming that these genitive gerunds result from d-marking
without tense, we of course expect that they are never tensed, as indeed is
the case. Thus, we see again how rules [49]-[51] conspire to generate the cor-
rect surface forms. Note that these results also follow as such if we assume
that, instead of being defective argument v, the subject of nominal passives
is simply missing. The cost is that one must stipulate that nominal sentences
are d-marked arguments, as evidenced by the fact that their subjects appear
to take the genitive Case (or at least not the nominative or the accusative).
The question of exactly why they are d-marked, namely whether the expla-
nation is semantic or syntactic (e.g., comparable to the treatment of the last
resort in the case of dative arguments), is not discussed here.15
15The present proposal is in agreement with the proposal that DPs are, basically, propo-
sitions with predicates and arguments, but often without tense (e.g., Bernstein, 2001,
Grimshaw, 1990). However, there are reasons to be sceptical about the proposal that the
above-mentioned constructions with genitive subjects of DPs are directly comparable to
clausal passives. Longobardi (2001, §1.2) mentions four reasons. First, there are lexical
restrictions on whether the process may apply (The perception of the problem, *the prob-
lem’s perception). Secondly, the subjects of passivized DPs lose their controlling ability,
while in the case of clausal passives they do not (the sinking of the ship to collect the
insurance, *the ship’s sinking to collect the insurance; the testing of such drugs on oneself,
*this drug’s testing on oneself ). Third, the preposition expressing the subject in clausal
and nominal passives may be different. Finally, clausal passives have their own verbal
morphology, whereas nominal passives do not. According to Longobardi, these four prop-
erties make it plausible to compare nominal passives to middle constructions rather than
to clausal passives (e.g., expressions such as senators bribe easily). In Finnish, with its
rich verbal morphology, practically any verb can be made into a “middle” by adding a
specific suffix, which turns a transitive verb into an intransitive one. In that case, one
argument may be completely amiss at the LLF level. But note that, if that were the case,
the present theory would still predict the correct properties: defective argument v is just
an invisible argument from the perspective of the elements below it. If nominal passives
are middles and not nominal passives per se, then this means that such an argument is
also invisible from the LLF perspective. This could explain the lack of subject control.
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Consider a predicate that has two readings, one non-aspectual such as
envious, one aspectual such as envies. We assume that they correlate with the
same constituent in its lexico-logical form (representing ‘enviousness,’ §2.1).
Thus we have Erebus envies Charon according to the rules so far, yet there
can exist only one aspectual argument for the non-aspectual counterpart.
Thus we can form Erebus (is) envious (accounting for the presence of the
copula later).
Yet the lexico-logical form can also have two arguments (as nouns and
adjectives in general have arguments), but due to [51], one of them must be
d-marked as a “last resort,” generating Erebus is envious of Charon, of being
the reflection of the underlying d-operator (a PP) at the LLF level.
(69) VP
Erebus V
′
PP
of Charon
V0
envious
Thus, the problem of as why nouns and adjectives need of support disap-
pears entirely: non-aspectuality together with rule [51] entail this property.
Vacuous arguments can be inserted into the position of objects (Patients)
as well. That there is a category of “null objects” cannot be doubted (e.g.,
Huang, 2000, §2.2.2). What happens, from a syntactic point of view, if a
vacuous argument is inserted at the object position? The present rules predict
no change: there are no constituents below “object” v at the lexico-logical
form position for which this insertion would have corresponding syntactic
implications. Thus we might have pairs such as the following:
(70) a. Erebus eats bread
b. Erebus eats
Non-aspectual predicates can have at most one thematic a-argument.
This includes adjectives, nominals and some verbs. I predict that passiviza-
tion is not possible, since, as expected due to the fact that the vacuous ar-
gument occupies a thematically derived structural position at the LLF level,
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the vacuous argument is thematic (Agent). In other words, non-aspectuality
entails the inability to passivize. This seems correct (so examples in Quirk,
Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1971):
(71) a. * is being tall Charon
b. * two hundred pounds is weighted by Erebus
c. * five dollars is cost by this pen
d. * Amy is resembled by Sue
e. * four is equalled by two plus two
f. * Erebus was resembled by Bill
Inherently non-aspectual predicates cannot take two thematic arguments,
when inherently means “always non-aspectual.” Moreover, unaccusatives
seem to correlate in their content with the crucial aspectual property at
hand when they represent states (Grimshaw, 1990, §2.5.3, Levin & Rappa-
port, 1995, §3.3). It is predicted that non-aspectual unaccusatives never take
only one a-argument. This is the case, as can be seen below (cf. Fillmore,
1968, Lakoff, 1970):
(72) a. the mail arrived
b. * the mailman arrived the letter
c. the mail arrived at its destination
d. * the letter was arrived by the mail
e. the war emerged
f. * the emperor emerged the war
g. * was emerged by the war
I also predict that they could not passivize, lacking two or more a-
arguments. This is indeed one property of unaccusatives representing states
(Burzio, 1986, Levin & Rappaport, 1995, Perlmutter & Postal, 1984). Fur-
thermore, some of them adopt special adjectival forms, supporting further
the fact that they, like adjectives in general, do not have an internal event
structure: recently arrived quests, collapsed lung, rotten apples, vanished trea-
sure. On the other hand, if a non-aspectual verb has two arguments, which
is surely not impossible, then the other argument is predicted to appear in
the semantic Case (PP) as a “last resort”:
(73) a. Erebus stood on the ground
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b. * Erebus stood ground
c. * the ground was stood on
Note that non-aspectual verbs cannot have only one aspectually individ-
uated argument, but discourse arguments are not banned. The other possi-
bility would be to use a non-thematic argument and, indeed, these predicates
easily appear with expletives (there arrived three men). Expletives are dis-
cussed in §6.3. This is important, since, again, unaccusatives are claimed to
be predicates that cannot assign the accusative case, hence they appear in an
oblique case. According to the present proposal, however, these properties
follow from non-aspectuality.
Properties of lexical elements individuated from the more ‘surface level’
are notoriously hard to formulate, since they are presumably to be explained
by invoking the interaction of several principles and, what is worse, the lexi-
con is naturally the place for a considerable amount of idiosyncracy concern-
ing language use, pragmatics, and so forth. Therefore, the above remarks
should be taken as tentative: I expect there to be exceptions, and I will
return to the matter more closely in what follows.
The following data shows that we lack an essential property of the vacuous
argument, central to the analysis of passives. In each case, a constituent has
been “raised” from an embedded full projection:
(74) a. Charon seems intelligent
b. Charon was expected to be found
This is an astonishing feature of natural language(s). The distance be-
tween Charon and v may be arbitrarily long, but the proposed mechanism
that generates ‘raising’ in personal passives is extremely local, in fact clause-
bound. Yet it is related to the EPP phenomenon, as these constructions,
too, lack a subject that must be probed from the underlying structure
In pursuing one possible explanation, note first that (75) violates [51]:
(75) we caused [ him to kill her ]
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VP
we V
′
VP
he
<a, a>
V
′
her
<a, a>
V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ cause
In this sentence, him and her have identical feature vectors (<a, a>,
ACC). Yet they both “pass” at the syntactic-linking level since (75) is well-
formed, contrary to what is expected according to the present theory and rule
[51], which prevents the CHL from interpreting syntactically two constituents
inside the same FP with identical feature vectors. I suggest that this is related
to the fact that he is still rises in the corresponding passive and has certain
other “object properties” (cf. Postal, 1974):
(76) he was asked to kill her
This indicates that he would be part of the upper FP, as assumed in Las-
nik (1999, §2, 1999b, Lasnik & Hendrick, 2003, §3.2.2) and Bowers (2001).
Assume, for now, that this is a matter of extremely local or minimal A-
movement which I call “restructuring”: the accusative subject of the embed-
ded infinite clause rises to be part of the upper FP, as shown in (77):
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(77) VP
we V
′
hei V
′
VP
ti V
′
her V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ cause
The target position is simply stipulated. More importantly, note that
two assumptions converge: assuming that he is part of the upper FP, it can
satisfy [51] and passivize. Consider the effect of the rule as shown in (78)(a-
d), where the lexico-logical form (a) is linked with syntactic properties (d):
(78) a. v expect [ v found Charon ]
b. v was expected [ Charon to be found ]
c. v was expected Charoni [ ti to be found ]
d. Charoni was expected [ ti to be found ]
The rules that generate personal passives plus restructuring entail long-
distance movement in a truly minimalist spirit: the element moves in a
strictly cyclical fashion, one clause boundary at a time rather than in one
long step.
But what is restructuring? It might be an economical Last Resort oper-
ation: when there is an escape hatch for an argument otherwise deleted by
[51], the escape hatch is used.16 The other possibility would be to assume
that arguments rise because of some morphological requirement. My own
hunch is that, given that these speculations are not completely off the mark
in the first place, restructuring is a consequence of some currently unknown,
16One type of evidence relevant to this issue is the fact that in some languages (e.g.,
Spanish), both the matrix predicate and the embedded predicate agree with the raised
(restructured) element. This suggests that the restructuring might not be movement, but
copying, as suggested in the minimalist program.
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albeit deep and important, aspect of the construction of LLF representations
from the syntactic point of view.
Restructuring was described as a process in which the subject of an infinite
complement is moved to the matrix clause, taking the role of the object. This
definition, although correct for present purposes, is unsatisfactory because
it relies on the surface properties of expressions rather than on the LLF
properties. Clearly the phenomenon of restructuring belongs to the LLF
level if it is used to explain long-range displacement.
To give a first approximation, but one that is sufficient for the purposes
of the present study, restructuring may occur at the LLF level whenever
there is no additional structure between the embedded proposition and the
matrix proposition. Thus, for the present purposes, the presence of T or a
d-operator dominating the proposition could be said to block the application
of restructuring. Otherwise, the constituent is assumed to be able to move.
Note that what prevents restructuring is additional structure (T, d) between
the embedded and the matrix clausees: a d-marked argument in the embed-
ded clause, although it does not arise in personal passives, may do so in the
case of restructuring (see Frampton & Gutmann, 1999, §5.2 for examples
of this type of “quirky case” in Icelandic, and Ferna´ndez-Soriano, 1999, for
Spanish).17
In sum, and to return to the explanation of personal passives, the vacuous
argument can be inserted in any argument position at the LLF level. The
following sentences are typical examples of subject and object replacement,
respectively:
(79) a. Charon was found
b. We ate
There are two other possibilities. If we assume that the LLF structure
contains two direct objects, the vacuous argument could occur in the middle
position. This still leaves two accusative direct objects, of which one must
be deleted according to rule [51], ruling such constructions out. If any of
these arguments is d-marked, it remains intact and does not alter its gram-
matical properties as a consequence of the presence of the vacuous argument.
17There is evidence that the presence of a dative (experiencing) subject in a rising con-
struction may block restructuring. This is important, fact but irrelevant to the discussion
that follows.
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This construction survives, but there would be no syntactic trace of the vac-
uous argument because the feature vector of the lower d-marked argument
would detect no change. Rather, what emerges is (79)(b) with a d-marked
argument, such as Charon ate for pleasure.
A declarative sentence contains another A-position, however, that of the
T node. I have assumed that the T node is the locus of the event argument.
So far I have not examined the question of whether a T node might contain
something with similar properties to the vacuous argument, resulting in a
“defective tempus.” There is some evidence that this is possible, for we are
searching for a structure in which an embedded clause would have tempus,
while behaving syntactically as if the T node were not there. This type of
sentence is found in Finnish, among other languages (see Boskovic, 1996,
Chomsky, 2000, 2001, pp. 6-9):
(80) mina¨
I-nom
na¨in
saw
Merjan
Merja-gen/acc
la¨hteneen
left-past
’I saw (that) Merja has left.’
(81) mina¨
I-nom
na¨in
saw
Merjan
Merja-gen/acc
la¨hteva¨n
leave-present
’I saw (that) Merja has left.’
In both cases, the subject of the embedded clause appears in the Case of
the structural object (here the genitive: for more on the Finnish case system,
see §6.3), and rises in the corresponding rising construction:18
(82) Merja
Merja-nom
na¨ytta¨a¨
seems
la¨hteva¨n
leave-pres
’Merja appears/seem to leave.’
Normally, the presence of a tense prevents restructuring (ECM), but here
it is obvious that restructuring plus an accusative Case marking may occur
even in a sentence that is tensed. There is thus evidence, in Finnish and
18Chomsky assumes that a defective T does not have a “tense structure” (Chomsky,
2000, p. 105). In that case, I would have to assume that these Finnish examples are
not instances of defective tempus, but CPs with null C and a full tense. This assumption
appears problematic in the current framework, and in the light of theory-external evidence
as well (e.g., the lack of agreement inside the embedded sentence), whereas the assumption
of defective tempus entails exactly the correct properties. Therefore, I assume here that
defective tempus contains features such as PRESENT / PAST, in much the same way as
the Finnish impersonal covert expletives have features such as [+pluar][+rational].
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elsewhere, that we may not wish to rule out the possibility of “defective
tempus” and hence maximal generality in the distribution of v at the LLF
level, in other words, that the vacuous argument may indeed occur at any
argument position.19
Assuming that the d-marking of a complex constituent results a non-
aspectual reading of whatever is represented by that constituent, certain
principles interact to transform the form of the sentence. The relevant lexico-
logical form is represented below:
(83) VP
Erebus V
′
XP
d VP
Charon V
′
PP
d mathematics
V0
℘ love
V0
℘ hate
Several factors have an effect here. First, since d-marking is associated
with non-aspectuality, I predict the gerund form of the verb. Then, according
to [51], the second argument must be d-marked as a “last resort.” Finally
Charon takes the genitive Case since it has the feature vector <a, d>. This
19This observation, if true, is clearly important in explaining the nature of restructuring
itself. Primarily, restructuring must not be blocked by the “defective T,” although it is
by a normal full T. This is because if the defective T is analyzed as a vacuous argument,
such a node is invisible to the arguments inside the embedded proposition. Hence it also
follows that the “triggering structure” of restructuring must lie in the embedded structure.
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lexico-logical form, meaning that ‘Erebus will hate the idea that Charon loves
mathematics,’ is then linked to expressions (84a-c).
(84) a. ? Erebus hates Charon’s loving/love of mathematics
b. Charon’s killing was awful
c. Charon’s leaving from the solar system surprised me
According to my semantic intuitions, this is correct. Note that I assume
here that it is the gerund nominal that is productive enough to warrant
this generalization at the level of syntax. Other nominal forms do not seem
productive enough, so they merit separate treatment following which the
conclusions, if executed in the present context, are currently open (e.g., *the
stories’ amusement of him, Chomsky, 1970). I return to this issue later, since
it is crucial in understanding the nature of redundancy in the lexicon, here
especially as it is related to the study of causatives.
I also predict an interaction between ECM constructions and sentential
nominals: assuming that sentential nominals are non-aspectual, I expect
them to lack ECM structures due to the presence of d-marking at the top of
the embedded clause. This is shown in (85):
(85) VP
we V
′
XP
d VP
Charon V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ cause
This turns out to be the desired result, since ECM structures indeed
cannot be found inside NPs:
(86) a. Erebus believes Charon to be intelligent
b. * Erebus’ belief Charon to be intelligent
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The following data further supports the conclusion that, as assumed in
the above argument, genitive gerunds do not have an internal event structure
representing propositions in a fully abstract sense:
(87) a. Erebus watched Charon leave twice
b. ?? Erebus watched Charon’s leaving twice
Here, (b) is a genitive gerund, incapable of taking an aspectual adverb
twice. Now consider
(88) a. i. Erebus wants Charon to leave twice
ii. ? Erebus wants Charon’s leaving twice
i. Erebus wants Charon to leave here
ii. ? Erebus wants Charon’s leaving here
i. Erebus wants Charon to leave now
ii. ? Erebus wants Charon’s leaving now
i. Erebus wants to leave
ii. * Erebus wants leaving
These aspectual adverbs modifying the complement clauses produce odd
sentences if there is no internal event structure present, as assumed. A similar
pattern is to be found in other languages. In Japanese, for instance, the
complement clause is marked with koto if it represents an “abstract concept”
formed “out of the proposition,” while it is marked with no if it is used to
represent a “concrete event” (Kuno, 1973, p. 221).
According to this theory, sentences are much like nominals in their struc-
ture (e.g., Ogawa, 2001). Whereas most minimalist theories explain their
differences by the presence of nominal affix or a nominal head in the nomi-
nalized clauses, in the present case the difference is located in the differences
in the corresponding feature vectors. These elements in the feature vectors
(i.e., d-operators) have morphological consequences that show up as nominal
affixes.
In sum, and returning to the EPP principle, I have argued that there is
no EPP principle as such, but that its overt manifestations are the results of
several interacting principles. This seems to me a significant departure from
the standard minimalist theory, but I think it is an improvement: the EPP
principle has been a mystery. At the same time, much of the evidence that
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has been explained directly by invoking it, such as A
′
-movement, remains to
be explained.
So far I have been occupied in presenting and exploring a few of the main
theoretical assumptions taken up in this work, in addition to the atomistic
hypothesis entertained earlier, and in embedding these assumptions in the
core of minimalist theory, guided by the strong minimalist SMT hypothesis.
These assumptions were the three rules [49]-[51] that were used to derive,
but not to stipulate, the formal features of the lexical elements, and which,
when used together, entail a number of grammatical properties, including the
Case Filter, personal passives, Burzio’s Generalization, UTAH, of support in
the case of nominal and adjectival predicates, and aspects of other principles
such as EPP. These phenomena are certainly quite real, but the suggestion
is not that one would wish to introduce dramatic changes to minimalist
architecture itself, but that a somewhat deeper unification might be possible
in terms of [49]-[51]. Thus, the lexical elements that appear at the LLF level
do not have all their morphosyntactic properties in place, as stipulated in the
Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis: rather, these features emerge as the syntactic
interpretation proceeds from LLF towards PF. This is important, for it makes
the lexical component abstract enough to allow me to attempt to combine
minimalism with the atomistic lexicon - with which this thesis is concerned.
Rules [49]-[51] are not intended as all-explaining, but rather as abstract
principles that may lie behind the surface aberrations of natural language(s).
Other grammatical constraints might be explected to be in operation at other
levels, especially in the morphological component, and I will turn to them in
detail in the subsequent sections. Moreover, many aspects of CHL have sim-
ply been omitted for now, including head movement and other grammatical
aspects that have putative ramifications in word ordering.
LLF is targeted to represent a formulation of ‘propositional thought’ in-
sofar as its linguisticially relevant properties are concerned. Rules [49]-[51]
thus have an intuitive interpretation, as follows. The formal features of lexical
elements such as Case and category are seen as encoding (for the speaker)
and revealing (for the hearer) the structural and hence also the semantic
properties of thought. Principle [51] is intended to capture the fact that the
interface between the language faculty and thought contains a bottleneck:
when thought is ‘formalized’ for the purposes of the operation of the lan-
guage faculty, the resources are very limited, and many elements of thought
cannot survive the filter.
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3.7 The empty lexicon and subcategorization
The received view is that the lexicon has been conceived of as a collection of
features: phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. For instance, the
lexical item for the verb run could be individuated as follows:
run:
/run/ phonological features
V formal features
run(Agent) argument structure
’. . .’ semantic decomposition
The arguments put forward in previous sections suggest that the seman-
tic features of the lexical items ought to be unstructured primitives, at least
insofar as they are visible to the computational processes available in the
‘language faculty.’ Let us assume that they are primitives, thus there are
no decompositions present. A lexical entry for run could thus look like the
following:
run:
/run/ phonological features
V formal features
run(Agent) argument structure
+run semantic feature
[+Run] is a semantic feature, capturing the content of to run. This con-
tent is best understood as being the ‘phenomenon of running’ as understood
by human beings. Let us now turn to the syntactic features. There is no
trivial way of predicting the syntactic class of the corresponding expression
at the surface from the semantic feature [+run], as running (N, A), to run
(V), runs (V) all denote, in some sense, the same phenomenon of running,
and we do not want to lose this generalization. What running is, or whatever
it is that we are acquainted when with we know what running is, has nothing
to do with distributional and morphological facts about language. In other
words, if it were possible to communicate by telepathy, features such as V,
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N and A would not necessarily play any decisive role in such communica-
tion. If this is the case, where do these syntactic features emerge? Given the
minimalist background, this problem must be solved.
The most straightforward hypothesis is to assume a plethora of lexical
items corresponding to the stipulated syntactic features. According to this
scheme, there is a separate lexical item for the verb run and the noun run-
ning. This entirely stipulative strategy is not at all satisfactory, since the
differences between verbs (runs) and nouns (running) would appear to be
entirely mysterious - even more so in the case of the minimalist program,
which seeks to eliminate all “imperfections.” I have assumed that these fea-
tures emerge in the course of syntactic linguistic computation (§3.5), and
hence they are not part of the lexical elements. Thus, if run/running are
morphemes in the surface language, they both correlate with the same lexical
entry containing both phonological and semantical features at the LLF level.
According to this hypothesis, the lexicon truly contains what is required by
“virtual conceptual necessity”alone, the pairing between sound and meaning:
run: /run/, [+run]
The syntactic features have vanished altogether from the lexicon, assum-
ing that this move proves successful. Morphological and distributional facts,
reflected in the categorial and structural features, are explained as a by-
products of the linguistic computation. General UG priciples account for the
further semantic properties.
In the context of the more standard minimalist theory, these highly min-
imalist assumptions of the “bare lexicon” might look impossible in practice,
due to the well-known fact that at least some subcategorization restrictions
seem operative at the lexical level, and there is some evidence that such
restrictions are best explained by assigning semantic features to the lexical
elements (s-selection). Although some general aspects of subcategorization
already emerge from the principles set out above, these idiosyncratic prop-
erties, while surely represent an important aspect of any theory of grammar,
do not. A typical example is given below:
(89) a. Erebus gave a book to Charon
b. * Erebus gave a book
The lexical element for give thus requires certain arguments that seem to
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be semantically motivated, while the atomistic“bare lexicon”explained above
seems utterly incapable of capturing these facts, precisely by virtue of its
assuming no semantic structure inside of the lexical elements. Furthermore,
I have assumed that there is not much syntactic structure in the lexicon
either.
However, this argument is mistaken in that as soon as one drops the as-
sumption that lexical elements are constituted by their categorial features,
as assumed here, this objection loses much of its appeal. Nominalized pred-
icates, represented here by identical lexical elements with verbal predicates
at the LLF level, are not subject to such restrictions:
(90) a. Charon’s giving of money to Erebus was astonishing
b. Charon’s giving of money was astonishing
c. giving is a virtue
The surface forms giving in (a-c) results from the same lexical element
give at the LLF level, hence there is no more no reason to stipulate these
restrictions as part of the abstract lexicon.
I do not claim that such restrictions do not exists: rather, they do not be-
long to the lexical component of the grammar which, therefore, does not need
to be constituted by semantic features. These restrictions emerge at some
later point when the lexical element has been assigned its categorial feature
+V, possibly as late as in Morphology (as evidenced from the fact that often
such restrictions concerning e.g. causativization or subcategorization found
in English do not extend to Finnish). There may exist semantic explanations
of such restrictions, say in terms of event structures, whole propositional
frames or extra-linguistic aspects: what is important to the present argu-
ment, and what is relevant here, is that such explanations need not, and
plausibly do not, invoke lexical decompositions at the LLF level.20
If the presence of certain complements can be explained away by assuming
that lexical elements at the LLF level are abstract category-netural roots,
the fact that when such arguments are present they are not arbitrary cannot.
Example (91) illustrates why.
(91) a. Erebus’ giving a book to Charon was unexpected
20There is a residuum of data that cannot be explained along these lines. For example,
certain predicates simpy cannot take sentential or propositional complements (*Erebus
sleeps that he is married).
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b. *Erebus’ giving a book from Charon was unexpected
Thus, the verb give does not allow one to combine it with a prepositional
phase headed by from. From the perspective of the present theory, certain
predicates can be combined with certain d-operators, but not with others,
and this seems to be a matter of semantics. However, even if a verb such
as give is associated with the d-operator to, this relation does not have to,
and presumably cannot, represent a decomposition of give. It is again a
matter of interaction between give and the other element involved in the
event represented by give.
3.8 Conclusions
A theory of lexico-logical form (LLF) was outlines in this chapter. Lexical
items appearing at the LLF level are atomic and correspond to primitive
morphemes at the surface level. They were assumed to represent properties.
A system of linking rules was then suggested within the minimalist frame-
work. This shows that a compositional atomistic theory may be linked to
linguistic representations with rules that are not too complicated, but in fact
the contrary seems to be the case.
Admittedly, showing that these assumptions would gain comparable or
even better explanatory force than any previous minimalist theory would
require going into details of linguistic data beyond the scope of this thesis,
in fact beyond the timeframe of a single lifetime. Nevertheless, in the next
chapter, I will investigate in detail the properties of lexical, morphological
and analytic causatives, applying the theory to that area. I will then turn
again to many other grammatical properties in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Causatives
4.1 Introduction
Causatives represent a bona fide case of a linguistic phenomenon that threat-
ens to tear apart the atomistic lexicon: practically all analyses of this phe-
nomenon involve decomposition, and when they do not, they do not seem
to be explanatory, relying on stipulative, or at best descriptive meaning pos-
tulates. There is a good reason for these choices: decompositional analyses
trace the origin of many linguistic properties, both syntactic and semantic,
of the causatives to their shared conceptual constituent CAUSE. This is an
attractive line of inquiry to start with, since this constituent has meaning
on both sides of the LF, affecting syntactic and semantic computations. On
the other hand, those who deny that such elements are real, linguistically or
otherwise, have been relying on meaning postulates, but essentially due to
the lack of a better theory.
However, in truth, there is no inference from the presence of CAUSE to a
biclausal explanation. These two assumptions, although closely related, are
independent of each other. According to Pesetsky’s (1995) theory, for exam-
ple, the element CAUSE is, from a syntactic point of view, a ‘preposition’
and hence the structure is not syntactically biclausal. Pesetsky’s position is
close to the one presented here in that the element CAUSE is an affix that
rises to check the causative affix of the verb, adopting the Strict Lexicalist
Hypothesis. Similar questions arise in the case of Larsonian vP-shells. In the
present Case, causativity affects grammar indirectly: first, aspectual individ-
uation of arguments is interpreted causally according to C-I system, whereas
it correlates with morphological changes in the lexical item itself.
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Specifically, I will argue that there is a third possibility that does not
assume any kind of linguistic causal element. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 I devel-
oped a thematic theory that relied on aspectual properties of the arguments
/ participants in an event denoted by the predicate. The role of the θ-theory
changed: it was no longer a description of the thematic roles (θ-grids) of the
lexical elements, but more a theory that was used to distinguish arguments
/ participators in an event. Therefore, it is part of the UG and, more impor-
tantly, a theory of how predicates and their arguments interact in complex
constructions. It is the whole propositional frame that involves thematic
roles, not any of its lexical elements taken in isolation. Causativity is seen as
a subtype of aspectual order, aspectuality provided by the UG, causativity
by the C-I system. This means that, from a linguistic point of view, there is
no underlying element CAUSE, yet it is easy to see that the existence of cer-
tain meaning postulates is predicted. For instance, among other inferences,
the sentence Brutus killed Caesar implies that Brutus preceded Caesar in
the event of killing.1
4.2 Causativity
A typical causative construction expresses the notion that “someone causes
something to occur,” giving rise to specific inferential relations between the
respective morphemes. As an illustration, consider the following versions of
the Finnish verb juosta (‘to run’):
(92) juostiin
ran-pass-past
kotiin
home
‘People ran home / there was a running home.’
(93) juoksin
ran-past-1sg
‘I ran.’
(94) juoksutin
ran-caus-past-sg1
koiraa
dog-prt
‘I made the dog run.’
1Russell was aware of the problem that this analysis leads to infinite regress, since
precede is a verb that seems to presuppose its own meaning in the individuation of its
arguments. Thus, the fact that Caesar precedes Brutus in the event of killing entails that
Caesar preceded Brutus in the event of preceding. I do not attempt to deal with this
problem here.
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(95) juoksututin
ran-caus-caus-past-sg1
koiraa
dog-prt
‘I made the dog run / I made somebody to made the dog run.’
(96) juoksutettiin
ran-caus-caus-past-pass
koiraa
dog-prt
’A dog was made to run.’
From the perspective of form, (92-96) are morphological variations of the
same 0-morpheme juoSTA (‘run’). Items (94-96) are causatives since, from a
semantic point of view, they involve the sense of someone’s causing somebody
to run. In (96), the causer is vacuous, hence it is a ‘causative passive.’
Item (95) represents what has been called “indirect causation,” whereas
(94) involves “direct causation.” The difference is that, in the case of indirect
causation, there is sensed of something being between the causer and the
causee, so that the causer is not directly responsible for the changes affecting
the causee, whereas in direct causation they engage in more direct physical
contact with each other.
Causative morphology is productive in Finnish, admitting relatively few
morphological gaps, at least compared to English. Turkish, Quechua, Mat-
ses and Tarascan are similar to Finnish in that there are few causative mor-
phemes, exploited in an iterative and virtually gapless way. English is more
restrictive, containing only a few morphological causatives such as mechanic-
mechanize, large - enlarge, sure - ensure, red - redden.
Verbs, nouns and adjectives all undergo causativization, even in passive
forms when they are verbs (but not, of course, in all languages), thus for
each of the verbs listed above, perhaps apart from (a), there is also a corre-
sponding specific causative nominal. The nominal form of (c), for instance,
is illustrated in (97).
(97) juoksuttaminen
running-caus
on
is
tylsa¨a¨
boring
‘Making somebody run is boring.’
Further elaboration is possible, since it is also possible to construct agent
and patient nominalizations from deverbal causative nominals:
(98) juoksuttaja
run-caus-agent
‘the one who causes running.’
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(99) juoksutettava
run-caus-patient
‘the one who is caused to run.’
I call these causatives “morphological causatives,” which are, in fact, one
of the most extensively studied linguistic phenomena in the world’s languages.
Their diagnostic properties include (i) the appearance of a special causative
morpheme, or several morphemes, (ii) a monoclausal structure at least on
the surface level, and (iii) causative interpretation. I will illustrate later how
each of these items raises interesting problems.
First, a few comments on each of these conditions are in order. There
are various kinds of “special causative morphemes” mentioned in condition
(i), ranging from the more fusional (or inflectional) to the agglutinative.
Problems arise when the causative affix is highly fusional and perhaps even
irregular. Thus, some linguists include a fourth criterion that the morpho-
logical causative must be a member of a productive system, as there are
causatives satisfying conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) that are nevertheless irreg-
ular and hence, in some sense, unclear instances between the morphological
and the lexical causatives (see Shibatani, 2001, for a review). As they are
irregular, they must be listed separately in the lexicon. Shibatani (2001) also
offers some evidence that these irregular morphological causatives tend to
pair with lexical causatives in their semantic properties, as lexical causatives,
together with irregular morphological causatives, imply more direct causa-
tion than morphological causatives (more below). Making a definite choice
on this matter is not altogether essential, but in the context of the present
theoretical framework it seems appropriate to include this fourth criterion in
the list.
In many cases, a morphological causative word begins a ‘life of its own,’
attaining special meaning which, in some cases, might be quite far from the
possible original causative. The following monoclausal (criteria ii) exam-
ples come from Finnish, and each word appears with causative morphology
(criterion i):2
(100) olettaa, pida¨tta¨a¨, tuulettaa, hivuttaa
‘presuppose, withold/arrest, ventilate, move slowly.’
Yet it is unclear whether these satisfy criterion (iii), the causative mean-
ing; it is also unclear whether they have any kind of root predicate form. In
2I thank Urpo Nikanne for raising the issue.
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some cases, it seems evident that the morphological form, even if identical
to the causative morphology, is not related to causatives, as is the case with
predicates such as saavuttaa ‘reach.’ In many cases, a word that might orig-
inally have functioned as a fully transparent causative has assumed special
rules of use. I will return to this matter in section 4.8. Nevertheless, care
must be taken in applying crieria (i-iv) when inferring LLF properties from
the surface form. It is not to be expected that a completely transparent set
of inferentail rules can be given since, especially towards the lexical level,
irregularities and other peripheral (in the sense of not being part of the core
grammar) and not so peripheral properties begin to take effect.
“Causative interpretation” (iii) should be taken as a specific type of ‘cog-
nitive perspective,’ as Pinker (1989) put it: “Viewed with a sufficiently sharp
microscope, there is no such thing as direct causation: when I cut an apple,
I first decide to do it, then send neural impulses to my arm and hand, which
cause the muscles to contract, causing the hand to move, causing the knife
to move, causing the knife to contact the surface of the apple, causing the
surface to rupture, and so on” (p. 86). In some cases the causative chain is
rather long and intricate, as in sentences such as the president of the United
States grows bananas in Guatemala. Thus, ‘what causes what’ in a causative
construction might not in reality have as much to do with (physical) causa-
tion as with how we conceptualize the situation and what aspects we perceive
as ‘salient’ (e.g., Langacker, 1987).
Productive morphology is not a necessary feature of causatives, as we
have alternatives such as Erebus killed Charon and Erebus caused Charon to
die. Morphologically unrelated causative pairs are called “lexical causatives.”
Their diagnostic properties are (i) the lack of appearance of a causative mor-
pheme and irregularity of form, (ii) a monoclausal structure on the surface
level, and (iii) a causative interpretation. One major research problem con-
cerns the conditions, i.e. the nature of the represented event itself, under
which a causative verb can be, or is most typically, lexicalized (e.g., Haspel-
math, 1987).
In addition, there are causative phrases themselves (that is, phrases on
the surface level), such as Erebus made the ship sink, Erebus caused the ship
to sink, Erebus made Charon give a present to James and Erebus had Charon
give a present to James. In some such cases the cause appears as an adjunct,
marked by the by preposition, for example, the ship was sunk by Erebus.
If causation is explicitly marked by a causative word at the surface level,
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such as had, make, cause, let or help, I call such constructions as “analytic
causatives.” The diagnostic syntactic property of an analytic causative is
that it is biclausal at the surface level. I assume that English “bare infinite
causatives” such as Charon made the ship sink contain clausal complements,
in this case the ship sink (Felser, 1999, among others).
The terms “morphological causative,”“lexical causative” and “analytical
causative” come from Comrie (1985). The classification is simplified, but
widely used. Furthermore, properties of the “d-structure” (in terms of GB
theory) are not used diagnostically in this study: rather, whether morpholog-
ical causatives are biclausal (decompositional) in d-structure represents ex-
actly what is controversial. Thus, I will use the surface properties of causative
constructions to diagnose the type among lexical, morphological and analyt-
ical causatives. I do not claim that these categories are ‘real’ rather than
convent heuristics or, presumably, only taxonomic artifacts equal to notions
such as nouns and verbs.
Indeed, the diagnostic properties of morphological, lexical and analytical
causatives may be in conflict. One example comes from Chichewa. In this
language, analytic and morphological causatives coincide at least morpho-
logically in the sense that the same causative appears as an (movable) affix
in both constructions. Nedyaldov & Silnitsky (1973) concluded that, “In a
number of languages there are transitional cases where the causative mor-
pheme can function both as a causative affix and as an empty causative verb”
(p. 6, cited in Baker, 1988, p. 151). French (and other Romance languages)
have similar peculiar ‘mixed properties.’
After studying a number of languages, Song (1995) presented a some-
what more detailed typology of causatives. She assumed that causative con-
structions could be analysed as consisting of two abstract particles, Vcause
and Veffect, the former being the “causative particle” and the latter being
the verb for the effect. The typology was then based upon the syntactic-
surface-closeness properties of Vcause and Veffect, ranging from “complete
fusion” (lexical causatives) to “complete separates” (analytical causatives).
“Morphological causatives,” with their various versions, lie in between in this
classification. Some of the properties of Song’s typology coincide with those
described above, yet it singles out some additional classes, the “AND-type
causatives” and “PURP-type causatives.”
There is an interesting semantic relation between analytic, morphologi-
cal and lexical passives. The ‘directness’ of the causation increases (rather
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smoothly and iconically), from analytic causatives via the morphological to
the lexical ones (Bouchard, 1995, pp. 104-108, Comrie, 1985, §2.2, Fodor,
1970, Gergely & Bever, 1986, Shibatani, 2001, Song, 1995). This phenomenon
has been exploited quite extensively in showing that lexical or morphologi-
cal causatives cannot be decomposed into analytical ones due to the lack of
strict synonymy. One cannot analyze, or exhaust, the meaning of lexical or
morphological causatives in terms of phrasal ones.
Not all causatives involve direct or indirect causation: sometimes the rela-
tion between the causer and causee (or the caused event) is permissive (‘let’)
or assistive (‘help’). There are languages in which the causative morpheme
carries all these meanings, and languages where some other features of the
sentence may alter the force of the causal bond (Comrie, 1985, §2.2, Talmy,
1985).
In addition to the fact that causativity is a common property in the lexi-
cons of a wide variety of otherwise unrelated languages, as a semantic prop-
erty it seems to correlate with certain grammatical effects, implying that,
presumably, there is something in it that interacts with the syntactic com-
putation inside the language faculty. According to those who support the
decompositional explanation, that something is the lexical semantic feature
CAUSE in its various forms. Let us call this as the “lexico-centric explana-
tion”: the origin of the semantic and syntactic properties is traced to the
properties of the lexicon. Looked at from a slightly different perspective,
scholars who prefer decompositional analysis of causatives claim, in effect,
that there is something in lexical and morphological causatives that resembles
analytic causatives, namely, they are decomposed to a similar representation.
There is, of course, the substantial question of determining what “similarity”
amounts to here, but it often looks as if the putative semantic representation
underlying lexical and morphological causatives is the same representation
that underlies the analytic causative.
4.3 An atomistic explanation of causatives with-
out meaning postulates: a first sketch
In this section I will outline my solution to the problem of explanatory ade-
quacy in the case of causatives, giving the technical details only in the next
section. The problem, to recap, is to explain the systematic and productive
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syntactic and semantic properties of causative constructions in a minimalist
framework that assumes lexical atomism and rejects the view that lexical,
morphological and analytic causatives are mapped onto identical semantic
representations.
According to Dowty (1979), among others, explaining the widespread
phenomenon of derivational causative morphology requires one to postulate
a causative decomposition in which new lexical elements may be derived from
previous ones by combining them with a phrase expressing causation, and
hence supplying them with a semantic decomposition. The alternating gram-
matical properties of the resulting causative expressions are then explained
by invoking the corresponding differences in their respective lexical elements.
For example, a causativized intransitive, such as kill, allows but does not
necessarily force a new argument (external subject), whereas the subject of
the original intransitive (die) is demoted to the status of direct object. Thus,
semantic changes in the lexical element induce changes in the morphology,
syntax and semantics of the whole phrase.
There is an alternative to this explanation, which somewhat reverses the
cause and its effect and has what I believe is the desired effect of solv-
ing the conflict between lexical atomism and linguistic explanation. If the
lexico-centric approach stipulates that the grammatical properties are a con-
sequence of lexical decomposition, one could as well reverse the reasoning by
proposing that it is the grammatical properties - i.e., properties of the whole
expressions or ‘propositional frames’ or its logical syntax - that induce the
surface alterations to the appearances of the lexical elements, not only in the
case of the structural Case and agreement, for example, but also in the case
of what has been traditionally explained by invoking semantic features. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, causation is not part of the lexical elements, not
represented in virtue of predicate CAUSE, but is part of the logical syntax of
the whole proposition.3
Consider a proposition involving two participants, Brutus and Caesar,
and a relation, killing. These participants, or their roles in the respective
propositions, must be distinguished from each other, as Brutus killed Caesar
certainly differs in its truth-value from Caesar killed Brutus. As explained
in section 3.4, this problem has traditionally been adddressed by postulating
thematic roles and their syntactic linking, meaning that it was Brutus who
3To be accurate, causativity is a consequence of the logical syntax of the whole propo-
sition, provided by the C-I system, thus it is not, strictly speaking, ‘internal’ to it.
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was in the role of being the ‘Agent’ of the killing, whereas it was Caesar
who was the ‘Patient,’ assuming that it is Brutus killed Caesar and not
Caesar killed Brutus that is true. On the basis of this observation alone,
however, there is no reason to suppose that this information is part of the
lexical elements Caesar, Brutus or killing, since this explanation is perfectly
general and applies to a wide enough range of linguistic expressions to suggest
that there is a general principle involved, although the details are, as is well
known, moot. The role of that principle is to distinguish the roles of the
participants in the proposition they are parts of (who is the killer, who is the
one being killed), and hence it is a principle concerning essentially a complex
construction and not a single lexical element taken in isolation.
What is the principle involved? As I already mentioned in section 3.4, I
believe Russel (1940) was the first to suggest the correct answer, especially
relevant to the analysis of causativity. Russell, being concerned with the
above-mentioned asymmetry between Brutus killed Caesar and Caesar killed
Brutus, wrote:
The two sentences “Brutus killed Caesar” and “Caesar killed Bru-
tus” consist of the same words, arranged, in each case, by the
relation of temporal sequence. Nevertheless, one of them is true
and the other is false. The use of words for this purpose is, of
course, not essential; Latin uses inflexions instead. But if you had
been a Roman schoolmaster teaching the difference between nom-
inative and accusative, you would have been compelled, at some
point, to bring in non-symmetrical relations, and you would have
found it natural to explain them by means of spatial or temporal
order. Consider for a moment what happened when Brutus killed
Caesar: a dagger moved swiftly from Brutus into Caesar. The ab-
stract scheme is “A moved from B to C,” and the fact with which
we are concerned is that this is different from“A moved from C to
B.” There were two events, one A-being-at-B, the other A-being-
at-C, which we will name x and y respectively. If A moved from
B to C, x preceded y; if A moved from C to B, y preceded x.
Thus the ultimate source of the difference between “Brutus killed
Caesar” and “Caesar killed Brutus” is the difference between “x
precedes y”and“y precedes x,”where x and y are events. (Russell,
1940, pp. 35-36).
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Note that causativity is only one subcase of the aspectual individuation
proposed by Russell, since whenever one causes something to occur, it pre-
cedes it as well. Yet Russell’s principle of aspectuality was intended not as a
lexical principle, but as a principle of how propositions with identical lexical
elements are distinguished from each other. Causation is not in the lexical
elements, taken in isolation, it is in the interpretation of the aspectual order
of the arguments inside a proposition. Thus, it is part of the logical syntax
of the sentence.
Thus, insofar as this aspectual theory provides the most general way
of capturing the difference between two propositions with identical lexical
elements (see next section), it also provides a way of explaining causativity
and thematic properties without postulating them to be parts of the lexical
items. They are semantic properties that take effect at the level of phrasal
combination, not at the level of isolated lexical elements, hence they originate
from principles of UG, not from idiosyncratic information constituting the
lexical items.
For example, the fact that red does not allow two arguments, but red-
den does, could be explained thus: one would assume not that there are two
different lexical elements red and redden with their respective subcategoriza-
tion frames and semantic decompositions that explain their relations to each
other - redden containing a feature CAUSE - but rather that there are two
identical lexical elements inside of two differing ‘propositional frames’ hav-
ing corresponding morphological reflexes, thus transforming red into redden.
This means that redden is not a lexical item with CAUSE added to red. It is
rather a variation of red inside a different propositional frame together with
the aspectual theory of the individuation of the added arguments, with its
semantic import. More generally, putative semantic features emerge from the
sentential context of the lexical elements insofar as they are grammatically
relevant, and from conceptual-intentional performance systems (C-I) insofar
as they are not.
This explanatory strategy is not alien to contemporary theories of univer-
sal grammar, for there are many grammatical phenomena that are determined
by such structural conditions, such as structural Case, agreement, binding,
government, c-command and the like. Even in the minimalist grammar, if
the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis totally contradicts this type of explanation
at least terms of in rhetoric (as it also contradicts the strong minimalist hy-
pothesis), linguistic expressions are constructed by matching and eliminating
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mutual features between linguistic objects. I have now departed from SLH by
proposing that the morphosyntactic features of lexical elements might emerge
from their feature vectors, beginning with the category and structural Case.
Why can the same not be true of semantic features?
Recall that the problem here was that if we drop the assumption of lexical
decomposition, then it becomes notoriously difficult to explain the appear-
ance of the ‘analytic’ inferential relations between lexical elements. For ex-
ample, it is then hard to see why there are so many productive and systematic
causative relations between lexical elements, and why these relations appear
to have significant grammatical reflexes. One such inference is expressed by
(101)(a-b), in which (a) seems to entail (b).
(101) a. Erebus reddened his house
b. the house is red
Suppose that (b) is taken to express the basic case of something’s being
red, and the ‘deep structure’ of sentence (a) to involve the same lexical ele-
ment red with one extra argument added. This is expressed more simply in
structures such as (102).
(102) VP
Erebus V
′
NP
his house
V
′
V0
red
Since there are two arguments, they must be distinguished from each
other in order to explain the asymmetry between (101)(a) and (103).
(103) his house reddens Erebus
Following Russell, let us assume that, in terms of the relevant semantic
properties of (101)(a) qua linguistic, the arguments are individuated by their
temporal order of participation in the event of something’s being red, first
Erebus, then the house. This implies that Erebus participates in the event of
the house becoming red before the house does, but the inference is not based
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on the semantics of the lexical elements: it is based on the whole propositional
frame. It does not yet imply that Erebus caused the house to become red:
that inference is based on the conceptual-intentional system in filling the
necessary link between Erebus and the house’s being red, so that Erebus
preceded the house in the event of the house being red because he must have
caused it to become red.
There are other details that are provided by the C-I, such as the fact that
Erebus is an intentional Agent, the originator of the event. However, these
details are part of the pragmatic performance systems, we expect them to be,
at bottom, too obscure to serve as the basis of linguistic generalization. True,
such pragmatic properties can be grammaticalized in a language, but that is
a different issue altogether: it concerns what can be expressed by whatever
means, not how the CHL operates with whatever it aims to express.
Although the proposal is similar to the one put forward by Hale & Keyser
(1993) (henceforth H&K), there are important and illuminating differences.
First, insofar as I understand their proposal, in H&K’s case, red is turned
into redden via Verb Raising: the element rises and adjoins the empty v-
element dominating the inner VP structure. The details are not important
insofar as this means that there is a causative decomposition: the v-head
has a causative content, expressing an abstract causative participle. Thus,
in H&K’s case, the element CAUSE is a linguistic participle appearing in
the phrase-structure tree itself, whereas in my case it is part of the semantic
interpretation provided by the C-I. In the latter case, there is no linguistic
causative decomposition, since red is turned into redden by a morphological
rule that simply detects the existence of an extra argument. If causative
predicates are decomposed at some level, it is not a linguistic level. Still, we
can show why causativity takes part in word-formation.
Secondly, the meaning of (101)(a), or its deep structure, is not expressed
by the analytic causative phrase (104).
(104) Erebus caused the house to become red
As is well known, there are both semantic and syntactic difficulties with
this view, to which I will return later (Cooper, 1976, Falk, 1991, Fodor,
1970, Shibatani, 1973, Wunderlich, 1997). In the present case, phrase (104)
has a different deep structure altogether: it involves a linguistic predicate
cause with its own sentential complement, whereas a morphological causative
(101)(a) does not have either. On the other hand, what I would like to cap-
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ture is the fact that (101)(a) entails (104). This entailment follows since sen-
tence (104) indeed approximates the way in which the C-I interprets (101)(a),
although they express different ‘propositions.’ Causativity (temporal prece-
dence) is, as Russell posited, a feature that is internal to the constitution of
a proposition even if the proposition does not contain the predicate cause
itself.
Consider the comment by VanValin & LaPolla (1997), in a footnote, on
the status of their causative semantic decompositions: “It is important to
keep in mind that semantic representations, even informal ones, like ‘cause
to die,’ are not equivalent to the English sentence X caused Y to die. Rather,
the claim is that semantic representation of kill involves causation, a change
of state, and a result state” (p. 654, note 6). What, then, is the semantic
analysis of X caused Y to die? Does it involve causation, a change of state
and a result state? It does - hence the problem is not solved. To avoid
the problem of decompositional analysis one would have to explain why the
meanings of words and the meanings of the corresponding phrases are not
represented identically at the semantic level. In the present theory, this is
because causativity is part of what happens inside a basic clause or a basic
proposition with a predicate and its arguments (aspectual individuation with
causativity provided by C-I), and not between two clauses.
This feature brings up a familiar philosophical puzzle, discussed by Frege,
Russell and Wittgestein, among others. Since this thesis is not targeted as a
primary philosophical work, I will settle here for merely explaining, not inves-
tigating, the problem, but I still feel that VanValin & LaPolla, for instance,
might try to reply along these lines so as to warrant a short discussion on
the matter in the present context as well.
Consider, to begin with, Shibatani’s recent diagnosis of the monoclausal
/ biclausal controversy. He writes: “Most of us agree that causation is a
relation between two events [...] The question is whether we need a level
of abstract syntactic representation between the event structure consisting
of two sub-events connected by a causal relation and superficially simplex
causative constructions, typically manifested by morphological causatives”
(Shibatani, 2001, boldface characters removed). Thus, the question is, if this
diagnosis is correct, not whether causatives are semantically/metaphysically
decomposable, but whether they are also ‘linguistically’ decomposable. To be
sure, there are some problems here concerning what Shibatani means by“syn-
tactic,” i.e. whether he is concerned with the language faculty or Mentalese,
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or both; but we may put this question aside for now. Clearly, causative sit-
uations are “semantically decomposable,” if by that term we mean that they
have some kind of parts, say chains of events, since everything we refer to
can be seen under closer inspection as containing such ‘parts.’ Any causative
situation, for instance, consists of several interconnected nodes of energy
transfer, some kind of metaphysical or physical primitives notwithstanding,
and some of these interconnections might be constitutive ingredients of the
event.
Thus, as pointed out by Shibatani, the real question whether there ex-
ists a linguistic (this thesis), or perhaps conceptual (Fodor), decomposition.
Because I now have to admit that, from a semantic or metaphysical point of
view, causative propositions might have internal decomposition, VanValin &
LaPolla could reply that their logical metalanguage, as its expressions “are
not equivalent to the English sentence[s],” represents precisely such logical
decompositions. In other words, their “semantic representations of kill in-
volve causation, a change of state, and a result state” in the metaphysical
sense (§2.3).
Similarly, one could argue that the concept of three represents the num-
ber three, which has some kind of metaphysical decomposition since it is, for
example, certainly a prime number. Fodor, too, agrees that such decompo-
sitions are real - and there seems to be no point in denying their reality of
such decompositions.
Finally, since I have argued, and even more importantly explained in some
metalanguage, that the causative structure emerges from the aspectual di-
mension concerning the participants of a proposition, I may also need a met-
alanguage, preferably a logical metalanguage with explicit model-theoretical
semantics, to explicate these assumptions even if they are, by hypothesis,
internal to propositions.
The problem is not, to repeat, in assuming linguistically irrelevant meta-
physical decompositions, but in the claim that the proposition-internal event
dynamics cannot be expressed by phrases, for I am committed to the claim
that monoclausal causatives and biclausal causatives are not synonymous.
There is a semantic difference between these two types of causatives, which
is what makes the present issue crucial linguistically. This is implied in the
present theory by the fact that different LLF representations generate these
two types of causative expression.4
4Hence, I must conclude that there is something in the outer limits of our language
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Thus, a biclausal logical analysis of lexical / morphological causation, say
in terms of VanValin & LaPolla, within one proposition must be somehow
inadequate, representing, necessarily, an analysis of causation in an analytic,
not lexical / morphological, causative. Perhaps such analyses approximate
the internal event dynamics of propositions but, to borrow Wittgenstein’s
terminology, the rest of it must only “show” itself in the language. Dowty
seems to advocate occasionally similar treatment, writing that his decom-
positional analysis is only a “rough approximation of the correct meaning
of the complex word,” and suggesting that “the ‘real’ interpretation being
obtainable only from independent definition or contextual information” (I
must confess to being unable to grasp the intended sense of the “real inter-
pretation”). Fortunately, we need not succumb to this philosophical morass
here, suffice it to note that it is not at all clear what such logical metalan-
guages are supposed to do in the theories if they are not representations of
the corresponding biclausal sentences.
I think Fodor and Lepore land in to the same muddle concerning the
status of logical metalanguage decompositions in their latest book. Consider
the following sentences containing the predicates want and drink :
(105) a. Erebus wants a beer
b. Erebus wants to have a beer
c. Erebus drinks a beer
The problem is that (a) seems to be nearly synonymous with (b), yet (c),
which is structurally similar to (a), is not synonymous with Erebus drinks
to have a beer. Pursuing a semantically atomistic lexicon leads one to take
both (a) and (b) to contain the same predicate want at the LLF level. Ac-
cording to Fodor & Lepore, 2002, pp. 112-119, the predicate want requires
a propositional complement (b), whereas sentence (a) is interpreted as (b)
by an interpretation rule associated with the predicate want that is able to
interpret ‘want X’ as ‘want to have X’ (as understood in the material mode).
Such a rule must detect the logical form of the predicate’s host, then, mean-
ing that although one could still claim that the lexicon is semantically empty,
it is otherwise complex, containing information about the host’s logical form.
which appears, strictly speaking, to be unanalyzable: the internal constitution of a propo-
sition; a language, when made to work upon itself, will end up consuming all of its resources
before succeeding completely because, in order to say something, the proposition is the
minimal unit, hence presupposed in the saying.
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For instance, the beer in want a beer is not the logical object of want, but a
logical object of have, and the opposite is true of drink a beer. Why we not
say, then, that want contains the semantic feature [+to have]? Fodor and
Lepore comment on this as follows:
Our discussion has not assumed that there is a level of logical form
at which, for example, ‘want a beer’ is represented as WANT TO
HAVE A BEER. On our account, all that happens is that wanting
to have a beer (material mode) is assigned as the denotation of the
expression ‘wants a beer’. Our treatment is, however, compatible
with positing an explicit level of logical syntax should there prove
to be any reason to do so; we have no views on the matter for
present purposes. (Fodor & Lepore, 2002, p. 116)
The authors may be claiming here that want is not decomposed from
have plus the relevant logical form because they take this decomposition to
be a ‘metaphysical,’ not a representational, fact. They seem to claim, if I
read this passage correctly, that wants a beer simply means ‘wanting to have
a beer,’ without suggesting that this meaning is represented by any kind of
complex representation. What they cannot deny, it seems, is that what is
needed in analyzing the meaning of wants a beer is the biclausal sentence
wants to have a beer, although they may deny, in the characteristic material
mode, that this synonymy is of linguistic origin. A similar interpretation of
the ‘metalanguage’ may thus be available for VanValin and LaPolla, and the
rest of the decompositional theorists.
If we keep it in mind that the designation being ‘metaphysical’ need not
imply such meanings to be mind-independent (as argued in §2), we could
claim some plausibility here, for often reading the literature on lexical se-
mantics strikes us as if we were reading trivial facts about the world, only
under new terminology such as “semantic traits” or “semantic fields,” rather
than lawful claims on how our mind and language work.
Assuming that morphological and analytical causatives can be dealt with
as proposed here, we are left with lexical causatives, which are discussed in
section 4.7.
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4.4 An atomistic explanation of morphologi-
cal causatives: the minimalist framework
My aim in this section is to investigate whether the LLF together with a
theory of linking suffice to explain the semantic, syntactic and morphological
properties of causatives. I will show that the principles laid down in the
previous chapter suffices to explain the basic properties of causatives. I will
also discuss some of the consequences of adopting these assumptions, some of
which are rather problematic. Causation is assumed to be part of the logical
syntax rather than being part of the lexical elements.
Let us begin by considering the Finnish predicate nousta, ‘to rise.’ Sup-
pose that rising is instantiated in an elevator, taking T = past. The relevant
LLF structure is shown in (106).
(106) TP
T VP
℘ VP
hissi V0
℘ nousta
According to the rules given so far, this LLF representation generates the
following expression:
(107) hissi
elevator-nom
nousi
rise-past-sg3
‘The elevator rise.’
Suppose I introduce another argument, say Erebus. This new participa-
tor is predicted to appear as the ‘originator’ of the event of the rising of the
elevator, generating (109):
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(108) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
hissi V0
℘ nousta
(109) Erebus
Erebus-nom
nosti
lift-past-sg3
hissin
elevator
Erebus lifted the elevator.
Now suppose a third argument is introduced. Given the individuation of
aspectual arguments, this new originator must participate in the event before
Erebus. I have assumed that this is how aspectual arguments are individ-
uated: if there is a particular causative bond of some particular strength
(permissive, causative), then it is supplied by C-I. Consider the underlying
lexico-logical form of the above situation with three arguments. Since there
are three arguments, they cannot all pass [51]. The constituents hissi and
Erebus have identical feature vectors, namely <a, a>, a case prohibited by
[51]:
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(110) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Charon V
′
Erebus
<a, a>
V
′
hissi
<a, a>
V0
℘ nousta
One of the arguments must thus be deleted at the syntactic interpreta-
tion. Since the choice of deletion is free, assume that Erebus is deleted. This
has been the general pattern on several occasions. The resulting expression
is (111).
TP
T VP
℘ VP
Charon V
′
. . . V
′
hissi
<a, a>
V0
℘ nousta
(111) Charon
Charon-nom
nostattaa
lift-caus-sg3
hissin
elevator
‘Charon caused somebody to lift the elevator.
The sentence means that ‘Charon causes somebody to lift the elevator.’
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There is a clear sense of something being ‘between’ Charon and elevator, as
is explicit in the lexico-logical form, the person or thing who actually brings
about the rising. This is my explanation of the difference between direct and
indirect causation, in that the latter has been argued to contain an ‘interme-
diate agency’ between the causer and the causee, now explicitly represented
at the LLF level but deleted when further processed according to CHL. This
structural property is thus able to trigger the relevant morphological mark-
ers, as in many languages, like Finnish, the distinction between direct and
indirect causation is signaled in the morphology.
Syntactic rule [51] prevents a syntactic interpretation (111) unless fur-
ther structure, such as d-operator, is involved. Indeed, a slightly different
lexico-logical form may escape the limitations of [51], namely, if Erebus is
d-marked. If the constituent is equipped with a d-operator, its feature vec-
tor becomes different from <a, a> (§3.6). The exact semantic Case alters
from language to language: the above proposal predicts only that it may
surface as an oblique or indirect argument, having corresponding syntactic
and morphological properties. Finnish does not have indirect arguments, so
it appears as an oblique argument. The predicted form is shown below.
TP
T VP
℘ VP
Charon V
′
PP
d Erebus
V
′
hissi
<a, a>
V0
℘ nousta
(112) Charon
Charon-nom
nostatti
lift-caus-past-sg3
hissin
elevator
Erebusilla
Erebus-sem
‘Charon caused Erebus to lift the elevator.’
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This phenomenon is not specific to Finnish; rather, according to Comrie,
“One feature that does seem to be common to languages with morphological
causatives is that it is always the causee that has to change its syntactic
relation in order to fit in with the increased valency” (Comrie, 1985, p. 336).
With certain reservations, this is a reasonable generalisation (some systems
with different properties are investigated in the following). Exactly this hap-
pens above: the causee is eliminated, due to [51], but it escapes automatically
if it is d-marked. None of these facts need to be stipulated as independent
properties of language, let alone causatives. The addition of a new causer
to the FP results in an illegitimate structure with the causee and the pa-
tient having identical L-vectors, so that one of them (causee) is d-marked or
appears as an adjunct. Consider the following causative constructions from
Turkish (Marantz, 1984, p. 261):
(113) Ali
Ali
Hasan-i
Hasan-acc
o¨l-du¨r-du¨
die-caus-past
‘Ali caused Hasan to die.’
This expression is derived in a similar manner as the Finnish examples,
raising no further problems. -du¨r - is a causative morpheme in Turkish (to-
gether with -t-). Hasan appears in the accusative Case, as predicted from
its feature vector. The causee, if there was one, has disappeared, due to [51].
However, Turkish allows indirect objects to appear in the dative Case, as in
the following:
(114) disci
letter-acc
mektub-u
director-dat
mu¨-du¨r-e
sign-caus-past
imzala-t-ti
dentist-nom
‘The dentist made the director sign the letter.’
In such cases, the present proposal predicts that the dative Case is the
result of d-marking an aspectual argument. Turkish differs from Finnish in
this respect, since Finnish does not seem to have a dative Case (Nelson,
1998). There is good support for this predication, as it seems that one of
these arguments needs to be a d-argument rather than a direct object of
the verb. In Finnish, the causee appears in the adessive Case (SEM, oblique
argument). This is what is predicted if d-marking, or moving into the position
of a d-argument, is necessary due to [51]. Furthermore, this fact is already
clear from the hypothesis given earlier: double objects and datives are d-
marked at the lexico-logical level. A similar pattern emerges in Japanese,
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which has a causative affix, -sase, attached to the verb. If there are only two
arguments, no syntactic changes of structure are predicted. This is the case,
as can be seen below:
(115) Naomi-wa
Naomi-nom
Ken-wo
Ken-acc
kuukoo
airport
ko-sase-ta
come-caus
‘Naomi had Ken to come the airport.’
(Assuming that Japanese causatives are morphological, not analytical
causatives.5) Since Japanese has the dative case, marked by -ni, a causative
with three arguments affects the causee, turning it into a dative. This is a
result of d-marking at the lexico-logical form:
(116) Ken-wa
Ken-nom
Naomi-ni
Naomi-dat
Tomio-wo
Tomio-acc
tazune-sase-ta
visit-caus-past
‘Ken made Naomi to visit Tomio.’
TP
T VP
℘ VP
Ken V
′
PP
d Naomi
V
′
Tomio V0
℘ tazune
The generalisation is that, if there are only two arguments, the direct
object may appear either as the wo-accusative (<a, a>) or as in the ni -
dative (<d, a>); if there is a direct object and an indirect object, then they
both cannot appear as wo-accusatives, but rather the indirect object appears
5Gunji (1987) argues that the morpheme -sase is an independent transitive verb and
that the similarity of causative constructions with ditransitive verbs is illusory. I do not
deny that this analysis could be true, since, obviously, analytical causatives exists. I
simply assume that this is not so, but not much depends on this assumption concerning
this particular example.
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in the ni -dative. These facts are predicted from the principles given so far,
and we therefore do not have to stipulate them.
Causatives are important from the perspective of grammar precisely be-
cause, in semantic point terms, they represent the basic case of increasing the
valency of the predicate. Thus their grammatical properties, by operating in
tandem with their causative interpretations, are valuable sources of evidence
of a theory of grammar: they represent the core case of what happens when
too many arguments are introduced into the linguistic structure. A general
argument overflow thus occurs, which motivates principles such as [51] and,
in doing so, implies many other grammatical phenomena, such as the Case
Filter, as a side effect. One could say that causatives reveal a unifying theme
underlying many grammatical phenomena.
This elimination of the causee, typical of transitive causatives, may result
if one of the three arguments is d-marked by the predicate, or appears as a
d-argument. This prediction is correct, as shown by (117) and (118).
(117) Merja
Merja-nom
juoksi
ran-past-sg1
kotiin
home-sem
‘Merja ran home.’
(118) Pekka
Pekka-nom
juoksutti
ran-caus-past-sg1
Merjan
Merja-acc
kotiin
home-sem
‘Pekka made Merja run home.’
Kotiin is an oblique argument in the semantic Case. Merja, the causee,
appears in the surface structure in the accusative Case. This is possible since
kotiin is a d-argument. These facts are in agreement with the present theory.
Causativity is an extension of the general principles introduced in the pre-
ceding chapters, causative interpretation being a special case of the aspectual
individuation of arguments. Causatives are, in other words, a natural conse-
quence of the rules so far, and in no sense a“special class”of predicates. Thus,
my usage of the term“causatives”differs from when the term is reserved only
for more restricted types of construction, say morphological causatives, or
when there is an explicit causee added to a basic transitive clause (Dixon,
2000). In the present case, there are no causatives per se, but ‘causativ-
ity’ exists as an implied way of distinguishing arguments inside any clause
containing more than one argument, taken as an extension of aspectuality
provided by the conceptual-intentional system.
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If we look at the properties of causatives from a theoretical perspective, it
is clear from these examples that principle [51] does the crucial explanatory
work. Verbs with less than three arguments are immune to [51]. I predict that
the causatives of intransitive verbs are never subject to radical grammatical
alteration, and is that the subject of the root verb becomes the direct object
of the causative derivation, the causer becoming the next subject. This is
exactly what happens, as noted by Baker: “There is one important domain
in which the unity of causative constructions can be observed relatively di-
rectly: the causatives of intransitive verbs. Regardless of their differences in
the causatives of transitive verbs, all the languages discussed [. . .] treat
intransitive verbs similarly; the causee consistently acts like the direct object
of the matrix clause” (Baker, 1988, p. 197). From a somewhat different per-
spective, we might also expect that when [51] begins to take effect, a plurality
of mechanisms of avoiding it as a ‘last resort’ may enter, such as d-marking
and d-arguments (cf. Comrie, 1976).
It is also possible to explain why morphological causatives differ in their
meaning from analytical ones. Let us compare the lexico-logical representa-
tions of the following two expressions, in which the analytic causative appears
to be a rough English gloss of the Finnish morphological causative:
(119) Erebus
Erebus-nom
nostatti
lift-caus-past
hissin
elevator-acc
Merjalla
Merja-sem
‘Erebus had Merja lift the elevator.’
The English gloss is not an exact paraphrase of the Finnish morphological
causative, since Finnish has a corresponding bi-clausal analytic causative as
well, approximated as Erebus laittoi Merjan nostamaan hissin, ’Erebus put
Merja to raise the elevator.’ This biclausal sentence is represented by the
LLF structure (120):
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(120) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
VP
Merja V
′
elevator V0
℘ rise
V0
℘ cause
This generates its properties correctly, and it correponds closely to the
English gloss of the Finnish morphological causative. On the other hand, a
morphological causative has a different lexico-logical representation, as shown
in (121).
(121) TP
T VP
Erebus V
′
PP
d Merja
V
′
elevator V0
℘ rise
There is no grammatical element CAUSE in the latter lexico-logical form,
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although there is in the former.
One interesting question that could well be explored is the relation be-
tween the feature [+non-aspectual] and causativization. If a predicate is
non-aspectual, it must have at most one a-argument (expletive structures
notwithstanding). The prediction is that one could not form a causative of
such a verb, since there is no way of creating new a-arguments as new causers.
This is true of Japanese (Kuno, 1973, pp. 149-150) and of Finnish. Some
Finnish examples are given below:
(122) Pekalta
Pekka-sem
puuttuivat
lack-past
kyvyt
abilities
‘Pekka lacked ability.’
(123) *Merja
Merja-nom
puututti
lack-caus-past
Pekalta
Pekka-sem
kyvyt
abilities
‘*Merja caused Pekka to lack ability.’
Of course, were it possible to change the predicate from the non-aspectual
to the aspectual, then causativization would be possible if accompanied by a
corresponding change in the aspectual class of the predicate.
So far I have predicted that the causee, or whichever of the objects un-
dergoes a syntactic change due to [51], can be interpreted if d-marked, or if
appearing as a d-argument. Which one is actually the case? The question is
not empirically empty.
The former belongs to the category of the “inherent Case” of GB the-
ory, and is therefore determined at d-structure with clear thematic content,
being assigned by the predicate, being non-optional (for that predicate). D-
arguments, on the other hand, do not have these properties. In Finnish, for
example, the causee in a causative construction does not have any of the prop-
erties of d-marking or an “inherent Case.” Instead, it is an oblique, adjunct,
and hence must be a d-argument. Baker reaches a similar conclusion, and
generalizes it to all causative constructions (Baker, 1988, p. 192): “Case-
marking of the causee is idiomatic, varies from language to language, and
does not correlate with the typical thematic content of its realizing semantic
Case.”6
We would legitimately ask whether it must be the causee that is elimi-
nated in causative constructions. Although this seems to be the core case,
6Except perhaps for languages such as Gilyak, in which the semantic Case realising the
deleted causee does not appear anywhere else, see Comrie, 1976.
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there are exceptions to this rule (Comrie, 1976). Nothing in what is proposed
here prevents the direct object of the source predicate from being eliminated.
Gibson (1980) argues that causative rules are separated into two classes, de-
pending upon the choice of the elimination. An example is provided by
Marantz, 1984, §7.2.2 (from Chi-Mwi:ni):
(124) mwa:limu
teacher
Æ-wa-a`ndik-ish-iz-e
sp-op-write-caus-T/A
wa:na
children
xati
letter
‘The teacher made the children write a letter’
-ish- is a causative morpheme. The causee, wa:na (children), carries the
properties of a direct object, as shown by the passive construction (adding a
passive morpheme to the causative verb):
(125) wa:na
children
wa-a`ndik-ish-iz-a:
sp-write-caus-pass-T/A
xati
letter
na
by
mwa:limu
teacher
‘The children were made to write a letter by the teacher.’
The passive construction is not well formed if the indirect object, letter,
is raised (for more examples, see Baker, 1988, pp. 162-166). Given the
present assumptions, the elimination of an argument depends on [51]. As
such, the rule does not determine which of the syntactically non-eliminated
arguments is deleted, so there is conceptual room for constructions similar to
the Chi-Mwi:ni example. The fact that [51] alone does not predict which of
the identical arguments is eliminated weakens its empirical content. On the
other hand, this was assumed due to the fact that the matter seems to be
subject to language-specific variation. One should then explain the source of
the variation. Baker, for instance, claims that it derives from differences in
Case theory.
Comrie (1976) argued that there exists a “paradigmatic case” of causative
construction that may be used as a ‘default case’ in analysing various ex-
ceptions. This paradigmatic causative consists of four properties (quoting
directly):
(i) There is no syntactic restriction on the formation of causative
constructions [. . .] no matter how many arguments a given
noncausative verb has, there will also be an equivalent causative
verb with one more argument;
(ii) doubling on the syntactic positions subject, direct object,
indirect object is forbidden;
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(iii) where restrictions on doubling require some constituent to be
removed, it is always the embedded subject that is so removed,
either by being omitted or by being demoted down the hierarchy
[subject, direct object, indirect object, oblique object];
(iv) when the embedded subject is demoted down the hierarchy,
it is demoted stepwise, i.e., always to the next-highest position in
the hierarchy that has not already been filled.
Property (i) follows in the present proposal since there are no restrictions
on the addition of LLF arguments from which we derive most of the prop-
erties that are traditionally attributed to syntax (syntactic category, Case,
passives). The bottleneck is principle [51], which regulates syntactic inter-
pretation from LLF into the d-structure. Principle (ii) follows the rules of
linking as well, and is thereby explained. Comrie also notes that oblique ar-
guments can be doubled, a natural consequence of the rules so far. Properties
(iii) and (iv), on the other hand, are not covered by the rules so far: [51] does
not determine which of the identical arguments is deleted at the syntactic
interpretation, and what position they take. I currently see no motivation for
(iii) and (iv), hence, if I am correct, they must remain descriptive statements,
lack of independent explanation.
This completes the argument to the point that the present theory is able
to account for the core syntactic and semantic properties of causatives with-
out decomposition. The key properties of causatives are automatic conse-
quences of the linking rules. It is also possible to explain why morphological
causatives differ in meaning from analytic causatives. Stipulative meaning
postulates are not needed, since they arise from the θ-theory with some prop-
erties provided of C-I. Causatives are considered from a morphological point
of view in section 6.4.
4.5 Complex morphological causatives: a syn-
tactic view
By the term “complex morphological causatives” I mean causative construc-
tions that are not transparently morphological, as Finnish causatives are,
but which involve a perplexing set of properties that, at first, appear as a
mixture of the morphological and the analytical causatives. I will attempt
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in this section to apply the present theory to the analysis of these complex
causatives.
To give a simple example, causative particles may behave as if they were
agglutinative, resembling corresponding free (analytic) morphemes yet at-
taching to the verbal stems. This is illustrated below (From Baker, 1988, p.
148).
(126) mtsikana
girl
ana-chit-its-a
agr-do-make-asp
kuti
that
mtsuko
water-pot
u-gw-e
agr-fall-asp
‘The girl made the water pot fall.’
(127) mtsikana
girl
anau-gw-ets-a
agr-fall-made-asp
mtsuko
water-pot
‘The girl made the waterpot fall.’
In the biclausal sentence (126) there is a separate causative particle -its-
that appears to be attached to the verb stem in (127), which looks mon-
oclausal on the surface level. According to Baker, if we wish to maintain
UTAH, these sentences must have identical d-structures: the thematic roles
of the constituents are identical. This transformation is shown below:
(128) S
NP
girl
VP
V
make
S
NP
water-pot
VP
fall
S
NP
girl
VP
V
make-falli
S
NP
water-pot
VP
ti
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Baker points out that this analysis allows him to take the causative parti-
cle its to have only one thematic structure, applicable in all relevant construc-
tions due to an identical d-structure and UTAH. This is surely an advantage,
more so when it is recognized that the phenomenon is very general across
the world’s languages, extending beyond causatives to applicatives and other
similar constructions. However, the analysis, if true, is decompositional: it
assumes that the monoclausal causative is, on a deeper level, identical to the
analytical one.
Supposing we reject the decompositional, transformation approach here,
without any reason and only for illustrative purposes, then gw-ets verbs would
reflect properties of the feature vectors of the non-causative predicates, as
explained earlier. Its properties are predicted based on the linking rules. The
fact that the causative particle appears in a virtually identical form in both
analytical and morphological (monoclausal) structures would be a general
property of the morphological component of such languages, but accidental
with respect to their narrow syntax. That such a mechanism is general is
undeniable: other verbal constituents may be attached to the verb stem via
similar processes, as shown below (from Chichewa, cited in Baker, 1988, p.
155):
(129) ndi-ka-pemp-a
I-ssp-go-beg-asp
pamanga
maize
‘I am going to beg for maize.’
(130) kati
if
madzi
water
banu
your
dza-man-e-ni
come-refuse-asp-past
ine
me
‘If it is your water, come and refuse me’
(131) ku
from
kasungu
Kasungu
si-ku-nga-chok-er-e
neg-pres-can-come-appl-asp
bangu
people
woipa
bad
‘Bad people cannot come from Kasaungu’
In each case, the source structure is similar to the case with causatives:
a verb from the embedded clause seems to be attached to the matrix verb
and, assuming transformational analysis, the trace of the embedded verb
appears to be governed by the matrix verb, hence satisfying the ECP. Baker
also cites evidence that, when these morphological forms exist, they do not
violate the ECP: “The observed variation does not cross certain well-defined
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boundaries. In particular, polyadic verbs may incorporate a verb out of
their sentential objects, and some monadic verbs (always nonagentive) may
incorporate out of their sole sentential argument, but these are the only
possibilities”(Baker, 1988, p. 161). In other words, according to Baker, verbs
never incorporate out of subjects or adjuncts: a hallmark of the ECP (Lasnik
& Saito, 1984; for conflicting view, see DiSciullo & Williams, 1987, §3).
The key difference between the above proposal and Baker’s is thus where to
locate the explanation of these general mechanisms, i.e. in the morphological
component (in my case) or in the narrow syntax (Baker’s proposal).
So far I have offered no reason whatsoever to even question the trans-
formational version. Let us now to turn to the relevant evidence. First, as
shown by Baker (1988, §4.3.1), it appears that the argument structure of
these verbal complexes behaves as predicated by the present theory, in that
“the subject of the base verb [...] surfaces as an oblique in a prepositional
phrase” (p. 163). The direct object of the embedded clause appears as the
direct object of the causative construction, being raised in the passive and
triggering object agreement in the matrix verb. This (typical) property of
causatives is predicted by [51], and was explained thoroughly in section 4.3,
but only at the expense of assuming that these structures are monoclausal.
In Baker’s words, “The Case patterns seen in [Verb Incorporation] construc-
tions are almost always Case patterns seen with solitary underived verbs”
(Baker, 1988, p. 208). As I will show later, this aspect entails certain com-
plications to the transformational analysis (see also Baker, 1988, §4.3.2 for
more discussion), so that one might at least entertain the possibility that
these morphological causatives could be analysed on a par with Finnish mor-
phological causatives, being monoclausal on all linguistic levels (as argued
e.g., in Achard, 1998 and Mohanan, 1983).
Much the same is true of Romance causatives. Although they have some
peculiar properties, they behave as if they were monoclausal at LLF. Consider
(132)(all examples come from Kayne, 1975, §3 unless otherwise indicate).
(132) on a fait sortir Jean de sa chambre
‘They made Jean come out of his room.’
Jean appears postverbally with respect to both fait (‘cause’) and the
infinite verb sortir. The problem is, again, that it is not clear whether they
form biclausal or monoclausal structures. For instance, although from the
morphophonological point of view, faire behaves like a single word, being
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inflected and defining a domain of stress assignment, from a morphosyntactic
perspective, it behaves much like a bound morpheme, being comparable to
passive, anticausative and causative bound morphemes even though there is
a word boundary present.7
Strong evidence in favor treating this construction as monoclausal on
every linguistic level comes from the fact that the syntactic realisation of the
argument structures of faire causatives can be explained by assuming that
faire + V is a single predicate in its lexico-logical form. If the embedded V
had two arguments, its complement would be d-marked in order to comply
with [51]. This appears to be exactly the correct prediction, since in such
cases the postverbal object appears with the dative preposition a`, making it
PP rather than NP :
(133) a. il fera boire un peu de vin [PP a` son enfant ]
b. * il fera boire un peu de vin [NP son enfant ]
c. ‘He’ll have his child drink a little wine.’
If, on the other hand, the embedded verb is intransitive, or has a PP
complement, no change in predicted. This predication, too, is confirmed:
(134) a. il a fait partir [NP son amie]
b. * il a fait partir [PP a` son amie]
c. ‘He had his friend leave.’
As further examples of the same pattern, consider the following:
(135) on fera boire du vin a` Jean
‘We’ll have Jean drink some wine.’
(136) *on fera boire a` Jean
‘We’ll have Jean drink.’
7Almost every imaginable and reasonable hypothesis concerning the syntactic analysis
of faire causatives has been proposed. To name a few, Zubizarreta (1985) assumed that
some Romance faire constructions actually have two syntactic analyses, one monoclausal,
the other biclausal. She also refers to works by Vergnaud and Burzio, unavailable to me,
in which it is assumed that faire takes a VP complement, suggesting an analysis falling
somewhere between monoclausal and biclausal hypotheses. DISciullo & Williams (1987)
present a similar analysis, in which faire constructions, as well as other constructions,
involve two analyses (“coanalysis”) depending on how the attachment of an affix is inter-
preted. According to this view, faire is ambiguously both“the first member of a compound
verb and a main verb taking a complement” (p. 91).
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(137) on fera boire Jean
‘We’ll have Jean drink.’
Boire is a predicate that takes either one or two arguments: again, if
there are two arguments, the dative a` is necessary, but not otherwise. If
the argument structures of the complex faire constructions behave as if they
constituted a single clause, then the best hypothesis for their underlying LLF
representations would be the following:
(138) TP
T VP
Subj V
′
PP
d causee
V
′
Obj V0
℘ Verb
faire + Verb
In some cases, a` may be replaced by the preposition par (‘by’), as in the
following:
(139) elle fera manger cette pomme par Jean
‘She’ll have that apple eaten by Jean.’
There ought to be a semantic difference between the choice of PP, given
that this form is a result of SEM in both cases. This is so: the preposition
par implies that the causative link between the causer and the causee is more
indirect than it is with a` (cf. Kayne, 1975, p. 239, Zubizarreta, 1985). The
same patter is found in many languages. In general, a sentence in French
cannot have two direct objects, so that this data is readily explained by
assuming that we are looking at a single sentence with the fused verb faire +
V. The key problem of why the “subject of the embedded infinite sentence”
appears post-verbally disappears entirely, since the causative particle and the
infinite verb form a single LLF predicate. Similarly, there is no problem in
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explaining why the embedded sentence cannot contain an auxiliary verb or
the negative particle - the supposed sentence itself does not exists.
The faire-construction is productive, much like causatives in Finnish and
Turkish, as illustrated below:
(140) son fils a fait sauter le pont
‘His son made the bridge blow up.’
(141) elle a fait faire sauter le point a` son fils
‘She had her son make the bridge blow up.’
Here we see the effect of the a` rule, a consequence of [51]. This data,
again, suggests that faire + V correlates with one underlying LLF predicate.
This would then also account for the fact that no PRO may appear as the
subject of the embedded verb.
More evidence in favour of the monoclausal hypothesis comes from cliti-
calization. Clitics cannot come between the causative particle and the verb,
but they move in front of the whole construction as if it were a single verb.
The following examples illustrate this (cf. Kayne, 1975, §3.3 and §4.1):
(142) on fera boire du vin a` Jean
‘They’ll make Jean drink some wine.’
(143) on lui fera boire du vin a` Jean
‘They’ll let Jean drink some wine.’
The same is true of nouns, which must be postponed after the whole
complex faire + V. Consider the behavior of the reflexive pronoun se. Se
must have a clause-mate antecedent. The following examples illustrate this
(from Aissen, 1974b, p. 336):
(144) Jean a dit que Mariei s’esti insulte´e
‘Jean said that Marie insulted herself’
(145) Jean a convaincu Pierrei de sei mutiler
‘Jean convinced Pierre to mutilate himself’
Se is coreferential withMarie in (144), with Pierre in (145). Importantly,
with respect to faire causatives, se behaves as if the faire + V represented a
single verb: se may take the causer as its antecedent (see also Aissen, 1974b,
§3).
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The following data, leading towards the same conclusion, comes from
Italian (from Zubizarreta, 1985):
(146) Pierai ha fatto rasare se stessoi da Maria
‘Piero made Maria shave him.’
This is the paradigmatic case in Italian. In French and Spanish, se can
also take the direct object of the causative complex as its antecedent, and
the same is true of many other languages.
The permissive participle laisser is peculiar in that it behaves option-
ally as forming either a complex verb, comparable to faire, yet allowing a
situation in which the syntactic cohesion is not as tight as in the faire con-
struction (Comrie, 1976, pp. 298-299, Kayne, 1975, §3.4). An essentially
similar situation arises in Italian. Interestingly, Comrie notes that the effect
of demoting the embedded subject to an indirect object, as predicted if the
causative verb complex is one predicate in its lexico-logical form, appears if
and only if the causative laisser and the main verb are fused into a complex
verb. This suggests that, in a construction with a tighter relation between
the causative particle and the main verb, the complex verb corresponds to
a single predicate in its lexico-logical form. This also suggests that the faire
causative, which behaves similarly with respect to its arguments, corresponds
to one predicate at the lexico-logical form. Let us consider some data from
French to illustrate this basic point (Kayne, 1975, §3.4). With laissera, the
two possible constructions are illustrated in (147)-(148).
(147) il laissera son amie re´fle´chir
‘He will let his friend think.’
(148) il laissera re´fle´chir son amie
‘He will let his friend think.’
In (147), the subject of the embedded sentence is pre-verbal, in (148) it
is post-verbal. Both embedded infinite verbs are intransitive. Now consider
what happens if a transitive verb is substituted for re´fle´chir :
(149) a. il laissera son amie manger les gaˆteaux
b. il laissera manger les gaˆteaux [PP a` son amie]
The a´ insertion is obligatory only in the latter case. Thus, the position of
the subject correlates with whether the a` insertion is required or not, exactly
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as predicted, were the (b)-type sentences generated by taking laissera + V
to correspond to a single LLF predicate. Moreover, if the patient were to
be replaced by a clitic pronoun, it would appear in the accusative Case in
(a)-type sentences, and in the dative in (b)-type sentences.
These sentence types differ in other respects as well. The (b)-type sen-
tences do not allow a negative particle in the putative “embedded sentence,”
hence one could argue that this is because the embedded sentence does not
exist in the first place: the sentence is uniclausal at all linguistic levels. Ac-
cording to Kayne (1975, p. 231), the negative participle, when inserted into
the (a)-type sentences, results in a much better sentence.
The hypothesis that the faire causative is monoclausal can be tested
by trying to combine it with a predicate that is inherently non-aspectual
and involves vacuous arguments, such as seem. This would lead to an un-
grammatical expression, assuming that the faire particle represents increased
adicity, impossible in the case of seem and similar predicates. The follow-
ing sentences (glossed as ‘His pained expression makes Jean/him seem to be
suffering’) illustrate this outcome in both French and Finnish:
(150) *son expression paine´e fait sembler souffrir Jean
(151) *ha¨nen
his-gen
tuskainen
painful
ilmeensa¨
expression
na¨yta¨tti
seem-caus
Jeanin
Jean-acc
olevan
be
tuskissaan
in-pain
‘His painful facial expression caused to Jean seem to be in pain.’
Although all these effects could be explained by postulating transforma-
tions and d-structures - as is often the case in empirical inquiry - it would
presumably be a still more complex explanation still, taking the seem to
constitute its own sentence.
One such explanation runs as follows (from Kayne, 1975, §3.7). First, it is
assumed that the complement of seem is a sentence, while the Subject Rais-
ing transformation brings the embedded subject into the position of matrix
subject, which is empty. According to this explanation, it must then ensued
that the faire construction has the capacity to block this transformation and,
moreover, that it applies before SR. These are all complexities that arise if
the putative embedded sentence is treated independently of the matrix pred-
icate faire (I will return to these problems in §4.6). Moreover, as predicted
by the above account in terms of syntax-semantics linking, other inherently
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non-aspectual predicates, such as appear and know, behave similarly, as do
modal auxiliary verbs such as must (pouvoir) and might (venir de); this data
falls into place within the monoclausal account.
Although there is some evidence that faire +V could be treated as a single
LLF predicate, this hypothesis is not without its difficulties. One problem
concerns the status of faire: why does it appear as a separate morpheme?
Why can certain adverbs appear between faire and V? Why is it the faire
that is inflected for tense and person, and not V that is infinite?
Basically, I will adopt the hypothesis proposed by Aissen (1974b, see
also Aissen, 1979, §6.2), according to which faire is to be categorized as an
auxiliary. Taking only some of the relevant evidence at this point, let us
consider the perplexing feature of the Romance faire causative that certain
quantifiers are allowed to appear between the causative faire and the infinite
verb. One such quantifier is tout, ‘everything,’ as illustrated below:
(152) il fera tout sauter
‘He’ll make everything blow up.’
Assuming that faire is auxiliary, we might expect the same to be true of
English grammatical participles. This is indeed so, as shown in (153)(a-c)
below.
(153) a. they had gone home
b. they had all gone home
c. they all had gone home
What we see here is that the auxiliaries indeed behave similarly with
respect to faire causatives. Crucially, some adverbs may occur between faire
and the infinitive in French, but this is also true of auxiliaries and main verbs,
as in il est certainement parti, ‘He has certainly left,’ in which the adverb
certainly intervenes between the auxiliary est and left. The same is true of
the negative particle pas (Aissen, 1979, §6.2.4).
There are other considerations that suggest a striking similarity between
the causative particle and auxiliary verbs. Aissen (1979) showed that the
Spanish causative participle hacer, comparable to French faire, behaves in
the same way as auxiliaries in yes-no questions. He also notes that causative
participles and auxiliaries behave in the same way with respect to certain
deletion rules. If asked whether one wants to go to the movies, one could
answer ‘I do,’ deleting the infinite clause that would otherwise be repeated.
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However, in French this deletion cannot leave behind a construction with
the just subject and an auxiliary. Now, the same is true of the causative
participle faire, as shown by (154c)(a-c), ‘Do you always make Marie cry?’
(a),
(154) a. faˆıtes-vous tout jours pleurer Marie?
b. oui, je la fais tout jours pleurer
c. *oui, je la fais
Finally, it is the faire causative which inflects for tense and person, exactly
as auxiliaries do. Thus, there is evidence that faire is comparable to an
auxiliary, although now it must be admitted that no theory of auxiliaries has
been presented in this study. I will return to this matter in Chapter 6.4,
in which I claim that most auxiliaries are Last Report options for providing
hosts for inflectional features.
There is a lot of data on Romance infinitives that appears to be non-
diagnostic between the biclausal and the uniclausal hypothesis presented
here in terms of LLF. An explanation of roughly the same complexity of-
ten seems to be possible given either one of the assumptions. To take an
example, faire infinitives with par causees are subject to same restrictions as
the passives with par subjects (Kayne, 1975, §3.5). According to the present
theory, they are both adjuncts and d-arguments, hence the consequence is
somewhat expected. However, it is also possible to construct a transforma-
tional and bi-clausal explanation of this fact (Kayne, 1975, §3.6). In some
respects, the present proposal appears to be too impoverished to allow care-
ful argumentation. This is the case with the complex properties of tous.
Although the basic properties are as they are expected to be, a more careful
argument would require a theory covering the placement of particles such as
tous. These problems aside, a strong case for treating Romance causatives as
monoclausal in terms of LLF can be made, and it was shown above that their
basic properties then fall into place. This, if true, strengthens the argument
in favor of an atomistic lexicon.
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4.6 Biclausal analyses of causatives: some prob-
lems
So far I have sought evidence in favor of the monoclausal, atomistic hypoth-
esis. This section furthers discussion on the problems of biclausal proposals,
especially those invoked in the context of transformation grammar. I will
argue that, independently of the atomistic hypothesis, biclausal analysis is
problematic both semantically and syntactically.
Presumably the first analysis of causatives executed in the context of
transformational grammar comprised the generative semanticists’ treatment
in terms of a causative deep structure. According to this theory, the deriva-
tional source for Erebus broke the vase is [S Erebus cause [S the vase broke
] ] . The verb of the embedded clause was raised to be incorporated into the
matrix verb, forming a constituent ‘cause-broke,’ which was then lexicalised
to form broketr. This analysis was thus biclausal in a very transparent sense:
lexical/morphological and analytical causatives were, on a deeper level, iden-
tical.
However, as pointed out by Fodor (1970) and others,8 this analysis is
not without problems. There is an asymmetry between the break/broke,
kill/cause to die cases, exemplified in the following sentences:
(155) a. Erebus caused Nyx to die and it surprised me that he did so
b. Erebus caused Nyx to die and it surprised me that she did so
c. * Erebus killed Nyx and it surprised me that she did so
Assuming that killing is represented as ‘cause to die’ at the d-structure
(or LF), asymmetries like these cannot be explained by relying upon the
d-structure (LF).
Moreover, lexical items are not synonymous with their phrasal equiva-
lents. By exploiting advantage of this, it is possible to produce odd sentences
according to the above-mentioned transformational operators, such as Erebus
caused the glass to melt on Sunday by heating it on Saturday and *Erebus
melted the glass on Sunday by heating it on Saturday. The same mismatch
of content holds for kill, hence the following pair:
(156) a. *Erebus killed Nyx on Sunday by stabbing him on Saturday
8See Shibatani (1973) and Wunderlich (1997).
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b. Erebus caused Nyx to die on Sunday by stabbing him on Satur-
day.
These sentences exhibit ‘iconicity’: the more there is syntactic ‘fusion’
between the verb and its causative particle, the more direct is the causative
bond (§4.1 and Haiman, 1985).
A third problem concerns the distribution of instrumental adverbials.
Consider (157).
(157) a. Erebus contacted Charon by using a telephone,
b. Charon believed Erebus contacted Charon by using a telephone
In this sentences the subject of the instrumental adverb is the same as
the subject of the clause it modifies. Hence Erebus caused Bill to die by
swallowing his tongue, which is ambiguous in terms of who has swallowed
his tongue, yet the same ambiguousity is lacking in the derived alternative,
Erebus killed Bill by swallowing his tongue. Again, it is impossible to explain
this difference by relying upon the properties of the d-structure if they are
identical.
Finally, consider the following sentences:
(158) a. Smith caused the students to sit on the floor on purpose
b. Smith sat the students on the floor on purpose.
The former is (again) ambiguous in the way that the latter is not. These
examples illustrate the fact, derived from the causative analysis, that syntac-
tic complexes (seem to) contain more syntactic and semantic material than
derived lexicalised forms, therefore allowing ambiguities that the latter do
not tolerate. In any case, the explanation of such ambiguity could not be
formulated by relying upon their respective d-structures, although one could
attempt such an explanation in terms of s-structures or some extra-linguistic
interpretational mechanisms. Such an attempt seems unattractive, however,
because the relevant ambiguities appear to be structural in terms of the lo-
cation of the adverb, and hence clearly visible in the d-structure (or LF).
Finally, lexical and analytical causatives also differ in the thematic prop-
erties they assign to the subject of the sentence. Thus, one could say (159a)
but not (159b).
(159) a. a change in molecular structure caused the window to break
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b. * a change in molecular structure broke the window
Indeed, I think Wunderlich (1997) was right in insisting that “the para-
phrase is about two different situations, whereas the use of a single verb
requires one coherent situation.” Cause to die expresses a relation between
a thing and an event of dying, making room for quite exotic mechanisms
intervening between, whereas kill denotes a single event, in some sense.
These problems are also pertinent in the case of more ‘logical’ analyses
of causative constructions. There are many such analyses available, one of
the best being that produced by David Dowty (1979). I will now consider
this proposal in the light of the above-mentioned problems. Consider the
following statement of the problem:
It is still somewhat controversial in present linguistic theory whether
or not operators such as CAUSE and BECOME are really nec-
essary in analyzing the meaning of basic lexical causatives, but I
think it cannot be denied that such operators (or semantically
equivalent theoretical constructs) have a place in a language-
universal theory of DERIVATIONAL MORPHOLOGY. One nat-
ural language after another exhibits morphological processes for
producing new causative and inchoative verbs out of adjectives,
nouns, and noncausative and noninchoative verbs. (Dowty, 1979,
p. 234, capitals from the original.)
As I have shown, it is precisely the productive and systematic “deriva-
tional morphology” that poses the most interesting problem for the analysis,
beginning with meaning postulates. Dowty proposed a word-formation rule
for the derivation of causatives. Suppose α is an intransitive predicate. Then
we may form a new transitive predicate F(α) = α + affix, such as if α trans-
lates to α* in the intensional logic of PTQ, then F(α) translates into
(160) λP λx [ y [ ∨ M [ M (V x ) CAUSE [ BECOME [ α*(y) ] ] ] ] ] ] ]
This represents the meaning of kill. BECOME is a tense operator, CAUSE
is a sentential connective. In this analysis, the meaning of CAUSE is anal-
ysed along the lines proposed by Stalnaker: f CAUSE j is true in some
world i if and only if they are both true in i, and furthermore, in that pos-
sible world which is most similar to i except that if f, then also j. There
exist a number of improvements to this analysis, but in this case we need not
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be concerned with them insofar as they are all biclausal, involving sentence
operators. Other operators concern the notion of a ‘possible world’ that is
assumed in this system, but they are inessential to the problem at hand.
What is absolutely essential is the fact that the sentence means, approx-
imately, that ‘x causes y to become α.’ Here the decompositional formula
(160) is composed from a logical metalanguage with explicit model-theoretical
semantics, rooted in Montague’s compositional semantics. The potential ad-
vantage of this rule is that (160) appears to explain something: it produces
new causative predicates from the old ones, as this seems to be possible in
many languages. The logical formulae then provide the approximated mean-
ing of the derived word.9 Nevertheless, the theory is decompositional in this
sense: the meaning of the new word is supposed to be decomposed into the
phrase (160).
What is important here is that, interestingly, Dowty nevertheless prefers
the ‘lexicalist hypothesis,’ and claims that (160) generates new lexical entries
rather than clauses. Suppose that we adopt the above-mentioned ‘lexicalist
hypothesis.’ Then, consider the translation of the phrase ‘x caused y to α,’
such as Erebus caused Charon to die, into the same logical metalanguage.
If we wish to avoid the problems associated with decompositional analysis,
the translation of Erebus caused Charon to die cannot then be (160) (with
Erebus and Charon substituted by y and x, respectively). However ‘x caused
y to die’ seems to translate to (160) - that is what (160) says. The meaning
of new words and phrases have identical semantic representations, which, of
course, constitutes a biclausal, decompositional analysis.
Dowty considers several possibilities in understanding the relation be-
tween (160) and lexical words such as kill. The first solution is to translate
kill in terms of (160), or to take kill as a syntactic abbreviation of (160). The
second method would be to lay down strong meaning postulates in terms of
biconditionals. Since, as Dowty notes, kill and (160) are not synonymous (see
above), he considers the possibility that the meaning postulates could be one-
way only. He then recognizes the problem I discussed in section 2.4: one-way
9Dowty is aware of the problem that it still looks as if the above formula (160) does
not exhaust the meaning of the items (i). He assumes that it is a “rough approximation
of the correct meaning of the complex word,” suggesting that F(α) could still form an
independent lexical entry in the grammar, “the ‘real’ interpretation being obtainable only
from independent definition or contextual information.” I think the idea is that the above
rule is an idealisation, although I do not fully understand the meaning of “independent
definition” here. I will put this problem aside for the moment.
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meaning postulates presuppose, rather than analyse, the meaning of kill. Fur-
thermore, its validity and apparent ‘analyticity’ is left without explanation.
Why is there not some other formula than (160) instead? Dowty suggests
that we may continue with laying down more and more one-way meaning
postulates rather than approaching the meaning of the “whole word” at once.
I can see no explanatory benefit of that process, however, unless we suppose
that the meaning of kill can be analysed completely, in the end, in terms of
other words, that is, if kill has, after all, a complete definition. Admittedly,
if that were the case, then all the problems of compositionality would disap-
pear at once (§2.1), and I would conclude that my approach could have been
misguided from the start. It is a crucial premise in the present work that it
is more or less correct idealization to say that morphemes cannot be defined
by using other words.
Biclausal analyses also have some syntactic problems. Cooper (1976) first
showed that certain Bantu causatives behave as predicted in the proposal put
forward here: whenever there are too many arguments at the lexico-logical
form, one must appear either as d-marked, or in a more traditional tax-
onomy, as an oblique argument. If we try to explain this phenomenon in
terms of transformations, such as Verb Raising, we would need correspond-
ing mechanisms for manipulating the noun phrases and their“emergent”Case
properties. This mechanism is difficult to come by if we accept transforma-
tional analysis since, according to Cooper, which Case actually appears de-
pends in an irregular manner upon the resulting complex causative form. In
other words, what seem to control the properties of nouns are the subcate-
gorization facts of causative verbs. A similar problem arises in other, more
modern, biclausal analysis: how can the matrix verb govern and control the
Case properties of the noun(s) in the assumed embedded sentence?
In developing a typical biclausal analysis, Burzio assumes that the dative
a Giovanni originates at the subject position of the embedded clause. The
d-structure would be as follows:
(161) [S Maria [VP ha fatto [S Giovanni [VP riparare la macchina] ] ] ]
Then the lower VP rises between the upper VP and S to form
(162) [S Maria [VP ha fatto [VP riparare la macchinai][S [NP a Giovanni[ ti
] ] ] ]
Giovanni is turned into the dative in the process. How, and why does
this happen? It looks mysterious under this transformational analysis (cf.
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Burzio, 1986, pp. 233-234 and note 2, p. 307). To take another example,
Burzio (1986, §4.1.3) first argues that verbs in Italian do not assign Case
across clause boundaries (under normal conditions), thus they lack ECM
structures. Consider the following pair:
(163) a. *Maria ha fatto Giovanni riparare la macchina
b. Maria ha fatto [VP lavorare] [ Giovanni t]
c. ‘Maria has made work Giovanni.’
How does Giovanni pass the Case filter in (b), assuming the analysis
given above? No such problems emerge if we assume the present uniclausal
hypothesis. If my analysis is correct, then the adicity operator that produces
causative predicates at the lexico-logical form is reflected syntactically by
attaching the verb fare (or a particle corresponding to it) to the main verb,
whereas in many languages the syntactic cohesion is more tight (cf. Song,
1995). Furthermore, [51] readily explains the following violations:
(164) ?? faccio scrivere una lettera a Giovanni a Maria
‘I will have Maria write a letter to Giovanni.’
(165) Maria fa ripararla la macchina Giovanni
‘Maria had Giovanni fix the car.’
In the present hypothesis, a Maria is an ordinary nominal argument so
that [a Giovanni a Maria] violates [51]. Given no new assumptions, the
d-structures of the causatives are thus predicted to be
(166) [XP Maria [X′ ha fatto riparare [YP la macchina [NP a Giovanni ] ] ] ]
and
(167) [XP Maria [X′ ha fatto riparare [YP la macchina ] ] da Giovanni ] ] .
Falk (1991) presents similar criticism of the biclausal transformational
analysis proposed by Baker (1988), noting that Baker’s proposal, like that of
Burzio, requires a language-specific mechanism to alter the Case properties
of the causee.
Transformational analyses also lead to the syntactic problem that, for
some reason, transformations with a simple sentence as their antecedent
structural analysis cannot be applied to the embedded causative construc-
tions. Thus, there are no constructions in which, assuming biclausal analysis,
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passive transformation has been applied to the embedded sentence before the
verb raising takes place. This holds for most such transformations (cf. Ais-
sen, 1974b, §2, 3). According to the present proposal, this is so because there
are no biclausal structures: the problem disappears. The data falls into place
without any complications: it does not make sense to ‘passivize an embedded
sentence before causativization.’
Transformationalists are forced to stipulate that Verb Raising transfor-
mation is precyclic, meaning that it takes place before other transformations.
However, this assumption, although already rather stipulative, runs into some
empirical problems. Aissen (1974b) shows that Reflexivization must be al-
lowed to appear before Verb Raising in French, contradicting the claim that
Verb Raising is precyclic. In the following examples, the reflexive clitic se
refers to the underlying subject of the embedded clause so that it must have
been applied before the Verb Raising moved it into the position of the object
of the matrix verb (Aissen, 1974b, §5.1):
(168) voila` ce qui a fait sei tuer votre amii
‘That is what made your friend kill himself.’
(169) Paul essaiera de faire sei laver les mains a mon amii
‘Paul will try to make my friend wash his hands.’
These problems disappear if we jettison the assumption that the Romance
causative is a result biclausal d-structure with Verb Raising. Another, similar
problem again occurs in French, in faire causatives and their transformational
analysis. According to biclausal transformational analysis, the causative par-
ticle faire takes a sentential complement at least at the d-structure. Then
the order of the verb and its subject is reversed in the embedded clause via
a transformational vehicle (see above), and in some cases a special transfor-
mation, say a´ insertion, inserts a dative particle. In more precise terms, the
transformation applies to the structure ‘. . . faire NP V (NP) . . .’ and turns
it into ‘. . . faire V NP . . .’, with the possible a` insertion if the second NP
is present, omitted for now. Now consider the fact that the transformation
is recursive: it may apply to its own output, as illustrated below:
(170) elle a fait faire sauter le pont a` son fils
‘She had her son make the bridge blow up.’
In deriving this sentence, the transformation that inserts a second faire
must treat the complex faire sauter as one verb, otherwise a` son fils would
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not end up in the correct post-clausal position. Hence Kayne assumes that
the input to the transformation is rather ‘. . . faire NP V* (NP). . .’,
where V* stands for arbitrary long string of verbs (Kayne, 1975, §3.8). Thus,
transformation is applied cyclically so that the resulting verbs are ’merged
together’ as if they would represent one predicate for the purposes of further
causativization and structural operation. We could avoid this complication
- transformation that merges separate predicates from distinct clauses cycli-
cally into one - by taking this evidence at its face value, taking the causative
complex to be one predicate V*.
In sum, the properties of the argument structures of these causatives
constructions can be explained in the light of the present hypothesis with-
out invoking complex notions of deep structure and related transformational
analysis. As noted by Falk (1991), these transformational devices might be
unnecessary complications, in terms of both their syntactic and their seman-
tic properties.
Could this path be pursued with a view to eliminating the causative ‘light
verb -projection’ vP or related heads that encode transitivity? From the be-
ginning I have presented the minimalist theory without vP projections (§3.3),
although many linguists today share the assumption that syntactic structures
ought to be binary (Chomsky, 1995, §4, Kayne, 1984, Larson, 1988, Radford,
1997, §9). This is the standard minimalist assumption. Given the binary
branching condition for syntactic structures, assumed here as well, verbs
with three arguments result in a hierarchical rather than a flat, representa-
tion. Recent analyses suggest that causatives are made up of VP shells of
the following kind, as shown in (171).
(171) vP
Spec v′
v VP
NP
the book
V′
V
put
PP
on the shelf
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The upper v is a light verb position having a ‘causative meaning.’ PUT
is a predicate that does not surface in English. Rather, as a result of X0
movement, put moves up to adjoin or incorporate the light verb:
(172) vP
Spec v′
v-puti VP
NP
the book
V
ti PP
on the shelf
This generates Charon put the book on the shelf. According to Hale &
Keyser (1993), sentence (173) below, with a denominal predicate, is also
formed via successive X0 movements:
(173) Charon shelved the book
(174) [vP [v v-shelvei [VP [NP the book] [V′ ti [PP ti ] ] ] ] ]
My proposal in terms of the lexico-logical form (LLF) in fact comes quite
close to analysis in terms of the vP shells. In both cases, the relevant structure
is binary. Although there is no structure in my proposal that is comparable
to the d-structure vP shell, the lexico-logical form plus the d-structure seems
to contain relevant information to link it with the correct surface expression.
It is thus a substantial question whether the above abstraction is correct in
terms of the vP shell, or whether less is, in this case as well, sufficient.
One motivation for the postulation of a more intricate vP structure rep-
resentation is that it provides a mechanism for combining Baker’s UTAH
straightforwardly with ‘ergative’ predicates. We are virtually forced to as-
sume the vP shell analysis by presupposing a certain version of UTAH, binary
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branching, and the traditional theory of argument structures. What is prob-
lematic here is, I think, Baker’s formulation of UTAH. The individuation of
thematic roles by means of Agent and Patient is problematic. This chal-
lenges the claim that an empirically principled UTAH can be formulated
along these lines, associating unclear notions such as ‘Theme’ with certain
structural positions. As I have argued previously, a more general approach
would be to subsume thematic roles with their aspectual roles. I have shown
that it is possible to maintain UTAH by using aspectual arguments at the
lexico-logical form without syntactic features such as N and V, thereby avoid-
ing the postulation of complex vP shells. Note that the constituent ball does
occupy the same position in the lexico-logical form and hence it has identical
thematic properties in both constructions:
(175) TP
T VP
we V
′
ball V
′
PP
down the hill
V0
℘ Verb
(176) TP
T VP
. . . V
′
ball V
′
PP
down the hill
V0
℘ Verb
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Thus, pairs such as (177a-b) do not pose special difficulties.
(177) a. we rolled the ball down the hill
b. the ball rolled down the hill
In sum, UTAH with binary branching does not necessitate anything like
vP shells, it does so only given the meaintenance of all the conventional, but
I think dubious, assumptions concerning the d-structure.
Further, the analysis in terms of vP shells leads to difficulties with se-
mantics, although I think this point is not particularly strong. The trouble
is that the d-structure representation of we rolled the ball down the hill is
not synonymous with we made the ball roll down the hill, a reading obtained
directly from the vP shell analysis. This is clear from the following data:
(178) a. we made the ball roll down the hill by letting Peter roll it
b. * we rolled the ball down the hill by letting Peter roll it
On the other hand, the proposal given here avoids these problems, since
it is not assumed that s-structure expressions with one predicate correspond
to analytical causatives with two predicates on any level of linguistic repre-
sentation.
This problem could nevertheless be avoided by distinguishing the seman-
tics of vP clauses from the semantics of analytical causatives since, in the
standard neo-Larsonian analysis, an analytical causative is not mapped onto
the same LF-representation than an ergative transitive predicate. I will re-
turn to this matter presently.
One empirical problem concerning vP shells is that, in certain languages,
verbs that are assumed to occupy the light-verb position can be causativized
productively. Following the vP shell analysis, we should then postulate an-
other light-verb position, perhaps even two or more. I have assumed that
one could do this at the lexico-logical level in terms of unrestricted adicity
(there are no semantic limitations on the number of arguments a predicate
can have). Another possibility would be to locate the productive causativ-
ity on the lexical level, introducing new lexical elements for each such new
causative form. This strategy would obviously miss something important,
locating the same phenomenon at two levels, namely, the lexical and the
syntactic (v-heads).
Another problem is the fact that Finnish causative forms may also appear
systematically in nominal forms (§4.1), suggesting that we should construct
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recursive xP shells. This leads up to the present proposal and its lexico-
logical forms which, if rephrased in X
′
-theoretical terms, are just such xPn
shells in their simplest possible form: argument shells that can be expanded
aspectually and which appear either in the V or N -form, depending on their
position in the LLF. According to the the standard minimalist theory, we
would be obliged to expand the transformational analysis to NPs. This is
not impossible (e.g., Longobardi, 1994), but requires some rethinking - which
to some extent had led me to consider the present alternative.
One argument in favor of vP shells concerns the process of Incorpora-
tion, which, together, explain certain morphosyntactic features of causatives
and other ergative predicates. The embedded verb is assumed to raise and
incorporate the v head with its associated morphological consequences. If
there are no vP shells, there are no landing sites, or empty heads, to which V
incorporation could apply. This issue is discussed more fully in section 6.4, in
which an alternative analysis is proposed. Note that I have remained sceptical
on whether the relevant word-order facts (e.g., Object Shift, the placement
of adverbs, negative particles and auxiliaries, all linked to each other in a
complex manner) should always be taken to count as evidence of deep, struc-
tural assumptions in narrow syntax in the first place (that is, evidence of
structural LLF positions), favoring a model that puts some explanatory bur-
den onto Morphology, phonology and hence linearization (Chomsky, 2001, p.
30f, Moro, 2000, Zwart, 2001). Thus, a consequence of my abandoning of
the vP shell analysis is that a variety of facts concerning word order are left
without explanation. Whether this is a serious problem, or rather calls for
more work, depends on whether an explanation in terms of other components
of grammar can be found.
I have argued for a theory in which morphological and lexical causatives
are represented as monoclausal at the LLF level, differing from analytical
causatives in this respect, since the latter are represented by biclausal deep
structures (LLF). It is not entirely clear, however, whether vP analysis is
“linguistically biclausal,” and hence whether it suffers from the problems of
biclausal analysis. In terms of metalanguage used to analyze the meanings
of vP shells, the vP shell is biclausal, given that it comprises two events,
one causing the another, plus a separate predicate (the v-head), which has
a causative meaning (e.g., Hale & Keyser, 1993). However, the vP analysis
of an ergative predicate is not necessarily identical to the LF-structure rep-
resenting an analytical causative, which seems to involve more structure: a
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finite matrix clause with an embedded infinitive headed by a deflective T:
(179) Erebus made [ Tdef the ship sink ]
Thus, the difference between the present proposal and vP theory is very
subtle: one could argue that vP theory already offers at least part of the solu-
tion to the original problem, namely the formulation of a theory of causatives
that does not take analytical causatives and morphological causatives onto
map into identical ‘semantic representations.’ If this is the case, then whether
it is the present theory or the vP theory that is more true is a question of
overall elegance with respect to linguistic data, and is not to be argued on
the basis of independent considerations concerning causative decompositions.
From a slightly different perspective, one could adopt vP analysis into the
present theory as a small complication in the structure of a full projection at
LLF, changing the rest of the rules accordingly. For reasons already given,
and for other reasons, I would not pursue this strategy, but I do not rule it
out either.
Thus, it turns out that the present proposal resembles recent proposals in
terms of vP shells: both assume UTAH and binary branching. The difference
is that the linking rules of the former do not generate vP shells, and the
correct surface forms directly. I have maintained the general idea of vP
shells, even if I have tried to express the same properties in somewhat more
general terms. The process of incorporation is addressed in Chapter 6.4.
One strong argument in favour of biclausal analysis relies on the prop-
erties of reflexives. The basic facts are as follows. In many languages, a
reflexive needs an antecedent that is its clausemate and appears in the ‘sub-
ject position.’ Such reflexives may take the direct object as their antecedent
in some causative constructions, suggesting that at some linguistic level, i.e.,
that at which reflexives are bound to their antecedents, this direct object
appears at the ‘subject position.’ It is the biclausal d-structure that makes
this generalisation possible.
Let us begin by considering the data first. Consider the data presented in
Marantz (1984, citing a study of M. I. Abasheikh). Chi-Mwi:ni contains the
reflexive ru:hu-, ‘self,’ the distribution of which is constrained in the above-
mentioned sense: it may appear attached only to the direct object of the verb,
taking the external subject as its antecedent and requiring the antecedent to
be a clausemate of the reflexive (for similar properties of Turkish, see Aissen,
1974a, unavailable to me but cited in Falk, 1991, pp. 65-66, in which similar
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evidence is cited from Tamil). The relevant constraints operate in English
analytic causatives as well, as illustrated below (Marantz, 1984, p. 267):
(180) a. Elmer made himself lock the porcupine cage
b. Elmer made Hortense help herself to the paˆte´
c. * Elmer made Hortense help himself to the paˆte´
Chi-Mwi:ni causatives behave similarly although they are morphological
(at the s-structure), suggesting that they could be explained in analogy to
(180)(a-c) at the d-structure level. A corresponding violation in Chi-Mwi:ni
is shown in (181).
(181) *mi
I
ni-m-big-ish-iz-e
s˚a-op-hit-caus-T/A
Ali
Ali
ru:hu-y-a´
myself
‘*I made Ali hit myself’
I made Ali hit himself is well-formed, although the Chi-Mwi:ni causative
is not biclausal at the s-structure. Thus, if the verb is a morphological
causative, then the direct object may be the antecedent of ru:hu, suggesting
that the direct object of this verb is an external subject at some linguis-
tic level, in this case the d-structure. This is easily explained by biclausal
analysis, suggesting that Ali himself is a clause. Baker draws similar conclu-
sions based on similar data. Similar evidence in favour of biclausal analysis
also comes from Chamorro (Gibson, 1980, cited in Baker, 1988, p. 211). In
Japanese NPs in the object Case of underived verbs cannot be antecedents
of reflexives. Yet specifically in causative constructions, such NPs can be the
antecedent of reflexives, as shown in (182).
(182) Erebus-ga
Erebus-nom
Charon-ni
Charon-dat
zibun-no
self-sem
uti-de
house-in
hon-o
book-acc
yom-(s)ase-ta
read-caus-past
‘Erebus made Charon read the book in her own house.’
Similar properties are found in Georgian, at least (Anderson, 1992, pp.
269-279, Harris, 1982). Zubizarreta (1992) argues that these causatives have
mixed properties: they also behave much like morphological causatives (due
to their effects upon the syntactic realization of the causee), but due to the
above property, they also resemble biclausal causatives (at the d-structure).
In effect, the main verb and the causative verb have independent argument
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structures that combine to yield the desired effects. Kuno (1973, §25) ar-
gues for the transformational biclausal analysis of causatives based on the
properties of zibun.
However, if we search for a possible monoclausal explanation within the
LLF theory, we should be aware that causatives, as well as other clauses,
sometimes involve a semantic parameter describing the amount of ‘control’
the causee exercises in the causative situation. For example, in Japanese, the
accusative Case expresses a lower level of control (“non-subject properties”),
whereas the dative Case expresses a higher level (“subject properties”)(see
Shibatani, 1990, cited in Song, 1995, pp. 5-6). Accusative objects with their
lower level of control over the situation cannot serve as the antecedent of the
reflexive in causative constructions:
(183) *Erebus-ga
Erebus-nom
Charon-o
Charon-acc
zibun-no
self-gen
uti-de
house-in
korosi-ta
kill-past
’Erebus killed Charon in her own house.’
Moreover, as pointed out by Falk (1991), under certain semantic condi-
tions, zibun also appears to be bound to a non-subject in a non-causative
(from Kitagawa, 1980, see also Huang, 2000, §3.3.3). If this is so, then the
distribution of zibun does not point to a biclausal analysis of causatives,
but calls for an independent semantic parameter of ‘subject control.’ Huang
sums it up: “Antecedents for long-distance reflexives in Chinese, Japanese,
and Korean can also be some non-subject argument, provided that this ar-
gument represents the ‘source’ of the proposition or the ‘experience’ of the
mental states that is being described” (Huang, 2000, p. 192). According to
Langacker’s theory (1991), datives tend to represent the active participants
in the event, whereas accusative objects are non-active.
An interesting piece of data comes from Bemba (a Central dialect of
a Bantu language, Givo´n, 1976). The underlying subject, the causee, of
causative form of a transitive verb appears in the dative Case if it is a human
agent, otherwise it is in the accusative with the previous direct object taking
the instrumental or locative Case. Thus we again see the same pattern:
agentives, or control arguments, appear in the dative Case.
Furthermore, as noted by Shibatani (1985), several languages have a pat-
tern in which one of the arguments of the non-causative predicate takes the
dative Case, yet retains some properties of the subject, such as (i) appear-
ing in the position of the subject, (ii) entering into agreement with the verb
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and (iii) serving as the antecedent of a reflexive. This particularly applies to
noncanonical verbs expressing human experiences and feelings. We would,
in fact, expect this construction when the predicate is non-aspectual, as it
clearly is in Japanese (Ura, 2000, §4.1). Some scholars have thus argued,
contrary to morphological evidence, that constituents in the dative Case are
the real subjects of such sentences. Such constructions have also been re-
ferred to as “Dative Subject Constructions.” My proposal does not rule out
such constructions: the subject could well be d-marked, therefore appearing
in the dative.
Consider data from Tamil. Tamil is a nominative-accusative language,
which occasionally allows dative subjects. In these constructions, the other
NP argument appears in the nominative Case. Interestingly, the dative ar-
gument has properties (i) and (iii), whereas the nominative enters into agree-
ment with the finite verb (ii)(see Ura, 2000, §1.2; for similar data, see Holm-
berg & Hro´arsdo´ttir, 2003). This cluster of properties is expected in the
present theory. If the nominative patient takes the nominative Case and not
the null accusative (correlated with the presence of a vacuous argument),
then such a nominative NP must appear as the topmost argument at the
LLF level, since if it were below the dative argument it would appear in the
accusative Case. The same is true of Japanese and Korean non-aspectual
verbs with dative subjects. Thus, if the nominative is at the top of the struc-
ture, it is predicted to induce subject agreement in the verb:
(184) VP
NOM-φ V
′
PP
d DAT
V0
V-φ
In some, but not all, Tamil Dative Subject Constructions the Patient
takes the accusative Case rather than the nominative Case. On the basis of
this fact alone, the underlying LLF representation is predicted to be (185)
or (186):
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(185) VP1
V
′
PP
d DAT
ACC
(186) VP2
V
′
pro V
′
PP
d DAT
ACC
This is so because the accusative Case is associated with feature vector
<a, a>, meaning that in both constructions the accusative object cannot be
the uppermost constituent of the respective FP. In this construction, then,
ACC does not agree with the predicate, as predicted, but neither does the
d-marked dative subject DAT. Rather, a default third-person singular neuter
agreement always appears. On the other hand, as predicted, if the Patient
takes the nominative Case in Tamil Dative Subject Construction, then it
also induces agreement. Exactly the same is true of Icelandic (Falk, 1991;
Holmberg & Hro´arsdo´ttir, 2003) and, for all I know, of Old English as well.
These facts are predicted on the assumption that it is the topmost arguments
at the LLF level that induce agreement in these languages: hence the gen-
eralization that, if there is no covert or overt expletive, it is the argument
appearing in the nominative Case that agrees with the verb. I will return to
these assumptions at the end of this section, but for now, I will take them for
granted. Note, however, that in terms of binding and control, dative subjects
are subjects. Hence, it must be concluded that binding and control are not
determined entirely by the LLF structure: rather, they are determined, at
least in part, by semantics, which only correlates with structure in standard
cases. This further supports my contention that the binding of reflexives
could not be used as a decisive argument against monoclausal explanations.
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If my explanation in terms of (185-186) is on the right track, then I would
expect to find evidence showing that the Patient is located in a structurally
higher position in the DAT-NOM construction (185) than in the DAT-ACC
(186) construction, given that both of are possible. Ura (2000, §4.2.4, at-
tributing this observation to Vaijayanthi Sarma) presents evidence that this
is so. Whereas sentential negation can take precedence over the Patient in
the DAT-ACC (185) construction, it cannot do so in the DAT-NOM con-
struction (186), thus indicating that the Patient does appear in some lower
position in the former. Further evidence supporting this theory comes from
passivization, whereas it is a key feature of the present theory that dative
arguments do not rise, although after the insertion of v this may, but need
not be, the sole argument of the verb. The following data comes from Ice-
landic (Ura, 2000). In (187) and (188), an intransitive dative Patient raises
but maintains its Case properties, as expected; in (189) and (190) the dative
argument in the ditransitive sentence behaves similarly, but the accusative
rises and takes the nominative Case:
(187) Paul
Paul
bauð ykkur
invited you-dat
‘Paul invited you.’
(188) Ykkur
You-dat
var
were
boðið
invited
‘You were invited.’
(189) Olafur
Olag-nom
sagði
told
mer
me-dat
Pessa
this
so¨gu
story-acc
‘Olag told me this story.’
(190) me´r
Me-dat
var
was
so¨gð
told
Pessi
this
saga
story-nom
‘I was told this story.’10
The verb agrees with the nominative. These are exactly the expected
properties. Both Japanese and Korean allow a subject-related reflexive to be
bound by the dative argument, and they allow the dative argument itself the
power to control (Ura, 2000, §4.3). Falk (1991) on the basis of similar observa-
tions, suggests that dative arguments in Japanese causatives are not indirect
10“P” replaces ‘the thorn’ in these examples; see the original source.
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arguments, but are “in some sense, a secondary subject[s].”11 Despite the
properties of the zibun-reflexive, he also cites the fact that Japanese floating
quantifiers, allowed in the case of subjects and direct objects but prohibited
in the case of indirect objects, are nevertheless allowed in connection with a
dative causee. Moreover, there seems to be evidence that phrases that are
normally controlled only by subjects may controlled by the causative dative
(Falk, 1991, p. 64, citing Dubinsky, 1985). Finally, Falk also notes that a
pronoun can be bound by the causer in a Japanese causative construction, a
potential violation of Binding Condition B of in GB theory, which requires
that the pronoun cannot be bound wihtin a minimal governing category.
However, this problem is avoided if we assume that the dative object is an
‘accessible subject’ in the sense of Binding Condition B: it moves the causer
out of the minimal governing category for the pronoun.
My hypothesis is, then, that the ‘subject properties’ of causees in causative
constructions - and, as I have shown, in other constructions as well - are due
to special subject d-marking. It need not be argued that a suitable operator
exists; one candidate is illustrated in (191):
(191) Erebus was killed [d by Charon ]
The by-preposition argument clearly determines the subject in some sense.
Assuming that the same operator is used as an aspectual argument, turning
the constituent into a dative rather than an adjunct would create such an
argument with apparent subject properties. A clear example is provided by
Spanish:
(192) Juan hizo arreglar el carry a Maria
‘Juan had Maria fix the car.’
Here Maria is d-marked as the subject, appearing with the preposition
a. These subject properties, and their relation to d-marking, become strik-
ingly obvious when the a-dative is replaced by the corresponding discourse
argument in a construction with a reflexive clitic:
11Falk’s proposal on the notion of “secondary subject” is quite far-reaching: he argues
that the structure of Japanese causative constructions is [[NP causer] [I
′
I VP][NP causee]].
This structure has, literally, two subjects. Wali (1981) cites further evidence of subject
properties of dative causees in causatives. According to him, it is universally valid that the
dative causee cannot be coreferential with the causer, although the direct object causee
can be. Thus, the dative object can not be replaced by a reflexive bound by the causer.
This suggests that the dative object holds an exceptional structural position, if compared
to other objects.
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(193) Juan hizo [ afeitar-sei a los muchachosi ]
‘Juan had the boy shave themselves’
(194) Juani hize [ afeitar-sei por el barbero ]
‘Juan had the barber shave himself (Juan)’
In the former, the d-marked constituent a los . . . serves as the subject,
entering as the antecedent of the reflexive. This interpretation is impossible
in the latter, thus the reflexive refers to the causer.
Many languages allow d-marking to code properties of ‘control’ directly
in the subject position. For example, in Manipuri (a Tibeto-Burman lan-
guage from north-east India with semantic case marking) and Folopa (from a
Teberan family of Papua New Guinea), there exists a separate semantic case
marking (d-marking) for subjects that gain “control” of the event (Dixon,
1994, §2.2). That this is an instance of d-marking is reasonable since for
many verbs in Manipuri and Folopa, the agent may appear in this form, but
also in another form, corresponding to ‘lack of control.’ Thus, it is not in
doubt that there exists a d-operator that can raise the ‘controlling ability’ of
an argument in an event (Lyons, 1968, pp. 350-65). My suggestion is that
this operation might underlie the curious binding properties of causatives,
since there, too, direct objects that can be bound appear to be d-marked. In
fact, given the monoclausal analysis, there is hardly any other possibility.
Further evidence in favor of d-marking with ‘subject properties’ is to be
found in Romance causatives. Consider again the behavior of the reflexive
clitic se. In French and Spanish faire-causative constructions, this clitic can
appear as attached to the embedded verb, taking the object or the dative
NP as its antecedent:
(195) On a fait sei raser Pierrei
’We made Pierre shave himself.’
This is not possible in Italian, however. Thus in French and Spanish, the
patient NP of the faire causative must possess some crucial subject proper-
ties, since the antecedent of the se clitic has been traditionally captured as
the d-structure subject. It turns out that this property also correlates with
the impossibility of passivization (Zubizarreta, 1985, p. 268). Given the
above assumptions, this is crucial evidence in favor of d-marking: d-marked
arguments do not undergo grammatical function shifting due to the fact that
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the insertion of a vacuous argument does not change their feature vectors
(<d, a>).
Before ending this section, I will return briefly to the syntax of Icelandic
and Tamil dative-subject constructions. I have assumed that dative subjects
are not “subjects” from the syntactic point of view, though they may be
subjects in more pragmatic/semantic terms. Some evidence in favor of this
assumption was presented: the nominative patient behaves in many respects
as if it were the syntactic subject, inducing agreement with the finite verb.
When it appears in the accusative form, such agreement is not observed,
and a default agreement appears. The price of these assumptions is that
many properties associated with subjecthood, e.g., reflexivization and subject
control, do not hold solely for the topmost argument at the LLF level and
cannot be used as a diagnostic tool for that position: the dative might carry
these properties as well. Thus, the fact that the dative passed many such
tests of subjecthood (e.g., Boeckx, 2000, Zaenen, Maling & Thra´insson, 1985)
does not indicate, in my theory, that it appears in the topmost LLF position
and hence it indirectly implies that it ought not to appear at [Spec,TP] either.
This could be considered a serious difficulty in terms of my proposal.
However, the generalization that it is the topmost argument that induces
agreement with the finite verb, although quite correct from a heuristic point
of view is, obviously not strictly correct according to my theory. If personal
passives are created by inserting a vacuous argument in the subject position
at the LLF level, then the finite verb apparently agrees with the patient, as
shown in (196):
(196) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v V
′
Obj-φ V0
℘ V-φ
Now note that the weak vacuous argument, observed in personal passives,
is invisible to the constituent below it, and hence, it does not appear in their
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feature vectors either. I have assumed that it is precisely the φ-features that
appear in the feature vectors, not the constituents themselves, for assuming
that the constituents themselves should be allowed to be part of the feature
vectors would heavily complicate the morphological component.
The null hypothesis seems to be that the predicate always agrees with
the subject, as this notion is defined from the perspective of the predicate’s
own feature vector. This is entirely reasonable, since agreement has to do
with feature vectors, not LLF positions. The weak vacuous argument is not
a subject from the morphological point of view, but the patient is. This
fact is relevant to the ongoing analysis of dative subjects in that in these
constructions it is the nominative patient that induces agreement with the
finite verb. However, given the above remarks, one cannot infer from agree-
ment alone that the argument entering into the subject agreement appears
at the topmost LLF position. This is because the subject position could be
filled with vacuous argument and we would still be observing normal subject
agreement, given that the patient appears right below the vacuous argument.
4.7 Lexical causatives and lexicalization
Lexical causatives are, by way of approximation, words that do not bear any
trace of a separate causative morpheme, but are still strongly felt to have a
causative meaning. This is illustrated in (197)(a-b).
(197) a. Erebus killed Charon
b. Erebus persuaded Charon
The predicate kill is perceived to be related to the fact that if Erebus
killed Charon, then Erebus caused Charon to die. This type of inference is a
core feature of (197)(a-b). Given the theory so far, the question is whether
kill is a lexicalised form of die2, ‘cause to die’:
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TP
T T
′
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
Charon V0
℘ die2
kill
This is clearly what is predicted by the present proposal, although ‘cause
to die’ is to be understood linguistically in the sense of ‘x precedes y’ together
with whatever more robust interpretation is supplied by C-I. If this is so, then
we could explain why kill involves ‘causative tone,’ viz. much of the same
reason as any causative does.
This solution removes the ad hoc character of meaning postulates. Mean-
ing postulates can be stipulated freely, and there would be no explanation
for their appearing in certain cases, and not in others.
Secondly, we avoid the pitfalls of biclausal analysis. Biclausal causatives
and their corresponding lexicalist versions are not synonymous, and the ex-
planation runs into technical difficulties over scope phenomena, and so forth.
Here, causality does not involve any sentential source. “Causative tone” is a
result of the cognitive principles regulating the assignment of arguments at
the level of syntactic representation. This can be illustrated by comparing
analytical and lexical causatives in the context the present theory. Analyt-
ical causatives involve two predicates, whereas a lexical causative involves
only one. This, of course, leaves room for syntactic and semantic differences,
ideally just the required amount.
As another piece of evidence, consider a language (like Finnish) in which
the morphology of causative forms is quite productive. We may thus ask
whether we could form a morphological causative from die instead of the
lexical one, and whether these are synonymous. These appear to be two
options available to the language faculty. It turns out that where there is a
lexical causative, the morphological one is ungrammatical (or very odd):
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(198) Pekka
Pekka-nom
kuoli
die-past
‘Pekka died.’
(199) ?Merja
Merja-nom
kuoletti
die-caus
Pekan
Pekka-acc
‘Merja caused Pekka to die.’
The verb kuoletti in (199) has a special meaning, ‘to eliminate something
in an abstract sense.’ Similar data is cited by Givo´n, 1976, §5.1: in Bemba, a
Bantu language, there is no morphological causative cause-to die, since this
“target slot” is already occupied by the lexical causative kill (see also note 6
on p. 336 for an analysis of what happens - basically just what is seen in the
case of Finnish). This supports the hypothesis that lexical causatives and
morphological causatives are derived from basically the same mechanisms.
However, it also shows that we must be able to distinguish tappaa(‘kill’)
from kuolettaa(‘to eliminate something in an abstract sense’) at some point
in order to guide the morphological component to produce the corresponding
differences; so far their LLF representations are identical.
On the other hand, it must be mentioned that there are languages that
allow the same intransitive verb to correspond with both lexical and morpho-
logical causatives. Thus, in Japanese the intransitive verb ori -, ‘come down,’
can be transformed into a morphological causative ori-sase, ‘cause to come
down,’ while there also exists a verb -oros, meaning ‘bring down’. In that
case, much as in Finnish, the morphological component must have two op-
tions for interpreting one and the same LLF representation, one morpholog-
ical and the other lexical, presumably associated with some slight difference
in meaning in Japanese, too.
A more interesting case is reported by Valenzuela (2001). A lexical
causative verb in Shipibo-Konibo can be detransitivized by adding the suf-
fix -t. Interestingly, these derived intransitives can be further turned into
morphological causatives by adding the productive suffix -ma. The derived
elements, then, double the lexical causatives so that, from the semantic side,
they correspond to a single LLF representation. The prediction is that these
new forms should carry a different meaning from the doublets, as is indeed the
case as they tend to code more unusual and elaborate causative situations.
As yet another piece of evidence, it has been observed that children pro-
duce causative forms of die, as they tend to produce such form from any
intransitive predicates (from Pinker, 1989, p. 24):
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(200) a. he’s gonna die you, David
b. Eve’s gonna die it
These are ungrammatical only in the sense that the morphological form of
die is wrong (i.e. kill). The child is thus overgeneralizing the rules of the UG,
needing only to substitute kill for die2 to obtain the correct forms. But then
we know that the ungrammatical forms cease to exists in his or her idiolect
(Hochberg, 1986, Pinker, 1989, §7.1.3). Thus we might speculate that the
morphological component overrides the general rules, replacing morphological
causatives with lexical ones:
TP
T T
′
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
Charon V0
℘ die2
*die
kill
Thus, the Lexicalization Hypothesis (LH) predicts that transitive verbs
are, roughly, formed from their intransitive counterparts, and that this pro-
cess has consequences for both types of interpretation: conceptual-intentional
systems (causativity, agentivity), and the morphology-PF surface forms (red,
redden). Sometimes a separate morphological affix is used, as in the case of
morphological causatives, while at others a whole new lexical item is used.
These two options are illustrated in (201) and (202) below.
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(201) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
house V0
℘ red
redden
(202) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
house V0
℘ die
kill
However, as noted above even if the lexicalist version (kill) often replaces
the morphological one (*die-CAUS ), in some cases both forms co-exist with
a slight difference in meaning. This is the case with the Finnish verbs tappaa-
kuolettaa, of which represent ‘elimination,’ but the latter in a more abstract
sense. However, the latter is a morphological causative formed from kuolla
‘die’. The question is how to represent this difference.
This phenomenon is not exceptional, but part of the ‘core grammar,’
hence it is not really useful to try to explain it in terms of obscure facts
concerning pragmatics. Thus, words such as kill, assassinate and murder all
involve causation and dying, yet they cannot be synonymous. They seem
to express different semantic concepts. This leads to the following dilemma.
Suppose we take murder to be a distinct concept of kill. Then the fact that
190
murder involves ‘cause to die’ would be left unexplained, requiring us to rely
on meaning postulates. If we rely on meaning postulates, we could do so in
the case of kill as well, so that much of the original favor of the proposal
would be lost. In any case, we would then fall short of a theory of any kind,
since the appearance of such meaning postulates would be stipulative. On
the other hand, if we assume that the causative meaning of murder derives
from the same source as the causative meaning of kill, then we would predict
that they were synonymous, with identical deep structures ‘die(x, y)’. This
cannot be so, since murdering and killing, although close in their meaning,
are not synonymous.
Consider the difference between killing and assassinating, as a concrete
example with which to begin. In both cases, the Patient is subject to the
same course of events: she or he dies. The difference is located in the activ-
ities of the Agent. The atomistic lexicon contains the item die, which has
one semantic feature, say DIE, representing dying or death. The result is
killing by associating a subsequent participator, an Agent, with the dying
in a certain (causative) way. Thus the fact that dying becomes killing is
not only to do with the lexical item DIE, it also has to do with the way
another participator becomes involved in the event. The difference is located
in the “interaction” between the two constituents. Much the same is true
of assassinate / kill : assassination involves an Agent who kills the subject
‘on contract’ and/or for ‘political reasons,’ and killing does not necessarily
involve such an element. Hanging differs from shooting (to death) in that
the instrument (the d-argument) differs. If this is so, however, we do not
need a separate lexical item for assassinate: instead, we need to vary slightly
the presuppositions involved in the participation of the Agent. Again, the
difference is in the ‘composition rule,’ not in the lexical elements.
From a different perspective, the Agent of the assassination is individ-
uated in a slightly different way than the Agent of the murder or killing.
These differences, assuming that the above analysis is correct, nevertheless
affect the morphological component, turning kill into murder / assassinate.
Such phenomena are widespread in human languages: different lexicalised
verbal forms are associated with various pragmatic aspects of the agents and
objects, as “languages lexicalise different aspects of a state of affairs and vary
in what they require a speaker to code about it” (VanValin & LaPolla, 1997,
p. 89). Moreover, I observed earlier that the same LLF representation, as it
has been defined so far, may result in two lexical words, so that, in any case,
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some additional source of semantic-pragmatic information must be assumed
as part of the theory.
This is especially true of causatives, which are often sensitive to pragmatic
factors such as the agent’s ‘control over the situation’ and the like. These
pragmatic differences are often grammaticalized, hence there must be a way
to allow them to affect linguistic computation.
To summarize the argument so far, if morphological and analytical causatives
are produced by transparent generative mechanisms, ‘lexicalization’ requires
that some additional input is fed into the LLF. One hypothesis is that such
information comes through the φ-features of the arguments, and is then re-
flected in the morphological component:
VP
Erebus
+killer
V
′
Charon V0
℘ die
kill
VP
Erebus
+murderer
V
′
Charon V
′
℘ die
murder
This hypothesis is in line with my more broader hypothesis that many
syntactic, morphological and even semantic properties of lexical elements
are not intrinsic to the lexical elements themselves, but emerge from the
propositional frames that constitute them. From a linguistic point of view,
such ‘propositional frames’ are LLF representations. This hypothesis allows
me to entertain lexical atomism by removing the explanatory burden from
the lexicon to the overall clausal / propositional structure. Moreover, the
theory does not violate the atomistic hypothesis, since now the fact that
there is no definition of the verb kill is explained by the fact that there is
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no definition of the semantic feature killer. Yet, it can be shown that to kill
means also ‘cause to die’ - just the result I wanted.12
One problem with this specific hypothesis is that these lexical forms, such
as murder and assassinate, can be nominalized without any arguments. This
is shown in (203).
(203) a. killing is wrong
b. murdering is wrong
c. assassinating is wrong
If these forms are differentiated by virtue of an agreement-type argument-
predicate relation, then in these cases there are presumably no arguments
to induce such changes. Moreover, if semantic features such as [+mur-
dered]/[+killer] are part of the agreement features of arguments, why they
do not induce something like ‘inflectional changes’ to the word, but rather
than changing it fundamentally? In other words, why does ’lexicalization’
not look at all like an instance of inflectional morphology?
To further understanding of the problem, let us consider the semantic
feature that represents the valency of a predicate. We could ask whether it
is the valency that forces the required LLF structure around the predicate (a
bottom-up explanation), or whether the LLF structure induces the valency to
the predicate (top-down explanation). The matter is not empirically empty.
The latter hypothesis means that there cannot exist a predicate with two
argument positions without the relevant structure. Nevertheless, there is
grammatical evidence that a predicate with a valency > 0 can appear with
any number of arguments:
(204) a. dying1 was scary
b. killing2 was scary
c. Charon’s killing2 was scary
d. Charon’s killing2 by Erebus was scary
12A certain resemblance to the “contextual” theories proposed by Frege, Russell, Quine
and Davidson must thus be acknowledged, yet these authors, for different reasons than
the ones given here, went far beyond in their “contextualism” by proposing that (certain
or all) words do not have meaning at all in isolation, but only acquire meaning when they
appear, and in virtue of their appearance, as constituents of truth-valuable sentences. My
view is similar in that many properties of words, although not, of course, all, depend upon
their ‘context,’ namely causativity, thematic roles, categorial features and structural Case,
among other things.
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This, in turn, means that when a lexical element is attached to a valency,
the required structure is created only when it is necessary (when the predicate
is merged with ℘ operator, which makes it unsaturated). The morphological
component does not reflect the LLF structure (feature vector), but it does
reflect valency as an associated (but not constitutive) lexical semantic fea-
ture. Since lexicalization follows the same pattern as valency in all relevant
respects, I am inclined to assume that the semantic features of ‘manner’ that
distinguish killing from murdering are attached to the lexical root elements
even if they have something to do with the participation of the Agent (or
Patient):
VP
Erebus V
′
Charon V0
℘ die2
+manner: by murdering
murder
In other words, lexicalization means that the root lexical element is asso-
ciated with an additional semantic feature. Note, however, that this semantic
feature now represents murdering, as a distinct event from killing, and the
theory thus still relies on the atomistic lexicon. The answer to the question
of what it means to murder somebody, is not ‘cause to die’, but ‘cause to die
by murdering.’ It is just that murdering is a ‘manner of causing to die’ that
cannot be expressed completely in any way other than as “X murders Y.”
Another way of looking at this proposal is to say that the facts that make
the lexicon semantically primitive may still be complex from the perspective
of form (LLF). What is primitive in the lexicon can be tunneled into it via
several routes (events, manners, or instruments).
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4.8 Homonyny, polysemy, lexical redundancy
rules and language use
Lexical elements, causatives included, have semantic properties that I have
left unexplained, raising questions in the present atomistic context. To begin
with, although most Finnish T(T)A causatives are causatives in that they
satisfy the diagnostic criteria given earlier, they often have more intricate
semantic properties in addition. For instance, the morphological causative
verb ‘cause to jump’, hyppyytta¨a¨, can be used in the following sentence:
(205) Pekka
Pekka
hyppyytta¨a¨
jump-caus
Merjaa
Merja
kaupoissa
shops-sem
‘Pekka causes Merja to go to the shops.’
The verb has a special meaning, hard to translate into English, imply-
ing that Pekka is somehow being unfair in causing (asking) Merja to go to
shops. I have mentioned earlier that lexical words can begin a ‘new live’ when
they attain such features, or special meanings and special use. In this case,
the special meaning exists aside with the normal causative ‘cause to jump’:
Merja does not literally jump to the shops, but probably goes there to hand
Pekka’s business. Thus, it could be a causative, but the root predicate at the
conceptual level (or at the LLF level) is, insofar as its meaning is concerned,
not JUMP. Many possibilities remain.
As discussed earlier, we need to distinguish the productive and systematic
aspects of language from the idionsyncratic, non-productive aspects. Prob-
lems related to the usage of individual words could potentially cause confusion
in this respect. Lexical atomism follows from compositionality (productivity
and systematicity), in a manner explained earlier. It thus represents an ide-
alization in allowing a finite number of exceptions. In other words, as soon
as the productive and systematic representational generative capacity is in
operation, it can digest additional properties as long as such properties come
in finite numbers. A single word, for instance, can begin a “life of its own.”
Sometimes complex expressions have this property, hence idioms such as kick
the bucket. Nevertheless, the lexicon is a finite stock by nature, and thus an
easy candidate for hosting such information. It is clear that it really does
attract a lot of it. It is thus to be expected that the lexicon of a language is
only indirectly related to the stock of concepts, primitive or complex, masked
by a complex array of idiosyncratic and language-specific information. Taken
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from a slightly different perspective, the lexical meaning relevant to the level
of concepts is that which is “abstracted”: it is the core meaning that is rel-
evant in terms of language as a whole. In other words, the meaning that is
relevant when the lexical element contributes something to the meanings of
its infinite range of hosts.
Returning to the case of hyppyytta¨a¨(‘cause to jump’), we could seek for
an historical explanation for the usage of words related to jumping, which
not implausible because hyppyytta¨a¨ in this sense has a synonym pompottaa
(‘cause to bounce’). This is the case of homonyms: one word, two concepts.
In some cases, certain words that are either identical or different in their
phonological properties resemble each other in meaning enough to warrant
one to say that they are not homonymous, but polysemous. The problem here
is that, assuming that two polysemous words express two different primitive
concepts, it is difficult to explain why they are related to each other.
Such an explanation is not altogether impossible, however. There are
three possibilities within the atomistic hypothesis. The first is to rely on
non-constitutive connections between the two concepts: it may not be the
concepts that are similar, only what they represent.
However, there is another possibility. It is not prima facie clear if any such
items express two different concepts that are ‘related in meaning’, or whether
they express one concept with a more abstract meaning. Consider the Finnish
causative nostattaa, ‘to rise’, and its use in the following sentences:
(206) Pekka
Pekka
nostattaa
rise-caus
kapinan
revolution
‘Pekka caused a revolution to rise.’
(207) Pekka
Pekka
nostattaa
rise-caus
myrskyn
storm
‘Pekka causes a storm to rise.’
(208) Pekka
Pekka
nostattaa
rise-caus
hissin
elevator
‘Pekka causes an elevator to rise.’
In addition, it is common that even temperatures and stock prices can
rise. One might be inclined to argue that these meanings are related to
each other, and an advocate of the atomist hypothesis could further claim
that they involve the same abstract concept RISE, disambiguated in a given
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context. This would, of course, explain why they are related in meaning
(Fodor, 1998, pp. 49-56).
The third possibility, used especially in the present proposal, is to rely
on the fact that several elements at the LLF level may interact to yield
different morphological forms of words. Thus, words such as kill, murder,
assassinate, hang, shoot (to death) are clearly polysemous. They appear
polysemous, according to my proposal, because they have been constructed
from the same LLF predicate DIE-die, with slightly different presuppositions
concerning the participation of the agent, patient and the instrument. Such
information must be present as features at the LLF level, and then these
features are turned into corresponding morphological forms.
Finally, and most importantly, the operation in the language faculty is,
to a certain extent, subject to one’s voluntary control. One could use its
resources by, for instance, allowing it to output certain morphological forms.
These activities are guided by the C-I system as a whole, and hence they are
virtually unrestricted: there are no constraints on how one can use a certain
word. In the context of this study, one could, at will, construct an LLF
representation in any situation. Thus, it is not altogether impossible that
society might sustain certain stable patterns of language use. These stable
patterns of social conventions could account for the correct intuition that
certain words are used in special situations or special contexts, and hence
that they are associated with ‘semantic features.’ A root lexical element at
the LLF level, being interpreted truth-conditionally by some external system,
might well constitute a concept; but there are other usages of these formal
elements as well. Thus, it is possible to use the word or lexical element,
expressing the concept JUMP in contexts that are not related to jumping,
or which are restricted to special contexts. This would constitute part of
the theory of “choice of action,” determining how CHL is put into use, or
part of the more extensive “situational semantics,” to use Bouchard’s term
(1995, §1). But, as Chomsky put it, even if the “problem of choice of action
is real,” there is no theory of such action in sight, and the whole phenomenon
is “mysterious” and thus excluded from the “narrow study of mechanisms”
(Chomsky, 1995, p. 227). My own suspicion is that, in addition, most of
such curious facts are not explainable (in the naturalist sense of the term),
although they can be described and provided with some kind of historical
account.
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Consider the following question: What is it to know Chinese? What are
the possession conditions for the concept CHINESE SENTENCE? What is
the meaning of the word Chinese? Yet the question might be misleading in
that, according to many authors, there is no such concept as CHINESE: “In
the empirical study of language, it has long been taken for granted that there
is nothing in the world selected by such terms as ‘Chinese,’ or ‘German,’ or
even much narrower ones” (Chomsky, 2000, p. 155). English, Chinese and
German are best described as“non-natural categories,”determined in part by
principles and primitives of the Universal Grammar and hence, ultimately,
by the innate and genetically determined endowment of the human language
faculty, plus a great deal of socio-cultural noise influencing through the senses.
This makes categories such as CHINESE and ENGLISH “sociological and
political construct[s]” (Lasnik, 2000, p. 2). This means that the meaning
of the term English (or English sentence) is not constitued (only) by the
concept ENGLISH, but also involves some deeper aspects of our mind (UG)
plus some ‘socio-cultural noise.’ It could be that a large part of the putative
semantics of English is determined by the usage of that word. What I am
suggesting, then, is that this might be so with many other ordinary language
words, such as doorknob.13
These assumptions entail that the interface LLF representation has two
kinds of “semantic interpretation.” One of these associates an LLF represen-
tation with the property or a proposition it represents. The lexical element
red is associated with the concept RED, hence the phenomenon of redness
(whether individuated in terms of I-semantics or E-semantics). This kind of
interpretation should be a suitable descriptive tool in an appropriate model
theory, the model being a collection of either some internal or external realms
of objects, or possibly both. I have assumed that it is semantic properties in
this sense that are used to individuate the lexical elements at the LLF level.
Thus, a typical LLF representation contains lexical elements such as RED
rather than 09834. Nevertheless, LLF representations are formal objects in
terms of the operation of CHL, and such formal elements are, to some extent,
subject to one’s voluntary control. This results in the second notion of in-
13Part of the reason I am fond of this proposal is that it appears to solve some mysteries
concerning ‘mad dog concept nativism.’ For much the same reason as there is no reason
to assume that the concept ENGLISH is innate, there is perhaps no reason to assume that
the concept of DOORKNOB is. Moreover, the proposal explains why lexical concepts
cannot be defined: viz., for much the same reason as English cannot. If this is compared
to Fodor’s theory, some amount of intentional realism must nevertheless be compromised.
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terpretation, which has to do with langauge use rather than representation.
It does not matter in terms of systematicity or productivity what semantic
feature such processes associate with the lexical elements, since pragmatic
interpretation need not be productive and systematic - it may, and should,
be highly idiomatic.
4.9 Conclusions
I have argued in this chapter that it is possible to develop a theory of causative
constructions in a minimalist framework such that the lexicon is taken to con-
tain what seems forced by virtual conceptual necessity: atomistic semantic
features plus idiosyncratic phonological matrices. Causativity, as a semantic
property, is factored into two components, aspectual θ-roles and C-I. θ-grids
that have traditionally been located in the lexicon are derived from the prin-
ciples of UG with some contribution from C-I. These modifications are also
guided also by the desire to formulate semantics in a manner that is abstract
enough to be relevant to syntax (Bouchard, 1995).
It is no longer a mystery why certain characteristic syntactic, semantic
and morphological properties of causatives tend to hang together. These
properties follow from the minimalist principles of the UG in a way that
seems inevitable.
The LLF theory presented in this work is intended to solve the long-
lasting problem of ‘uninterpretable formal features,’ the presence of which
in the Numeration appears mysterious. These formal features reflect seman-
tically interpretable relational properties of lexical items at the LLF level,
supervening their feature vectors. This involves categorial features as well as
the abstract Case. It was also possible to derive certain core principles of the
GB theory, such as the Case Filter, Burzio’s Generalization, one version of
UTAH, the theta Criterion, and the heuristic validity of the X-bar theory and
the EPP principle. PP support in the case of adjectival arguments was shown
to depend on a cluster of properties, such as non-aspectualilty, needing no
stipulation. ECM constructions pose no special problem, and were derived
immediately. Similarly, properties of personal passives emerge automatically
without stipulation, even in some more complex cases involving nominalised
sentences and genitive subjects. However, on balance these properties must
be derivable in any theory, since they are so central to the UG.
Although the theory I present assumes a truly minimalist lexicon in that it
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contains only what is required by“virtual conceptual necessity” - a phonologi-
cal matrix and one semantic feature - and hence agrees with Fodor’s atomistic
lexicon, there is an important difference. According to Fodor (1975), lexical
elements such as kill and die both express primitive concepts, but the fact
that killing entails dying is not explained. I could say that, according to
Fodor, there is, as understood in the material mode, something in killing
that implies dying; but it is not part of the concept of killing. Why is this
so, and why are such implications commonplace among the world’s lexicons?
This is what I believe to be the most challenging problem of explanatory
adequacy. Those who assume lexical semantic decomposition have pointed
out, correctly I believe, that the explanation must rely on the properties of
our mind/brain. However, that alone does not lead us to assume that the
explanation must rely on the concept of killing, since there are other mental
faculties and entities expect concepts that could, in principle, determine such
connections - say Kant’s “pure intuition.” For instance, the fact that three
is a prime number does not, probably, constitute the concept three, yet the
fact could be - and it is not argued here that it must be - constituted by our
mind/brain, say as some ‘number faulty.’ The details are not important, and
the fact that there are non-concept constitutive necessities is at least consis-
tent with the view that the explanation of such necessities emerges from the
mind/brain.
According to my proposal, the meaning of Erebus killed Charon is not
synonymous with Erebus caused Charon to die, because these sentences ex-
presses different LLF representations, and hence different meanings alto-
gether. Thus, the first LLF representation (209) is typical of a biclausal
causative, the second (210) is a representation of a monoclausal causative,
whether lexical or morphological.
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(209) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
VP
Merja V
′
elevator V0
℘ rise
V0
℘ cause
(210) TP
T VP
Erebus V
′
PP
d Merja
V
′
elevator V0
℘ rise
There is no conceptual or linguistic element CAUSE present in (210),
although they both contain the lexical element, or concept, DIE-die. This
explains why lexical and analytical causatives do not have the same meaning,
and why the problems with scope, for instance, emerge (§4.6). Further, the
present theory also explains why these patterns, both syntactic and semantic,
are so productive and systematic; the mechanisms are built to the operation
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of CHL and its interaction with conceptual-intentional systems.
The toughest question, then, is this: what is the meaning of kill? Accord-
ing to Fodor’s ‘disquotational theory,’ kill means killing (Fodor, 1998a). My
theory departs from this suggestion, if only slightly. First of all, there is no
separate entity, the meaning of kill or the concept of killing, that corresponds
to this morpheme, for it was produced by a generative mechanism sensitive
to both LLF representations and Morphology (see section 6.4 concerning the
role of Morphology). The morpheme occurs, or is intelligible, only in certain
‘propositional frames,’ much as suggested by Frege, who postulated for other
reasons that predicates are unsaturated entities and hence incomprehensi-
ble in isolation. Furthermore, as noted above, the meaning of kill cannot
be given by the corresponding analytic phrase, x caused y to die, for this
sentence expresses another proposition, or in fact an amalgamation of two
propositions. Thus, to repeat, what, exactly, is the meaning of kill?
I believe the meaning of kill can be given only by saying that it is the
activity that occurs when Charon, for example, kills Erebus. The sentence
x kills y, expressing the relevant propositional frame, in virtue of its explicit
derivational history, immediately “shows” that Charon must then be dead.
Causativity is part of the ‘logical syntax’ of a single sentence rather than an
aspect of its lexical elements.
Many problems concerning this solution remain, and some are discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
According to the theory put forward in this study, the lexical component
of grammar (Numeration) contains only what is forced by virtual concep-
tual necessity: atomistic semantic features (following Fodor, 1998a) plus id-
iosyncratic phonological features. This explanation is similar to that given
by Bouchard (1995), adopting certain modifications from Chomsky (2000b,
2001) but with a greatly simplified lexicon. All semantic and formal structure
is removed from the lexicon and predicted based on the general principles of
the UG.
The core idea of my proposal is that formal features in the lexicon can be
predicted from their relational properties in the syntax-semantic interface,
their lexico-logical form (LLF). Such an approach simplifies many compo-
nents of grammar and offers a natural explanation of many otherwise prob-
lematic but interesting phenomena, such as displacement properties (passives,
long-range raising), causatives, empty elements, X-bar theory, and others.
Characteristic to my theory is that passives, for instance, follow automati-
cally from simple linking rules and do not need to be characterized by any
construction-specific properties. These favorable consequences suggest that
we can pursue minimalist goals by eliminating imperfections from the lexi-
con. The Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis was simplified so that, although formal
features can be associated with the lexical elements in situ at the LLF level,
they are not stipulative, but are rather consequences of syntactic linking.
As the formal features of lexical elements can be predicted along the lines
of their relational LLF properties, it was argued that the principle of se-
mantic compositionality leads to similar conclusions concerning the semantic
structure inside the lexicon. I have argued that there is no semantic structure
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inside lexical items, and what look like semantic constraints can be explained
by other means.
Specifically, argument structures are largely predictable with an abstract
θ-theory of the UG, whereas the residuum of the s-selectional restrictions
are apparently best explained by relying upon Morphology that assigns mor-
phological structure to the the lexical items based on their relational LLF
properties. Part of the explanatory burden was eliminated by assuming that
lexical elements lack categorial features.
Whether this strategy can be pursued so as to eliminate all s-selection
and c-selection cannot be demonstrated in a single study, however. This
hypothesis was guided by the minimalist goal of reducing language-specific
variation to the Morphology whose properties are supposed to be more easily
learned. However, the θ-theory that could explain the thematic properties of
the arguments of lexical items must be more abstract than it has appeared in
recent literature, and many semantic properties that are often seen as part
of the lexicon and linguistic computation are better viewed here as products
of the conceptual-intentional (C-I) system. For example, notions such as
‘Agent’ and ‘Patient’ are partly pragmatical (C-I), and only partly part of
CHL.
Several issues and problems were brushed under the carpet here, some-
times consciously, quite possibly sometimes not. My primary concern has
been to show that the atomistic lexicon provides the starting point for a
linguistic analysis under the rules of minimalist grammar, such that it is ex-
planatorily adequate, and has the potential to further simplify minimalist
theory, and to reveal interesting generalizations about the organization of
human language(s). The basic principles were laid down, and some core data
was discussed, especially data that was relevant to the study of causatives.
The theory is being tested by computer simulation, as it is fully formal and
easy to implement on a computer. Focusing on a somewhat narrower topic
is not likely to be illuminating in the long run, however, though it must
be assumed to be a necessary but unfortunate restriction for a single study.
I would now like to point out some significant weaknesses in my account,
mostly concerning the omission of a great deal of important data.
The development of the minimalist theory from GB theory was crucially
influenced by the properties of long-distance displacement phenomena, covert
and overt, such as wh-movement, Quantifier Raising and V-movement. More
specifically, it was evidence concerning invisible landing sites (ECP) that
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suggested that an element can only move a certain highly restricted distance
and for certain highly restricted purposes. This seemed to be so in the case
of NP-movement and V-movement. Of particular importance in these spec-
ulations was, and still is, evidence concerning word order and its variation in
various languages across the world, which is considered an important syntac-
tic fact, and part of the reason to postulate specific hypotheses concerning
narrow syntax. One problem is, thus, that I have, first of all, ignored such
evidence almost completely, and secondly, assumed that word order might
not be revealing in terms of the study of narrow syntax (see, in particular,
§3.5, 6.1 and §4.8).
Ignorance is not necessarily a deficit as such, quite the contrary, but in
the present case one might wonder whether only ignorance of complex data
could have produced the putative simplifications to the theory or, indeed, it
could be that “what appear to be improvements in one area may turn out
to raise problems elsewhere” (Chomsky, 1981a, p. 3). The burden of proof
is on my side, requiring demonstration that the putative simplifications and
other assumptions proposed here do not lead to difficulties, but result in
simplification in these other areas of data as well.
The hallmark of true explanation in comparison with mere description is
the fact that some putative explanatory principle may be motivated and sup-
ported by independent evidence. This has been the case with most assump-
tions put forward in this study. Thus, systematicity and productivity have
been motivated by reasons external to the syntactic and semantic properties
of linguistic causatives, leading to the atomistic lexicon which, in turn, leads
to an alternative explanatory strategy concerning causatives. The derivation
of formal features in the lexicon, along with many other assumptions that
have a minimalist flavor, was motivated by the strong minimalist hypothe-
sis, which, in turn, could have been motivated in part by some evolutionary
hypothesis concerning the origins of human language. Empirical, linguistic
evidence for the minimalist hypothesis, such as the fact that elements seem
to make the ‘shortest moves possible,’ should be viewed more as a hint that
makes minimalist speculations at least plausible in the first place.
The rule for deleting constituents with identical feature vectors (maximal
projection) or otherwise identical formal properties (binding theory) was mo-
tivated by the assumption that the language faculty is modular, in a strong
sense. Some principles lack independent motivation, however, and could be
seen only as descriptive, which is an obvious defect.
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The most problematic of these, was the phenomenon of restructuring,
which involved, roughly, the movement of an element from an embedded in-
finite clause into the matrix clause, thus explaining the ECM constructions
and many phenomena that would otherwise contradict my assumptions. I
was incapable of finding any independent motivation for such a curious phe-
nomenon, and more so when I recognized that in order to explain various
phenomena concerning binding and the assignment of morphosyntactic fea-
tures to lexical elements, for example, I had to assume that this movement
took place before any other derivational aspect. This makes restructuring a
relatively deep property, yet not deep enough to be motivated semantically.
The possibility remains that, from a theory-internal perspective, something
fundamental is missing; of course, from a theory-external perspective this is
obviously the case.
Certain phenomena which that clearly contradicted my assumptions were
not addressed properly, but only mentioned. Real double-object languages,
if they exists, plainly contradict rule [51], which requires that an XP cannot
contain two arguments with identical morphosyntactic properties (L-vectors).
I was unable to solve this puzzle. From a descriptive point of view, these
languages represent the minority, and in many cases the argument has been
put forward that their usage of double objects is in part illusory, a result
of the confusing morphology (see §3.5). However, it was impossible to state
with complete certainty that this would be so in every case, hence I believe
there might be a real problem here.
Two possible solutions present themselves at once. The first is to stipulate
a parametric difference, although such a difference must again be motivated in
part by independent considerations, requiring an extensive and careful study
of these languages one-by-one. A ‘parametric difference’ that distributes the
number of direct objects among the world’s languages would not explain
anything. The other solution points to the fact that, from both theory-
internal and theory-external perspectives, something important is amiss. I
still believe that the general pattern might be right. Only a certain number
of arguments are interpretable syntactically, for some reason, as was clearly
illustrated in the case of causatives in which such overflow is transparent, but
it may be that a serious mistake has been made.
I have argued that LLF representations are semantically interpretable,
yet no concrete interpretational procedure together with an explicit model-
theory was presented. There were two reasons for this.
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First, presenting such details would have enlarged the study considerably
with material that was not essential to the argument at hand, and would
merely have added more technical niceties. Some earlier versions of this
study nevertheless included sections on semantic interpretation, in which
I largely followed Bealer’s theory of concepts and qualities (1982), adding
nothing original. The theory is first-order, taking intensional entities, such
as the property of redness, as primitives into the model, and producing a
specific predicate for instantation corresponding to the operator ℘.
The second reason for such an omission of semantic detail is that I was
not able to develop or borrow a convincing theory of quantifiers - precisely
the aspect of model theory that is most non-trivial, and most discussed in
the literature which offers a range of opinions and theoretical possibilities.
The whole complex of issues to do with the syntactic and semantic properties
of quantificational expressions was simply not addressed in this study. Yet I
would suggest that this omission is not so harmful to the argument at hand,
since it is hard to see how data on quantifiers could be relevant enough to
the issue of the atomistic lexicon to warrant the considerable lengthening of
the material and of the time taken in discussing such topics. Another and
separate treatment is thus called for.
Ergative languages, omitted here, present an interesting challenge to cur-
rent rules of syntactic interpretation (see Dixon, 1994). At first, syntactically
ergative Case marking - i.e. a system in which the object of a transitive clause
and the subject of an intransitive one have identical morphosyntactic features
- seems impossible in the present context, which necessitates that the subject
of both intransitive and transitive sentences are identical in their morphosyn-
tactic properties due to their identical feature vectors (<a, ℘>). This case
is fairly interesting and much studied, but these aspects were not discussed
here again due to the desire to concentrate on the essentials.
My weakest and most vulnerable hypothesis, as I see it, concerned the
derivation of lexical formal features (categorial, Case) in agreement with STM
and the idea that the lexical component might be more abstract than has
been assumed previously. Thus, I rejected the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis.
There is no direct argument in favor of this proposal, only indirect ones:
these assumptions, together with the rules of linking, could be used to deduce
several other principles of grammar. Furthermore, this hypothesis ‘converges’
with, or supports, the atomistic theory. The problems inherent in these
principles (e.g., the Case theory, Burzio’s Generalization), however, are also
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problems for the present proposal. I could merely reply that counterexamples
are not usually sufficient as such for the rejection of some principle or other:
they often call for independent explanation.
One complex problem concerns the ordering of the various rules. For
instance, restructuring has an immediate effect on the feature vectors of
various constituents, which then influence the operation of further rules. One
problem is the question of timing between, say, restructuring and binding,
and another is the question of the recursive application of restructuring.
These assumptions and the interactions of various rule components have a
wide variety of empirical consequences. In the worst case the interactions
cannot produce the correct empirical consequences, while in the best case,
an optimal arrangement is found that conforms to the empirical data. The
matter remains open, but must be addressed urgently. Before these questions
are resolved in one way or another, they leave crucial problems unsolved.
Finally, I would like to add that if these assumptions appear too prob-
lematic from the linguistic point of view, there is a weaker interpretation
such that they do not represent any attempt to change the more standard
assumptions as they are formulated in the context of current minimalist the-
ory. One could interpret LLF structures as ‘conceptual,’ and not ‘linguistic,’
assuming that the linking rules are not rules of grammar per se, but rules
of connecting semantic representations to linguistic ones. In that case, the
linking rules provide the Numeration, given a semantic representation (LLF):
lexical elements with the morphosyntactic features assigned to them. This
weaker interpretation would still satisfy the goals of this study, namely, to
present a linguistically relevant atomistic theory of concepts. It is just that,
if we assume that LLF structures are conceptual and not linguistic, they
become detached from the plethora of useful linguistic evidence, becoming
almost completely invisible to rational, empirical inquiry. Not much is known
about non-modular cognitive structures and processes.
In conclusion, I have pointed out a number of problems and inadequacies
in my proposal in order to set some broad guidelines for future research, given
that my assumptions were on the right track in the first place.
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Chapter 6
Appendix: The minimalist
framework and the atomistic
lexicon II
The previous chapters presented the basic assumptions of the theory and ap-
plied them to the study of one important body of linguistic evidence, namely,
causatives. The central idea of the theory was to propose rules of linking
that would map a ‘propositional thought’ (LLF), in terms of its linguistic
propeties, to its surface form. The existence of an atomistic lexicon was a
crucial assumption in the theory. In this appendix I will continue to explore
the grammatical consequences and properties of the atomistic theory.
6.1 Numeration and linearization
In what is currently the most influential version of the minimalist theory, the
derivation of linguistic expressions begins from an array of lexical choices,
called Numeration. According to the Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis, these lex-
ical elements are already attached to their relevant morphosyntactic features
(e.g., agreement, Case, category) already at Numeration, rather than as-
signed in the course of derivation. Whenever such a feature is uninterpretable
it must be eliminated in the course of the computation by finding a suitable
local match in order to satisfy the principle of Full Interpretation (§3.5).
In some cases this elimination process entails the displacement property as
a side effect. The remaining problem is then to explain why such formal
features emerge in the Numeration, or why they are included in the lexical
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elements, in the first place.
According to the present proposal, formal features are not stipulated in
the array of lexical choices, but are derived from the structural LLF proper-
ties. This has left the status of Numeration and the notion of “derivation”
essentially open. There are several possible lines of inquiry one may take
at this point, but fortunately the choice is not so significant for the issue at
hand. Nevertheless, these choices should be made explicit in order to reveal
the purpose of such minimalist explorations in the context of the working
hypothesis of this thesis.
I have followed Fodor’s insight in arguing that systematicity and pro-
ductivity are not consistent with any kind of conceptual role theories with
statistical features, and on the other hand that there is much evidence that
lexical elements cannot be decomposed either by invoking necessary and suf-
ficient semantic features (definitions). In Fodor’s view this is a question of
the nature of lexical concepts, but from the minimalist perspective it is not
obvious that a theory of concepts, even if it uses the notion of “lexical” in its
formulation, is relevant to the computation in language faculty. I think it is
relevant, but in any case it is an empirical matter. Suppose, however, that
it is the “level of concepts” - by which I mean a more abstract level of repre-
sentation than the linguistic levels - on which systematicity and productivity
operate, and that they henceforth constrain only a theory formulated at that
more abstract level. In that case, the LLF representation would represent a
non-linguistic level of semantic representation, which is interpreted or linked
linguistically.
In this scenario, the LLF is either connected to the LF or it is used to
generate the Numeration, for as I have shown, the structural properties of
LLF may be used to assign formal features to the lexical elements, from where
the derivation is usually thought to begin. This scenario would still satisfy
my initial purposes in that it shows how an atomistic theory of concepts
could be used in an explanatory framework, its conceptual primitives and
structures being linked to the syntactic ones via rules that are intuitive and
simple. In other words, it would be possible to leave the minimalist theory
almost intact by proposing that an LLF theory is a theory of concepts (a
“language of thought”).
There are two principal reasons to deny this weaker hypothesis, although
nothing that follows will depend on the matter. Chomsky (2000b, pp. 175-
176) considers this possibility, pointing out that assuming yet another se-
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mantic level would add some “extra layer of complexity.” This is true: with-
out very strong empirical motivation, we ought not to assume new levels of
representations. Secondly, some LLF properties are motivated by linguistic
concerns, and thirdly, it is not evident that the C-I system consists of repre-
sentations and local rules that manipulate them (derivationally or represen-
tationally). It seems that this system is too “holistic” or “complex” to benefit
much from the computational approach (Chomsky, 1957, 2000c, Fodor, 1983,
2000a). I will remain as neutral about these possibilities as possible; the data
is still too impoverished to settle the issue one way or the other. Note that
this is not a question of whether some kind of “language of thought” exists,
but has more to do with the theoretical status of the LLF representations.
Another and stronger, hence also more interesting, hypothesis is to spec-
ulate whether LLF is internal to the language faculty, or whether it is un-
derstood at the “interface level,” its properties replacing the notion of LF, or
some aspects of it. In that case, the rules that assign formal features to the
lexical elements would be syntactic or linguistic, with the sole purpose of link-
ing LLF representations to elements that are phonologically interpretable, in
other words, code semantic properties in terms of what is interpretable at
the PF level according to the principle of Full Identification (not Full Inter-
pretation). Still, the principle of Full Interpretation would not be violated,
since LLF is semantically interpretable and PF requires properties that are
interpreted at that level. Then, assuming that the hierarchical relations are
not thus interpreted, they must be deleted, leaving an array of phonologi-
cally interpretable elements, say lexical elements with their morphosyntactic
features assigned. This corresponds to the concept of Numeration, except
that its place in the architecture as a whole is changed from the pre-syntactic
phase to the post-syntactic phase.
Morphology appears between syntax and phonology (cf. Zwart, 2001), so
that if we assume that Morphology feeds PF, meaning that every element
leaving Morphology must be phonologically interpretable, then clearly some
features - for example, ACC in English - are not. What happens is that either
the derivation crashes, or these features are not implemented by “movement”
or some other relevant condition.
This proposal already entails much of the approach that relies on Kayne’s
LCA (1994), since if linear order is assigned to the output of the morpholog-
ical component, as proposed by Chomsky, then this process can be sensitive
at most to the feature vectors of the elements (the feature vector being the
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input to the Morphology): the feature vector of a constituent contains the
nodes (or their agreement features) that c-command that constituent. There
is an another feature in my proposal that converges towards the LCA: I aban-
don the X-bar theory, and attempt to predict linear order by relying upon
feature vectors.
Certain word order properties can be captured by allowing agreement
(Morphology) to guide linearization. It is well-known that rich morphology
tends to“free” the linear order, and poor morphology freezes it, although this
is best understood as a strong tendency. One part of the execution of this
idea has been the whole notion of the“abstract Case,”which can be expressed
morphologically, but by other means as well. Thus, in English the relation
between the verb and the direct object is strict adjacency - a property best
captured at linearization - presumably due to the loss of overt morphology.
It seems that the V2 phenomenon follows this pattern quite strictly. In
German, verbs in finite root clauses, or rather whatever agrees with the sub-
ject (a verb or auxiliary), must occupy the “second position” in the sentence
(in quite a literal sense), whereas this requirement is not in force in embedded
finite clauses if these clauses have an overt complementizer. This had lead
many scholars to assume that these V elements must occupy C (Koopman,
1984, Koster, 1975, Rizzi, 1990). This explanation runs into a trouble with
V2 languages such as Yiddish and Icelandic, in which V2 constraints apply
to sentences with overt complementizers (Diesing, 1990). As a consequence,
some scholars have assumed that there is yet an additional position available
between CP and TP. English, too, has been said to constitute a “residual
V2 language” due to the fact that the V2 constraint seems to be effective in
questions. Finally, the same pattern - the second positioning of whatever it is
that agrees with the subject - can be illustrated in the case of VSO-languages,
a variation of the V2 language. The following example comes from Welsh
(Sproat, 1985):
(211) gwelodd
saw
Sioˆn
Sioˆn
ddraig
dragon
‘Sioˆn saw the dragon’
(212) gwnaeth
did
Sioˆn
Sioˆn
weld
see
draig
dragon
‘Sioˆn did see the dragon.’
(211) illustrates the basic word order of Welsh, in which in the periphrastic
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construction (212) it is the agreeing element that takes the first position. If
these word-order facts are indeed correlated with agreement, then we might
expect to find different behavior in non-finite clauses. Welsh shows this
pattern: infinite clauses obey the SVO rather than the VSO order.
Another type of evidence that is important in this connection is the po-
sitioning of negative particles and adverbs. In general, there seems to be
variance in how “high” the verb can rise in a sentence. This appears to be
conditioned, to a significant extent, by morphological properties. In French,
the main verbs in finite clauses are said to undergo“raising”over the negative
operator - and over whatever appears in the vicinity (some quantifiers and
adverbs). (213)(a-b) is a contrasting pair.
(213) a. Erebus did not go
b. Jean ne partit pas
Descriptively, these properties follow by from the choice of linear order
between negation and the predicate, depending on the tense/agreement prop-
erties of the predicate. Such a process is already in place in the case of the
predicate and the complement. Now consider instead the fact that, as noted
by Pollock (1989, §6.4), the lack of “Verb Raising” in English can be at-
tributed directly to the disappearance of its rich verbal morphology: there
is also diachronic evidence of these. (For similar evidence from a variety of
languages, see Thra´insson, 2003). Chomsky, too, proposed that Verb Raising
takes place for morphological reasons, an essential feature of the minimalist
program. Again, it might thus be a good generalisation to try to explain
why some linearization (positioning of the verb with respect to other major
constituents), and not some other, takes place by relying upon morphologi-
cal properties. Bobaljik (2002) argued, along similar lines, that Holmberg’s
Generalization could be explained by relying upon the adjacency requirement
between inflectional features and their host in the phonological component
(linearization). This strategy would be in agreement with my proposal, in
that it removes some of the explanatory burden away from the narrow syntax
and correlates it with inflectional agreement.
Consider this in the light of the fact that the negative particle has mor-
phological effects on the predicate, as it appears in its feature vector. In
English, this prevents the verb from being inflected. From the diachronic
data, and following suggestions made by Pollock and Chomsky, it thus looks
as if the verb is able to distance itself from the subject as a consequence of,
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or in correlation with, the lost agreement morphology - in other words that
a rich morphology binds these elements together. This could explain why
French infinities behave much like English finite sentences, allowing more
space between the verb and the subject.
By way of further exploration of the consequences of this hypothesis, note
that, in Finnish, the negative particle agrees with the subject, behaving much
like an auxiliary. In English it does not, but English never realises a sentence
Subj-not-V, whereas Finnish does. Thus, (a) is ungrammatical in English,
paralleled in the Finnish example (b) with agreement taking place in the
negative particle:
(214) a. Erebus not leave
b. Erebus ei la¨hde
The English sentence becomes grammatical if we insert a dummy partici-
ple and generate Erebus does not leave. The explanation is straightforward in
terms of Morphology: negative operators block person and tense agreement
in English, thus the dummy participle is used as a last resort (§6.4). Given
that the hypothesis was that this morphological process could lock the word
order between the predicate and negation, consider the following sentence.
(215) sina¨
you-nom
et
not-sg2
ole
be
ollut
been-perf
la¨hdo¨ssa¨
leave-prog
‘You have not been leaving.’
Although Finnish word order is relatively free, it does not allow variation
here:
(216) *sina¨
you-nom
ole
be
ollut
been
la¨hdo¨ssa¨
leave-prog
et
not-sg2
‘You have not been leaving.’
(217) *sina¨
you-nom
et
not-sg2
ollut
been
ole
be
la¨hdo¨ssa¨
leave-prog
‘You have not been leaving.’
(218) *sina¨
you-nom
et
not
ollut
be
ole
leave-prog
la¨hdo¨ssa¨
been
‘You have not been leaving.’
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This supports the hypothesis that word order is fixed by Morphology:
a negative particle that agrees with the subject does not generally tolerate
being pulled out of its vicinity, the same phenomenon that occurs in English
and French.
As mentioned above, these tendencies are strong enough to have led
Chomsky to suppose that Move and Agree are related to each other. This
seems correct. If it could be hypothesized that the present theory of LLF
could replace minimalist LF, and therefore that Numeration could be un-
derstood, not as part of a narrow syntax, but more as a post-morphological
stage with morphosyntax derived from the feature vectors, I would claim
that these word-order properties are not, in their explanation, part of a nar-
row syntax, but more of the surface phenomenon of assigning linear order
based on features otherwise unrealizable morphologically. This is basically
the suggestion made in Chomsky (2001), that head movement is not part of
a narrow syntax, but it is part of phonology (see also Zwart, 2001). This
is in line with Chomsky’s proposal in that certain surface properties that
are sensitive to interpretation (topicalisation, theme-rheme) are not part of a
narrow syntax, but belongs to the phonological component (Chomsky, 1995,
§4, see e.g., p. 220).
If this is so, then it follows that some aspects of semantic interpretation,
notably those that are sensitive to surface order (e.g., topicalization, Object
Shift), must be tunneled somehow into the process of linearlization. This
could be done either by attaching appropriate features to the representa-
tions at the LLF level, letting them guide linarization, or by supposing that
the C-I, which must be responsible for such shifts in meaning, can access
linguistic computation at other interfaces besides LLF or Numeration. In
the latter case, one might violate the Inclusiveness condition by proposing
that the derivation is more dynamic, allowing extra-linguistic intervention,
or by introducing the relevant features to the Numeration (these are by no
means two clearly different theses, and may be only notational variants).
Such effects are implemented standard minimalist theory in terms of formal
features, and hence they occur at Numeration (Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis
and Inclusiveness). In the present case, there are no formal features, but
nothing prevents the introduction of formal, or even semantic features at the
LLF level insofar as they do not constitute the lexical elements, but are as-
sociated with them freely and are thus based on “contingent truths” which,
by virtue of inflecting CHL, “have syntactic reflexes” (Fodor, 1998, p. 64). In
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any case, what matters here is that the LLF contains lexical concepts that,
due to the requirement of systematicity and productivity, are not constituted
of semantic features (statistical or definitional): this suggests that a theory
of such non-constitutive features is independently called for. In other words,
LLF satisfies systematicity and productivity and is connected strongly, to
use as neutral a phrase as possible, to linguistic computation. Part of its
appeal as an explanatory level is reduced to its ability to serve in that role:
the more it can be used in explaining linguistic evidence the better, but it
is not assumed that it would, could, or should explain it all. Considering
what is known about language, it seems impossible to provide convincing
arguments in favour of any more specific theory of such features, inducing
surface manipulations. Thus, I cannot provide answers to these questions
here. Needless to say, the hypothesis that the explanatory burden is moved
from narrow syntax towards linearization and PF is far-reaching and cannot
be maintained without much empirical support. It must be reduced to the
status of speculation in this connection.
6.2 A note on double object constructions
So-called double-object constructions could be argued to pose a challenge to
the present theory, which bans them outright. Sentence (219)(b) is a double
object construction that corresponds syntactically and semantically to the
more typical construction (a):
(219) a. Erebus gave a book to Charon
b. Erebus gave Charon a book
These constructions present an interesting challenge for any theory of
argument structure, especially in the present case since these constructions
seem to violate principle [51] requiring all arguments inside the same FP
to have a unique but different feature vector. Dativization is not general
in English, and is subject to morphophonological, syntactic and semantic
restrictions (Levin, 1993, §2, Pinker, 1989). If a language does not have
dative arguments, then it does not have this sort of alteration (like Finnish).
On the other hand, there are languages other than English that do have
dative, in which case the alteration seems to be subject to similar contrasts,
suggesting that UG principles are in operation (Ura, 2000, §7).
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Let us first look at some of the structural properties of these constructions.
Consider the following very interesting example:
(220) a. interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book
b. * interviewing Nixon gave a book to Mailer
These examples are peculiar in that only the double object construction is
grammatical. Suppose that the surface order of the arguments reflects their
dominance order at the lexico-logical form, Mailer being the direct argument
of give. What (220)(a) says is that there was an interview that caused Mailer
to write a book. Thus, the temporal order of the participators in the event
of giving in this propositional content is ’interview > Mailer > book.’ It is
this order that entails (220)(a), according to the present proposal. This also
explains why (b) is ungrammatical: this ordering of the arguments violates
the principles of the individuation of a-arguments, given the above meaning.
On the other hand, if the subject is volitional, then of course there is no such
problem, as shown in (221):
(221) Nixon gave a book to Mailer
This explanation works only if we assume that the s-structure order of the
arguments in (220) reflects the order of arguments at the lexico-logical level.
In other words, we must assume that (220)(a) is not a “transformational
version” of (b), and rely upon the most simple hypothesis. Furthermore, it
appears that quantifier scopes in double object constructions are fixed, as ar-
gued by Barss & Lasnik (1986), Hornstein (1995, §7.2) and Pesetsky (1995,
§5.1.2) and it therefore follows that the surface order fixes the quantifier
scopes. Under the present proposal, the fact that quantifier scopes are de-
termined at the lexico-logical form supports the view that the double object
construction and its dative counterpart differ in lexico-logical form. More-
over, the binding properties of double object constructions indicate that the
dative argument is not part of its own small clause, but behaves as if it
were part of the same FP as the verb and other arguments (Pestsky, 1995,
§5.5.1.2).
Finally, there are languages in which, if the indirect theme argument is d-
marked, and the direct Goal argument takes the accusative Case, the double
objects construction seems to be the only possible arrangement of arguments
for certain verbs. If this is so, then the account in terms of transformations
seems especially odd. For these reasons it would seem to be correct to assume
217
that (220)(a-b) are represented differently at the LLF level, and that (a) is
not a transformational source of (b).
The problem is then how to explain the fact that such a construction can
survive [51]. I predict that the indirect object - either one of the accusative
objects - is d-marked by the predicate, appearing in [+N][+SEM], although
this fact is not realised morphologically. Presumably, it is then realised by
some other means, say by word order. This hypothesis is in agreement with
Marantz’s (1984) proposal, suggesting that the argument structure of the
predicate is changed between the double object construction and its homo-
phone. It is also in agreement with Pesetsky’s (1995, §5) proposal that the
indirect object is supplied with a phonologically null element. For a review
of the passivization of double object constructions, see Ura (2000, §7).
A small number of languages seem to allow the doubling of the direct ob-
ject (Arabic, Matses, Mongolian, German, Dutch, Sanskrit, Swahili), while a
somewhat larger number allow the doubling of the indirect object (Punjabi,
French, Italian, Turkish; cf. Comrie (1976). To the best of my knowledge,
doubling is not obligatory. Rather, as in English, a dative or oblique construc-
tion exists side-by-side with the more marginal double object construction.
The data cited in Comrie (1976) suggest that informants also tend to
prefer the ‘normal forms’ to the double object construction, and there is con-
siderable hesitation in accepting the latter. This suggests that we could put
these marginal cases on a par with English double object constructions. (In
some cases, like Kinyarwanda,1 this explanatory scheme looks problematic.)
1According to Kimenyi (1980), datives and direct objects are “formally indistinguish-
able” in Kinyarwanda. This language has at least the following properties that are pe-
culiar to it: (i) datives and benefactives, like direct-object NPs, undergo reflexivization,
passivization, and incorporation; (ii) datives and benefactives, like direct-object NPs, are
connected to the verb without prepositions, and occur in sentences without explicit direct
objects; (iii) datives, like direct-object NPs, lack case marking, while benefactives are case
marked; (iv) oblique arguments, such as instrumentals, locatives, can be raised to the
status of a direct object: in some cases the existing direct objects undergo some syntactic
change, such as deletion, but mostly the deleted preposition of the oblique argument is
suffixed to the main verb when dropped from the constituent, and there are constraints
that prevent such raising in some cases, e.g. locatives are not raised if the verb does not
have a direct object already; (v) raised oblique arguments receive all syntactic properties
of direct objects; (vi) the words order of datives, raised objects, and direct objects, all
coming after the verb, is crucial and fixed; (vii) oblique arguments cannot be passivized,
but they can be passivized if they first undergo the process of begin raised to a direct ob-
ject: non-aspectual verbs may also have direct objects. These properties suggest that the
doubling of the direct object in Kinyarwanda might be possible. Some scholars disagree,
however, and I will not attempt to deal with this controversy here.
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If so, one of the double direct or indirect objects should have inherent Case
or indirect-object properties, interacting with the formation of passives as in
the case of English.
Although data from each language must be examined carefully and sep-
arately, this could well be the general pattern. To take an example, Swahili
takes a double object construction according to morphological criteria. A
ditransitive sentence contains two direct objects and no visible prepositions
or affixes. However, only one of these objects inflects the verb. This object
rises further in the passive construction. The other object does not pas-
sivize, which is a direct consequence of d-marking. In general, as predicted,
the object does not behave identically with respect to syntax (Comrie, 1976).
Exactly the same is true of Hebrew (Wali, 1981, p. 292), Korean and Dutch
(Kozinsky & Polinsky, 1993), but perhaps not of Sanskrit, Kinyarwanda or
Matses (Fleck, 2001). A controversy remains concerning whether these lan-
guages are truly double object languages or not.
As far as double object causatives are concerned, Wali (1981) argued
that the same patterns holds: “A preliminary comparison drawn from widely
unrelated languages indicates that the behavioural properties of the IO causee
differ considerably from that of the true IO. It appears that, contrary to
expectation, languages consistently differentiate between the causee IO and
the true IO, thus suggesting a need for critical re-evaluation of the proposal
to classify the causee IO in the object category in the deep sense” (Wali,
1981, p. 297).
6.3 Expletives and impersonal passives
I have argued that a considerable part of the EPP principle is already satis-
fied given the present rules, including the fact that personal passives involve
movement of the patient to the positions of the syntatic subject. Expletive
structures are part of the EPP phenomenon, however, in a sense that, were
there no subject for some reason, an expletive must then appear. I will argue
in this section that the present rules of syntactic interpretation explain a
number of perplexing properties of expletives and impersonal passives. The
key assumption will be that, alongside the vacuous argument postulated in
the case of passives, there exists another type of vacuous argument that differs
from the former in that it is ‘visible’ to the feature vectors of the constituents
below it at the LLF level. This vacuous argument is an “expletive.” Thus,
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expletives are semantically vacuous arguments that are almost (normal) ar-
gument from a syntactic point of view. Finnish impersonal constructions are
also discussed and it is argued that they contain covert expletives.
Expletives are related to the vacuous argument and hence to passives.
First, there is overlap in their semantic properties, and seem to be “null ar-
guments” in some sense. Secondly, there is some overlap in their syntactic
properties, as it is well known that expletive structures, especially those con-
taining there, are related syntactically to personal and impersonal passives.
The most interesting difference is that the expletive there, but not the exple-
tive it, requires a local, correlating nominative patient, called its “associate.”
This is illustrated in (222).
(222) there arrived three men
Suppose there are three distinct types of vacuous arguments instead of
just one: the weak vacuous argument v, which was used in the case of per-
sonal passives above; a strong vacuous argument, symbolized as v*, which
differs from the weak v in that it is visible to the feature vectors of the con-
stituents below it at the LLF level, and finally, that the phonological content
of weak v is it. From semantic side they are all null arguments, so that these
stipulated differences are purely formal. Finally, suppose that the new fea-
ture vector <a, v*> corresponds to a structural Case we may call the null
accusative, symbolized as ACC0. The following LLF representation (223)
illustrates the basic configuration with v*, a transitive predicate and a direct
object:
(223) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v* V
′
Charon
<a, v*>
V0
℘ kill
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At this point I will take the term“null accusative”as a new term, reflecting
the fact that we do not yet have a name for the structural Case corresponding
to the feature vector <a, v*>, and that a relation with the more traditional
notion of null accusative is implied, as shown presently. The basic properties
of expletive structures, and their close relation to passives, now seem to
follow.
If a predicate has only one argument and it is vacuous, it is pronounced
as it, as in (224).
(224) a. it rains
b. [VP v [V0 ℘ rain ] ]
The fact that a verb requires an expletive if it does not have a thematic
arument follows from the assumption that only full projections are well-
formed at the LLF level; the expletive fills the position of the argument.
The fact that weather verbs do not tolerate thematic arguments instead of
expletives is presumably part of their semantics.
It also follows that the it-expletive may never appear in a transitive con-
struction with an NP argument, but it requires a clausal complement (*it
seems Charon). This is because if the same clause contained both expletive
the it and a nominal argument, they would have identical feature vectors <a,
℘>. Figure (225) illustrates this:
(225) TP
T VP
℘ VP
it
<a, ℘>
V
′
Charon
<a, ℘>
V0
℘ seems
Remember that v was defined as a ‘no-argument’ and hence it is invisible
to the constituents below it, in this case Charon. The present proposal pre-
dicts that predicates with pleonastic subjects and accusative objects should
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be completely absent. Thus, no verbs like KILL, as in the sentence *it kills
Erebus, ought to appear (cf. Chomsky, 1981a, p. 148, note 113 and refer-
ences therein). However, if the object of the verb is d-marked (a PP, indirect
object), the subject could be it (or equivalent), as in (226)(from Frampton
& Gutmann, 1999, p. 25):2
(226) Pað
it
glampað
gleamed
a´
on
sverðið
sword
‘The sword gleamed.’
Consider next (227).
(227) Erebus seems to have hit Bill
If Erebus appears in situ then the complement must be tensed and requires
a complementizer: it seems that Erebus hit Bill. (227) does not violate [51],
since Bill has the feature vector <a, a> and appears in the accusative Case.
On the other hand, inserting a subject into the infinite clause then results in
a violation of [51], as correctly predicted:
(228) a. * Erebus seems James to have hit Bill
b. * it seems James to have hit Bill
What happens if a rising construction is embedded in some construction
as an argument? Several modules of the grammar then interact. First, if
the predicate is non-aspectual, then the embedded clause inside the rising
clause must be d-marked. It then follows that no “restructuring” and raising
is expected, for the same reason that datives do not generally rise. This
predication is correct, as is shown below:
(229) a. Charon seems [ to be intelligent ]
b. * Charon’si semblance [ ti to be intelligent ]
By the same line of reasoning, it seems to a strange man that it is raining
is grammatical, but *a strange man seems to that it is raining, *to a strange
man seems that it is raining are not, the PP being the d-argument: the
d-marked argument does not undergo “restructuring.” Note that I have so
far treated sentential arguments as distinct from nominal arguments in that
2Frampton & Gutmann conjecture that the expletive in these Icelandic sentences is
comparable to English it, which I take for granted here.
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they are not assigned a Case or any categorial features. Therefore, they are
not subject to principle [51]. Putting more detailed exploration of this aside
for now, and merely assuming it to be a descriptive generalization, I suggest
that it is then possile to construct and interpret the following structure (230)
syntactically with three arguments:
(230) VP
v V
′
S V
′
NP V0
℘ lex
In this structure the vacuous argument is invisible to the feature vectors
of the elements below it, yet if sentences (S) are exceptions to rule [51] in
that they are not assigned Case or category, then all three arguments can
be interpreted syntactically. This type of sentence is indeed possible, as
illustrated below:
(231) it struck me that Erebus would kill Charon
The there-expletive, on the contrary, can appear in transitive construc-
tions with a zero accusative “associative,” as in (232b). Since the there exple-
tive involves a quasi-argument v* that lacks a thematic role, (232b) is taken
to be a transitive construction (Belletti, 1988, Bouchard, 1995, §5, Bowers,
2002). The there-expletive is related to the passive, as illustrated by the
following examples:
(232) a. a man was arrested
b. there was a man arrested
The difference between (a) and (b) is that in (a), the vacuous argument
is weak, and in (b) it is v*. The meanings are very close, since both contain
a vacuous argument. (233) illustrates both types of sentence:
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(233) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v / v* V
′
Charon V0
℘ arrest
Expletive constructions provide some support for the “restructuring” A-
movement discussed earlier in the case of long-range displacement. Consider
(234).
(234) a. * there is likely there to be someone in the room
b. * there seems there to be a problem
These “perennial troublemakers” are ungrammatical, and the reason fol-
lows from the LLF properties of expletives and restructuring: in both cases
the embedded v* rises to be part of the matrix clause, but then two strong
vacuous arguments appear in that clause, hence there are two synonymous
constituents with an identical index, so that according to [51], one of them
must be deleted. The resulting sentences are as follows:
(235) a. there is likely XXXi [ ti to be someone in the room ]
b. there seems XXXi [ ti to be a problem ]
For much the same reason, *it seems Charon intelligent is not grammat-
ical: Charon rises through restructuring, but then the matrix clause has two
arguments with same feature vector, and this is banned according to [51].
Transitive expletive structures (Chomsky, 1995, §4, Jonas, 1996), which are
marginal in English but grammatical in many languages (e.g., Icelandic, see
also Rohrbacher, 1999, §5.4), emerge naturally since in such constructions all
three arguments have different feature vectors:
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(236) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v*
<a, ℘>
N
NOM
V
′
a house
<a, v*>
N
ACC0
V
′
a man
<a, a>
N
ACC
V0
℘ paint
V
(237) *there painted a house a man
Even more exotic constructions result when there (V) is combined with
vacuous argument v, resulting in what might be called a “double passive.”
(238) *there have some cakes been baked
[ there-nom [ v-acc0 [ cakes-acc0 [ bake ] ] ] ]
[ v-nom [ there-nom [ cakes-acc0 [ bake ] ] ] ]
These are grammatical in Icelandic and Faroese (Jonas, 1996). In both
cases, it is predicted that cakes should appear in the zero accusative (ACC0).
Let us consider more carefully the interaction between rising predicates,
such as seem, and expletive structures. Interesting interactions emerge. A
rising predicate, such as seem, is one which has, by virtue of its very nature,
a vacuous argument v as its subject (hence it is related to passive structures)
and, due to the non-aspectuality of the predicate, no direct object argu-
ments (dative subjects and objects are possible, however; see Holmberg &
Hro´arsdo´ttir, 2003 for a discussion on Icelandic rising predicates with quirky
subjects and objects). Due to its relation with the passive, if an object ar-
gument is restructured in the same clause with this predicate, it takes the
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nominative Case, and either the raised argument or the vacuous argument
is deleted at the syntactic interpretation. Suppose that v is deleted, thus we
derive
(239) a mani seems [ ti to be here ]
If the embedded subject is there, then this element raises and replaces the
vacuous argument:
(240) therei seems [ ti to be a man here ]
However, assuming that the subject of seem is necessarily v, it is not
possible to generate (241) where the there expletive emerges from nowhere:
(241) *there seems [ a man to be here ]
The same is true of a structure with two there expletives (*there seems
there to be a man here), although there are already several rules that are
broken here. Given that, with rising predicates, there must emerge from
the embedded clause if it is to emerge at all, we can explain why (242) is
ungrammatical:
(242) *there seems [ that a man is here ]
In this case, too, there is no possible origin of the there expletive, since
nothing can rise by being restructured from a finite clause. On the other
hand, it seems to be the case that any clause, whether a matrix clause or an
embedded clause, that has a there expletive as its subject, must contain an
associate:
(243) a. * there sleeps
b. * there thinks that a man is here
c. * there seems to a strange man that it is raining outside
On the other hand, if no constituent appears with the vacuous argument
in the matrix clause, then the vacuous argument is pronounced (it):
(244) a. it rains
b. it seems that a man is here
It is now possible to explain (245) below is ungrammatical:
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(245) *it seems to be a man here
In this sentence the subject position of the embedded clause, as assumed
above, is filled with a strong vacuous argument:
(246) *it seems there to be a man here
Yet this expression is ungrammatical as well, since, according to the rules
of restructuring, there rises so that rule [51] is violated in the matrix clause,
both expletives having the nominative Case. The correct from is therefore
(247) there seems to be a man here
I have argued that expletives might be overt realizations of two types of
vacuous arguments, one weak, the other strong. They are thus covered by
the EPP, which is itself explained as an inherent feature of the present rules.
Let us consider next Finnish impersonal passives. These constructions
are important since, as I will now argue, they represent an intermediate
case between personal passives and expletive structures. More specifically, I
will argue that Finnish impersonal passives contain covert expletives as their
subjects. Finnish impersonal constructions are also important because they
are relevant to the question of whether EPP, and hence the present proposal,
is too strong a condition for the formation of finite clauses, because they are
constructions that, apparently, seem to lack any kind of subject. According
to the present theory, this is predicated to be impossible: such constructions
must involve a covert subject of some kind.
“Impersonal passives” have been characterized by the demotion of the
subject without the promotion of the object (e.g., Comrie, 1977). The pu-
tative, impersonal passive form has the following properties that differ from
personal passives and Finnish rising constructions:
(i) no agreement between the NP of the patient and the passive
verb;
(ii) patient NPs appear to be in the nominative Case, although
pronouns take the accusative Case;
(iii) expletives appear freely in these constructions;
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(iv) in colloquial Finnish passive verbs appear with the first plural
pronoun with an apparently nominative patient (me lo¨ydettiin
koti, ‘we-nom found-pass a home-nom’);
(v) both intransitives and transitives passivize freely (for a more
detailed investigation into these properties, see Holmberg & Nikanne,
1993, 2002, Nelson, 1998, Vainikka, 1989, 1992).
Some examples are given below.
(248) (sita¨)
there
rakentaa
builds-sg3
sillan
a-bridge-acc
kuukaudessa
month-sem
‘one builds bridge in a month.’
(249) (sita¨)
there
rakennettiin
build-pass-past
silta
bridge-nom
‘A bridge was built.’
(250) (sita¨)
there
lo¨ydettiin
found-pass-past
ha¨net
him-acc
‘He was found.’
These properties of Finnish passives and other impersonal constructions
are problematic for the standard GB theory to deal with, for obvious reasons,
leading some authors to parametrize the whole Case theory (Vainikka, 1989).
Given the current assumptions, however, there is no need to make such radi-
cal hypotheses. As Finnish is a pro-drop language, one explanation could be
to assume that the Agent of the construction is “impersonal” pro, optionally
visible as an expletive (iii)(Perlmutter, 2001, made a similar proposal con-
cerning impersonal constructions in Russian; this paper is unavailable to me,
but is cited in Bowers, 2002).
(251) (sita¨)
there
rakennetaan
builds-pass
siltoja
bridges-acc0
‘Bridges are built.’
VP
v*
sita¨
V
′
siltoja V0
℘ rakentaa
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Current rules do not, in fact, predict agreement between the patient NP
and the verb (i). Then, if there is an expletive (covert or overt) in Finnish,
the curious property (ii, iv) could be explained in terms of why pronouns
take the accusative Case while nominals take the nominative Case: this may
be how the zero accusative ACC0 (<a, v*>) is realized in Finnish, as shown
in (252).
(252) VP
v*
sita¨
V
′
siltoja
ACC0
V0
℘ rakentaa
If this were the case, then we might expect to find corroborating evidence
from other areas of linguistic phenomena. Before discussing the supporting
evidence further, I will briefly consider the basics of the Finnish system of
structural and inherent Case (Holmberg & Nikanne, 1993, Nelson, 1998).
According to morphological criteria, the direct object is marked either in
the genitive Case (-n) or by the partitive Case (-a), the latter implying that
the object is indefinite, or that the action toward the patient has not finished.
When the object is plural and not partitive, or when it is a pronoun and not
partitive, the suffix becomes -t instead of -n. Hence it is not appropriate
to say that the accusative Case is a genitive Case tout court, for there is a
separate genitive Case for plurals. Both objects satisfy the syntactic criteria
of direct object e.g., by undergoing a shift of grammatical role in rising con-
structions. Thus, we may say that the structural accusative Case is realized
by the endings -n and -t, with the partitive Case optionally added with its se-
mantic import, while there exists a separate genitive case in Finnish, which is
not accusative. The true genitive Case and the accusative Case appear to be
homophones in the singular, presumably due to the diachronic process that
has transformed the older accusative ending -m into -n. Finally, it has been
argued that in some constructions, Finnish accusative objects are realized
morphologically as nominatives.
Keeping these basic facts in mind, let us turn to the evidence for the
covert expletive in Finnish impersonal passives. First, consider the surprising
fact that Finnish rising predicates (such as seem, na¨ytta¨a¨) have their own
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impersonal forms. This curious fact is illustrated in (253).
(253) talot
houses-nom
na¨ytettiin(/na¨yttiin)
seem-pass
rakennetun
build-pass
‘Houses seem to have been built.’
This means that, if normal rising predicates have vacuous argument v as
their subject, forms such as (253) must contain some additional structure.
The hypothesis that v is replaced with strong v* in such a construction pro-
vides just the right kind of explanation: it turns the rising predicate (na¨ytta¨a¨)
into the impersonal passive form (na¨ytettiin, na¨yttiin). Thus, the LLF struc-
ture of these constructions could be as follows:
(254) TP
T VP
℘ VP
v* V
′
XP V0
℘ seem
Another interesting property of Finnish impersonal passives is the fact
that when the sentence is negated, the Patient takes the partitive case. This
property is typical of structural objects in all clauses. Thus, negation does
not allow the partitive Case in raising construction (255), meaning that the
partitive Case is controlled, at least in part, by structural and not thematic
properties. Example (256) is a finite declarative negative clause with a par-
titive object:
(255) Pekka
Pekka-nom
ei
not-sg3
na¨ytta¨nyt
looked
kuolleelta
dead
‘Pekka did not appear dead.’
(256) Pekka
Pekka
ei
not-sg3
na¨hnyt
saw
Merjaa
Merja-prt
‘Pekka did not see Merja.’
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Now, as mentioned above, the patient takes partitive Case in negative
impersonal passives:
(257) Pekkaa
Pekka-prt
ei
not-sg3
lo¨ydetty
found-pass
‘Pekka was not found.’
This means that, from a structural point of view, Pekka is a direct object
in (257), not its subject. If this is so, what is its structural subject? The
present theory, which proposes that Finnish impersonal passives are expletive
structures with covert expletives, provides an answer: the subject position
is occupied by the covert expletive. This explains why the visible argument
Pekka behaves as if it were an object, in this case in the zero accusative Case
ACC0. Pronouns behave similarly, appearing in the accusative Case (ACC0),
as shown in (258).
(258) VP
v*
sita¨
V
′
ha¨net
ACC
V0
℘ lo¨ydettiin
Finnish impersonal passives, like many other constructions, allow the sub-
ject to appear either pre- or post-verbally:
(259) talo
house-nom
rakennettiin
build-pass-past
‘The house was built.’
(260) rakennettiin
build-pass-past
talo
house-nom
‘The house was built.’
As observed by e.g. Burzio (1986), for example, this property is typical
of pro-drop languages more generally. The following example illustrates the
shifting of the position of the subject in Italian:
(261) molti
many
studenti
students
arriveranno
arrived
‘Many students arrived.’
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(262) arriveranno
arrived
molti
many
studenti
students
‘Many students arrived.’
The similarities between pro-drop languages in general support the fact
that Finnish impersonal passives are there expletives with a covert (dropped)
subject. For instance, in English there constructions the verb agrees with the
patient. This is not so in Finnish, in which verbs do not agree with the patient
- a fact that could be used against the above analysis. Yet, as Burzio (1986,
§2) pointed out, this difference could be traced to the pro-drop parameter
as Italian allows similar expletive constructions without agreement. What
is perhaps more relevant, in Italian the verb could optionally agree with
the impersonal si (‘one’). Thus, it might be the case that, in the Finnish
impersonal passive, as in Italian, the verb agrees with the covert expletive
(or a standard impersonal agreement appears), not with the patient. Even
English has similar cases, although only marginally acceptable (there’s many
people).
Another test of this proposal concerns ECM structures. Recall that, in
these cases, the subject (Agent) of the embedded clause behaves as if it were
the object of the matrix verb:
(263) we saw him die
How do Finnish impersonal passives behave when they occur in these
constructions? The data indicates that the impersonal passive verb induces
the ECM phenomenon, but does not allow the subject of the embedded clause
to shift its grammatical properties:
(264) laivojen
ships-gen
luultiin
thought-pass
la¨hteva¨n
leave
‘The ships were thought to have left.’
The reason why the subject of the embedded clause takes the genitive (ac-
cusative) Case follows from the fact that it originates in the subject position
of the embedded sentence and thus has feature vector <a, a> (ACC) instead
of <a, v*> (ACC0). It does not, and cannot, occupy the subject position
of the matrix verb because, if these arguments are close to the truth, that
position is again occupied by the covert expletive.3
3One could argue against the present hypothesis by questioning the idea that the gen-
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(265) VP
v*
sita¨
V
′
TdefP
laivojen la¨hteva¨n
V0
℘ luultiin
If, in contrast, the matrix verb is a rising predicate, the argument occupies
the subject position and induces subject-verb agreement to the matrix verb:
(266) laiva
ship-nom
na¨ytta¨a¨
seems-sg3
la¨hteva¨n
leave
‘The ship seems to be leaving.’
VP
laiva-φ
NOM
V
′
TdefP
. . . la¨hteva¨n
V0
℘ na¨ytta¨a¨-φ
These facts thus support the hypothesis that Finnish impersonal con-
structions involve a covert expletive subject. The previous example (264),
repeated here as (267), is also interesting from the perspective of the Finnish
case system.
(267) laivojen
ships-gen
luultiin
thought-past-past
la¨hteva¨n
leave
‘The ships were thought to leaving.’
Here, the subject of the embedded sentence appears in the genitive Case
which, as argued previously, is the characteristic realization of an accusative
itive argument represents the real ECM phenomenon, and thus the standard structural
accusative Case. Vainikka (1989, 1992), for instance, takes the genitive subject to be a
Case assigned by the head verb to its [spec, VP] position, taking the complement clause
to be a VP (for a conflicting view, see Maling, 1993).
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Case in Finnish. This is in line with the hypothesis that (267) is, basically,
an ECM construction. Nevertheless, the genitive NP is in the plural and,
surprisingly, appears in genitive plural. This is untypical of accusatives in
Finnish which, in more typical declarative clauses, do not appear in the
genitive plural. Hence I used the more conservative ending GEN rather than
ACC.
Finnish contains other types of construction that seem to involve covert
expletives which, if this analysis can be maintained, further supports the
present proposal. Consider the following pair of sentences:
(268) ihmiset
people-nom
juoksevat
run-pl1
kadulla
streets
‘People run on the streets.’
(269) ihmisia¨
people-prt
juoksee
run-sg3
kadulla
streets
‘People run on the streets.’
The former sentence is a typical declarative finite clause, having nomina-
tive subject and subject-verb agreement. The latter is not typical, however:
the“subject”appears in the partitive Case, whereas the verb is no longer thus
inflected. Note that the verb in Finnish impersonal passives does not agree
with the patient, much as in the above cases: we could say that it agrees with
the covert expletive or with a null argument of some sort. This corroborates
the above examples if it is assumed that the latter sentence also involves a
covert expletive of some kind, much like the impersonal passive. A proper
gloss into English would thus be there run people on the street. Furthermore,
if the “subject” of these constructions is singular, then it takes the genitive
and hence the accusative Case. I conclude that, as with impersonal passives,
the nominative in these sentences is actually the direct object, the subject
being a covert expletive or a null argument of some sort.
A somewhat more complex, but also quite telling, pair of examples is
given in the following:
(270) vihollisen
enemy-gen
ta¨ytyy
must
voittaa
win
‘The enemy must win.’
(271) vihollinen
enemy-nom
ta¨ytyy
must
voittaa
win
‘One must conquer the enemy.’
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The sentences are identical, apart from the different Case of the word
vihollinen (‘enemy’). The surprising fact is that in sentence (271), the word
vihollinen (‘enemy’) is the structural object of the sentence by all tests of
objecthood (e.g., partitive Case tests). It is clearly not the object of ta¨ytyy
(‘must’),however, amd this sentence could therefore be an ECM construction
in which the nominal vihollinen (‘enemy’) has been restructured. Let us as-
sume so: in that case, the enemy is the structural subject of the predicate
win, whereas the object of must is the whole proposition ‘the enemy wins,’
and the enemy takes the accusative Case from its structural position in the
combination of two propositions:
(272) [ must [ the enemy-acc win ] ] (ECM)
VP
Subj V
′
TdefP
the enemy win
V0
℘ must
Here I assume that the modal operator ta¨ytyy (‘must’) is not located in
a T node, but that it occupies a verbal position and takes a clausal comple-
ment. If we assume the above analysis for now, what is the subject of must?
Again, we might speculate that there is a covert null subject, an expletive,
of some kind. This would explain the fact that the predicate must - which,
if this analysis is correct, is semantically a modal sentence operator - does
not agree with the enemy, but it does still inflect for tense. This analysis is
supported by (271). Here, there is clearly a covert subject somewhere, since
the sentence means that some unspecified person must conquer the enemy,
hence the enemy/enemy is not the thematic or structural subject of con-
quer/conquer, but its thematic and structural object: it is the enemy who
one must conquer. Where is the unspecified subject in the structure? Clearly,
it is the agent of conquer who is supposed to conquer the enemy. Suppose
there is, again, a null argument of some kind, presumably a covert version of
there. This then explains at once why the enemy appears in the nominative
Case, since it would be the zero accusative object of win:
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(273) [ must [ one/there conquer the enemy-acc0 ] ]
VP
. . . V
′
TP
Tdef VP
v V
′
enemy-ACC0 V0
℘ conquer
V0
℘ must
Again, if the object of win is a pronoun, it appears in the accusative Case,
exactly as predicted were it a zero accusative.
I have engaged in a rather somewhat detailed discussion of Finnish im-
personal passives in order to show that their curious properties could be ex-
plained within the present framework by assuming that they involve covert
expletives. This section was not intended as an extensive study of Finnish im-
personal passives, however, merely as a review aimed at demonstrating how
the present assumptions work in the case of concrete and often compelling
data, often making it look less complex. For other and often conflicting anal-
yses, but with a somewhat different theoretical background, see Holmberg &
Nikanne (1993), Nelson (1998) and Vainikka (1989, 1999), among others.
According to the EPP principle, a finite clause must have a subject,
whereby “subject” means a constituent that agrees with the verb and takes
the nominative Case. In the present theory, EPP holds, expect for construc-
tions with quirky case subjects. Finnish impersonal constructions provide an
apparent counterexample to this generalization, and this now follows from
the above assumptions as well. If it is true that impersonal constructions
involve a covert expletive, then the EPP principle can be maintained here as
well.
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These assumptions concerning expletives as a whole can be further tested
by investigating their relations with empty elements and the theory of bind-
ing. This is discussed in section 6.5.
Allow me to summarize my observations so far. I have explored the fol-
lowing possibilities of inserting a vacuous argument into an A-position at the
LLF level with the following options:
type of vacuous argument deletion by [51] Result
v v personal passive
v patient it construction
v* - there construction
The key properties of the expletives seem to emerge from these simple
assumptions, together with the rules of syntactic linking described previously,
although of course a much more detailed survey is needed than is possible in
a single presentation.4
Consider the status of the Case Filter in the GB theory. One problem
with the GB theory has been to explain the existence of the Case Filter itself:
why do all overt nominals have to take a Case? As such, it appears rather
odd and unprincipled, although a powerful requirement. One explanation
concentrates on unifying the Case Filter with the θ-theory in terms of the
Visibility Hypothesis, requiring that in order to be visible for θ-theory at the
LF level an argument in the A-position, or an element of its chain in the
A-position, must take a Case.
From the LLF perspective and that of the theory of linking, the Visibility
Condition seems close to the truth. Here, Case is associated with proper-
ties of feature vectors that, together with certain exceptions that emerge
automatically, encode structurally encoded thematic information at the LLF
level. We could say that feature vectors thus represent semantic information,
but in a ‘defective’ way.
However, expletives pose problems for the Visibility Hypothesis. They
appear in a position to which the nominative Case is assigned, but they a
4If expletives are vacuous arguments with slightly different syntactic properties, then
this means that, if I may use more traditional vocabulary, expletives are base-generated in-
side VPs (Dikken, 1995, Groat, 1999). They are external subjects, albeit without semantic
content.
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lack θ-role. In the present proposal, the Case Filter is explained in terms of
[51], which requires that each argument inside an FP must have a unique Case
(unique L-vector). Note that this is very close to the Visibility Hypothesis,
since each FP position is an A-position, with a thematic role. There is
therefore a close connection between thematic roles and Case (but not one-
to-one, given ECM). The same problem arises again here, although in a
somewhat different form: the expletive there appears as an argument at
the lexico-logical form, hence it is predicted to have a thematic role, which
it clearly does not have. Furthermore, the explanation requires that non-
aspectual predicates (which do not even passivize) could nevertheless have
a vacuous there with agreement features. Does the dummy expletive v have
thematic content or not?
The correct hypothesis seems to be that we must distinguish the exis-
tence of an aspectual thematic role from the existence of the corresponding
structural position at the LLF level. Thus, in *Erebus arrives three men,
Erebus is left without semantic interpretation, it has no role in the event,
although it may exist as a formal element at the lexico-logical form. No such
expression is ever generated, however, since there is no coherent meaning
to be projected. The only expression that makes sense in this position is
the semantically dummy expletive there (a vacuous argument visible to fea-
ture vectors). This is why non-aspectual predicates must allow two or more
structural properties, but prevent their aspectual interpretation.
According to my hypothesis, expletives (vacuous arguments) are base-
generated inside VPs, although I am forced to admit non-thematic positions
inside VPs as well. There is some empirical evidence to support this posi-
tion: there expletives possess strikingly similar properties to those of vacuous
arguments of passives that, on the standard account, appear as empty posi-
tions inside VPs. I have also shown that many of their essential properties
follow of the basis on these assumptions. Furthermore, although expletives
in English lack thematic content, Finnish impersonal constructions, arguably
instances of null expletives, seem to possess some thematic properties, break-
ing the absolute connection between expletives and thematic roles. Perhaps
VPs do contain non-thematic arguments other than thne vacuous arguments
of passives, (Dikken, 1995, Groat, 1999). Furthermore, there is no conceptual
problem in assuming that expletives can “raise,” in this case out of the VP
to adjoin T
′
. Rising, whether in terms of restructuring or Move/Agree, is a
potential operation for the expletive.
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6.4 Morphology: derivational and inflectional
The morphological component has so far played an important albeit implicit
role. Several major and also to a certain extent controversial assumptions
concerning the operation of this component have been made, including the
fact that it is the task of Morphology to convert red into redden when the
former lexical element, representing ‘redness,’ appears in a suitable proposi-
tional frame at the LLF level. Some features that are taken to be part of
syntax are thus moved to Morphology. This was one principal reason for
rejecting the decompositional hypothesis, which assumes that the lexical el-
ement redden contains the semantic feature CAUSE. As mentioned at the
beginning of this study, one way of developing the atomistic hypothesis is to
move some of the explanatory burden into Morphology.
On balance, the present proposal maintains many features of the more
traditional minimalist assumptions concerning the morphological component,
among them the assumption that morphology operates after syntax by con-
verting morphosyntactic features into something interpretable at the PF
level.
Some thirty years ago, the generative semanticist advocated a trans-
formational theory of the lexicon, the main idea of which was to capture
the (derivational) regularities, both morphological and semantic, in syntactic
terms. More specifically, new lexical items, when they were regularily related
to their root forms, were produced by transformational means. Causatives
were one paradigmatic example of this explanatory strategy. The key point
was that the formation of regularly connected lexical elements was syntac-
tic (and semantic). vP shell analysis has, to some extent, resurrected these
ideas. Much the same is true of the present hypothesis, although the details
differ.
The Lexicalist Hypothesis (see Chomsky, 1970, Jackendoff, 1975), in con-
trast, holds that these lexical regularties, or most of them, are not to be
explained syntactically (that is, by using the syntactic engines available at
the time), but should be explained ‘at the lexical level.’ Jackendoff, for in-
stance, proposed that they could be captured by lexical redundancy rules,
which were supposed to relate otherwise full lexical entries to each other, and
in doing so also to predict what would be possible words in natural language.
These lexical entries were inserted into the syntactic tree as such.
I have argued that there are two sources of irregularity at the lexical level:
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first, the morphological component is relatively autonomous and is situated
post-syntactically. It uses whatever information is provided as its input,
and its own available resources, and produces an output when such exists.
This, of course, is not a morphological theory: it is only a statement of the
basic architecture following the proposal given in Halle & Keyser (1993), for
example. The second source of irregularity is C-I, which can give, in addition
to a truth-condition literal interpretation, various contextual features to any
of the lexical elements that appear at the LLF interface.
Within this framework, “lexical redundancy rules” do not constitute a
single natural class, they dissolve into several components - hence the name
“distributed morphology” would be appropriate here as well. One part is
syntactic and is constituted of the local feature vectors. The morphologi-
cal component then uses this information and produces an output, following
whatever principles it contains such that they can be realized phonologically.
In some cases, no form is generated. More concretely, many morphological
gaps are argued to result from these principles (or properties) of the morpho-
logical component, and not, specifically, from the putative lexical semantic
features. This assumption is not explanatory, and what is worse, it is em-
pirically empty, but I suspect that a great deal of such restrictions are really
empty in that they are not explainable by applying general principles in
the first place. The rest should be explained by relying upon autonomous
morphology, perhaps conditioned by obscure pragmatic facts. On the other
hand, the proposal also allows for idiomatic semantic information, especially
concerning the proper use of words, since the operation of C-I is also partly
independent of the mechanisms of CHL. There is thus no one-to-one mapping
between morphology and meaning: such a transparent relation occurs on the
more abstract level (LLF), being abstracted from both complete semantic
and complete morphological / phonological interpretation.
In this section I will make these morphological assumptions more explicit,
and compare them to the more standard assumptions of minimalist theory,
exploring the consequences and detecting potential problems. To begin with,
consider (274):
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(274) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
bed V0
℘ sleep
This LLF produces an ungrammatical sentence due to the fact that the
main predicate sleep is “intransitive”:
(275) a. * Erebus sleeps the bed
b. * Erebus sleepize the bed
c. * Erebus sleepize Charon to the bed
According to the present hypothesis, there is a gap in the morphological
component of English - in particular, there are no gaps in semantics (LLF) or
syntax (d-structure), and no variation in the principles of the UG. Sentence
(275a) is semantically understandable, on a par with Erebus opens the bottle:
there is nothing logically or semantically wrong in thinking that sleeping
would take the bed as its direct object, since there are surely many ways in
which sleeping ‘affects’ the bed, as opening a bottle affects the bottle.
To cite another example, the verb to bleed is ungrammatical in its transi-
tive form in modern English (*Charon bled Erebus, but also the government
bleeds the taxpayer), but it was accepted in early English since ‘causing to
bleed’ was a standard medical practice in those days (for a similar and very
illuminating example, see Soto, §3.4). To borrow some terminology adopted
by Chomsky, the fact that sleep does not take the direct object reflects the
way in which language and its lexical items open ‘perspectives’ on the world
(cf. Chomsky, 1993a, 2000c). In Finnish, (275) would come out as (276).
(276) Erebus
Erebus-nom
nukutti
sleep-caus-sg3
sa¨ngyn
bed-acc
‘Erebus made the bed sleep.’
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This is a grammatical sentence, categorized as “morphological causative”
(§4.2). Thus, the morphological component is likely to follow, at least to
a considerable extent, pragmatic principles. I doubt if there are any meta-
physical, logical or semantic (truth-conditional) laws that could explain the
transitive and intransitive uses of predicates such as to bleed, and it seems
that when such principles are sought, they turn out to be increasingly prag-
matic in their nature, and hence part of the C-I system.
One especially illuminating example comes from Matses causative nom-
inals (Fleck, 2001). Matses is a very productive language in terms of its
causative morphology, and much like Finnish, it allows causatives to be nom-
inalized so that the nominals refer to the causer of the event. These nominals
can further be used as predicated when accompanied by a copula (a realiza-
tion of +V, I will discuss this matter presently). One morphological suffix
that codes these causative nominals is -anme¨s. This particular ending is not
very productive, however, and as summarized by Fleck, “What all nominal-
izations with -anme¨s seem to have in common seems to only be describable
in terms of a rather complex set of variables, with a definition of the specific
function of -anme¨s reading something like: ‘the referent of the nominalization
is one that non-volitionally, indirectly and often mysteriously causes helpless
victims to enter an undesirable, enduring state” (p. 406). Interestingly, he
also argues that, if we want to be able to use it correctly in explaining Mat-
ses causative morphology, this description must be understood against the
cultural background of native speaker/hearers and not against that of West-
ern civilization. Thus it makes sense to capture such restrictions in terms of
pragmatics, taking effect in Morphology.
There is also independent evidence to support the claim that notions such
as “intransitive” or “transitive” belong to Morphology, although here the ex-
act meanings of these terms become blurred due to the fact that predicates
or lexical elements at the LLF level are not identified on a morphological
basis. First, I have assumed, in accordance with the minimalist framework,
that variation among languages is to be explained by relying upon the mor-
phological component. Since there is much variation in the availability of
causative forms, it is to be expected that the differences between languages
are not attributable to the narrow syntax. Secondly, as remarked earlier,
when there are restrictions in the morphological component, children tend to
overgeneralize the rules of the UG and overcome such restrictions, learning
them only later. The present proposal also explains the well-known fact that
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most three-place verbs are causatives: they emerge automatically in the C-I
when aspectual arguments are added.
This strategy has consequences for the theory of subcategorization. Con-
sider again the predicate sleep. If the predicate appears with just one argu-
ment, the rules generate Erebus sleeps. If there are two arguments, it depends
upon the Morphology whether this component has a form for the predicate
sleep with two arguments. If it does not have the corresponding form, as in
English, nothing is generated. In some cases, Morphology does provide the
correct form, as in the case of mechanics - mechanize, large - enlarge, sink -
sink. This option is not available in English for sleep. In Finnish, in contrast,
this form is generated, and a grammatical sentence occurs. The difference
between these two languages is thus explained in terms of Morphology, keep-
ing the narrow syntax intact, as is assumed in the minimalist framework
presupposed in this study. Sentence (277) illustrates this difference:
(277) TP
T VP
℘ VP
Erebus V
′
bed V0
℘ sleep
English: *sleepize
Finnish: nukuttaa
This is not to say, however, that all derivational morphology can be ex-
plained along these lines: this claim would require a separate study, and
whatever the end result would be is currently very unclear. Nevertheless,
this strategy does provide some hope for keeping within the atomistic lexi-
con by moving some of the explanatory burden of morphosyntax from narrow
syntax and semantics into Morphology. This is a good strategy on indepen-
dent grounds as well, I believe, because of the uncertainty surrounding the
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identity and diagnostic properties of most putative semantic features (see
Fodor, 1998a, pp. 49-53, 57-64).
This explanation does not presuppose that Morphology produces a so-
called ‘morphological causative.’ In some cases the morphological form of
the word is not changed at all:
(278) a. the boat sank
b. Erebus sank the boat
These causatives are often called “labile.” Questions of this type also
belong to the theory of Morphology, given the proposal put forward in this
work. There is no presupposition here, either, that an increase in valency
always results in a causative, whether morphological or lexical. Some lan-
guages have specific forms, such as applicatives, which are associated with
an increase in the valency of a verb but restrict the individuation of any of
the new arguments to applicatives or instruments, for example - a hallmark
of the specific d-marking of such arguments. I will not attempt to review
and discuss these operations here.
Consider, again, the status of the so-called Strict Lexicalist Hypothesis,
part of the more standard minimalist framework. According to this hypothe-
sis, morphological and formal features are part of a narrow syntax, since they
are brought into the derivational procedure at Numeration. CHL is then obli-
gated to erase them, since otherwise the resulting syntactic object would not
satisfy the condition of Full Interpretation. In the present theory, the only
formal features that are part of the narrow syntax are lexical elements and
their relational properties, feature vectors. The difference is that relational
properties at the LLF level are semantically interpretable: hence the prob-
lem of ‘uninterpretable formal features’ does not arise, and we could claim
to be one step nearer the strong minimalist hypothesis. The morphological
component implements these features by altering the word forms, hence it
is quite correct to say that they belong to the separate study of morphosyn-
tax, not to narrow syntax: there is a fairly sharp difference. From a more
functional perspective, the purpose of these morphosyntactic features is to
code meaning and meaning-related properties of thought into expressions,
and thus enhance communication, so that the principle of Full Identification
is satisfied:
(Principle of Full Identification, PFI.) Every syntactic formative
of a sentence must have a corresponding element in the seman-
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tic representation. Every formative of a semantic representation
must be identified by a morphosyntactic element in the sentence
with which that representation is associated. (Bouchard, 1995,
pp. 93-4.)
The present theory approximates this principle quite closely, and is clearly
construed in the same spirit.
My proposal could also be fruitfully compared to the older minimalist
theory, as proposed in Chomsky (1995, §2). According to the first version of
this minimalist theory, “first version” referring to the above-mentioned paper,
inflectional and some of the derivational morphology (agreement, structural
Case) are explained by moving elements to appropriate [Spec, Agr] positions
which, because the V and T heads could incorporate them, are called Agr
complexes. According to this theory the Agr elements (both AgrO and AgrS)
are stacked over the VP, which contains the thematic argument structures
of the head V. Roughly, the clause is divided into one part recording the
thematic argument structures (VP) and another part recording the formal
features.
In his subsequent work, Chomsky (1996, pp. 194-197) argued that the
stack of formal heads was redundant, the formal features being assumed to
originate from the lexical elements themselves. Thus, this stack collapses and
becomes part of the lexicon (thoroughly so in Chomsky, 1995, §4). What was
previously explained in terms of the extra VP heads was now explained by
the double-Spec -hypothesis, for instance, and the idea that lexical heads
must check and erase their formal features in the process of the derivation
of linguistic expressions. Both solutions are suspicious in terms of the strong
minimalist hypothesis, however, for they involve formal features that are
non-optimal.
In my work, I have returned somewhat to the framework of the earlier
theory, moving formal features out of the lexicon back to the structure, but
this time the structure that takes the burden of generating formal features
is semantically interpretable (Full Interpretation). The relevant structure is
encoded in terms of feature vectors, which mirrors the LLF structure.
Let us now widen the perspective and consider the phenomenon of agree-
ment, returning to causatives later on. Since the appearance of Syntactic
Structures, a transformational vehicle was used to explain agreement (both
inflectional and derivational). In the first version of the theory, agreement
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was implemented by its own inflectional node, whereas in more recent ver-
sions, I is split into tense and AGR, which take on their own heads and
project. Following this trend, AGR was split into AgrS and AgrO. As ex-
plained earlier, the minimalist theory continued this tradition by proposing
that agreement is implemented by Agree, which is a more static local relation
between two syntactic elements.
I have suggested and argued that formal features supervene upon the
relational properties of the constituents at the LLF level, thus they supervene
upon their feature vectors. So far, this has involved formal features such as
categorial features and Case. I now conjecture that this is how inflectional
morphology, and a least a substantial part of derivational morphology, ought
to be explained. This seems to be the null hypothesis. If this is correct,
then Agree is a relation between a lexical item and elements appearing in its
feature vector. These elements do not rise, and the elements in the feature
vectors do not fall (affix hopping), but something like a minimalist ‘feature
match,’ or more appropriately ‘feature percolation,’ appears. There is no
head movement for the purposes of inflection, but inflection is driven by
morphophonological requirements (e.g., Bobaljik, 2002, among others).
According to these assumptions, Morphology is an independent compo-
nent: its input is a lexical element (index) of its feature vector, for which it
targets a representation implementable at the PF level. For example, English
plurals, third-person-singular verbs and possessives are realized by the same
morphological or morphophonological element. This fact is not related in any
way to narrow syntax: on the contrary, Morphology uses whatever resources
it can (Aronoff, 1994).
Consider the feature vector of the predicate, containing the symbol ‘a.’
What is it? It cannot be the whole constituent, since that may be of arbitrary
complexity imposing too much parsing power on Morphology. Let us follow
the hypothesis presented above and call them “agreement features,” includ-
ing φ-features such as [+person][+gender][+number] and others, which are
derived from the elements themselves and thus are “interpretable” by them.
Then we could take‘a’ to be shorthand for agreement rather than“argument,”
replacing AgrS, AgrO and even AgrIO. I would further stipulate that some
agreement features are [+strong], meaning that they must be overt at the
PF level. Tense and aspect, residing in T, are typically strong. In that case,
the feature vector of an element also contains among its properties related
to Case and category also information concerning agreement.
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Morphology is thus sensitive to different formal features of ‘a,’ that is, φ-
features [person], [gender] or [number]. The asymmetry in interpretability of
these features arises automatically, since the features themselves originate in
the A-positions where they are interpretable, but they appear in the feature
vector of the predicate that bears no content relation to them.
The whole feature vector is clearly too wide a notion to capture a lo-
cal relation such as agreement. This was assumed in the case of categorial
and Case-features, which supervene upon L-vectors. As far as agreement is
concerned, let us define the notion of “ψ set” and use it as a constraint on
(inflectional) Morphology:
(279) A ψ set of a lexical element at the LLF level consists of all symbols
inside two full projections: morphology is sensitive to the ψ set of a
lexical element.
According to [279], no language should
(i) have an inflectional dependency between constituents whose
distance is blocked by the juncture of two full projections; tense/aspect
can only inflect its own predicate; tense/aspect never inflects any
of its arguments; inflections never cross complementizers; there is
no inflection from tense/aspect of the infinite complement;
(ii) no inflectional relation from predicate to its arguments can
exist, only vice versa;
(iii) the subject can inflect objects and predicates, but objects
cannot inflect subjects;
(iv) inflecting elements must c-command inflected elements in
their lexico-logical form.
To the best of my knowledge, these are correct. A strong feature must
appear in the ψ set of an element that can take the required inflections.
If no such element is found, then we may assume that a suitable dummy
grammatical participle is created as a “last resort” (e.g. Bouchard, 1995,
§5.3.1). Consider a sentence such as this is a book. Since [tense] is strong
and book does not inflect for tense (as a morphological property), a dummy
grammatical participle, a copula, is created. However, book cannot inflect
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for +V. This, again, requires a dummy participle that can realize the feature
+V. Thus, consider a representation in which ‘[this [℘ book]]’ appears as an
embedded proposition. In that case, there is no need to implement matrix
T, since T is not in the ψ set of the predicate book : note the two FP labels
between the book and T. Nevertheless, book must still realize the feature +V,
since its feature vector is <℘, a>. A copula is thus created, as expected,
without tense (a), but not if the predicate can realize feature +V (b):
(280) a. I want this to be a book
b. I want this to run
Consider the following sentence and its LLF representation:
(281) Erebus wants [ James to find Charon ]
The predicate find of the embedded proposition is in a predicate position,
yet [tense] is not in its ψ set due to the two intervening FP projections:
(282) TP
T
tense
VP
℘ FP2
Erebus V
′
FP1
James to find Charon
V0
℘ want
So far, I have assumed (implicitly) that this situation creates an “infinite
verb.” According to this explanation, infinite verbs are those surface forms
of tense -inflecting predicates (verbs) that lack tense. We thus derive the
following:
(283) a. Erebus wants James to find Charon
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b. James wants fish raw
The reason why raw and to find do not inflect for tense follows from [279]
and the associated notion of ψ set: tense is separated from them by two
junctures of full projection. In the case of to find, the predicate itself could
inflect for tense, while in the case of raw it could not. When these predicates
are moved to a position in which they cannot escape inflection due to [279],
the difference becomes visible, as shown below:
(284) a. Erebus loves Charon
b. the fish is raw
In (b), the copula is created as a “last resort,” since adjectives in English
do not inflect for tense.
Consider next the category [+aspect], resident as a feature at T. There are
agreement features as [+progressive], among other possibilities. This feature
turns a predicate in English into its gerund form. However, the gerund does
not inflect for tense, person or number. This, again, creates contradictory
requirements so that a dummy grammatical participle, a copula, appears,
and this inflects for tense, number and person, as follows:
(285) Charon is running
Charon-nom is-pres-sg3 running-prog
Suppose that the predicate does not inflect for [+progressive]. This is
characteristic of adjectives (and of infinite verbs). Then I predict that the
copula ought to appear and take these inflections - hence [be+ing nasty].
Being nasty does not inflect for tense, person or number, and neither does
the gerund or the adjective (in English) if there is tense, the conditions force
a new grammatical participle, a copula, to take these inflections. The result
is shown in (286).
(286) Erebus is being nasty
Erebus-nom is-pres-sg3 being-prog nasty
If this construction appears in the A-position in its lexico-logical form,
then according to [279], there is no inflection of tense or aspect. The leftmost
copula should be missing: Erebus’s being nasty bothers me, *Erebus’s is being
nasty bothers me. The generalization is that if the verb form does not inflect
for T in a LLF with T, a functional word is needed:
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(287) a. * Erebus own a house
b. * Erebus owning a house
Now suppose that tense = [+perfect]. This is associated with two mor-
phological effects: first, the VP inflects for [+perfect] when possible (ran,
been running), and second, there is a separate and independent perfect aux-
iliary, have, potentially inflecting for number and person. Let us assume that
this auxiliary is a dummy grammatical participle, created at some point after
the lexico-logical form. The following surface forms can be derived:
(288) a. Charon has-perf-sg3 run-pref
b. Charon has-pref-sg3 been-perf running-prog
c. Charon might-sg3 have-perf been-perf running-prog
d. James imagined [ Charon to have-perf been-perf running-prog]
In (d), the embedded infinite have does not inflect for person or number
since the subject has been restructured (Charon seems to have been running,
they seem to have been running).
I have been assuming here that strong features are inflected, or “hopped,”
to borrow the terminology of Syntactic Structures, in a specific order: first
progressive, then perfective, then tense, number, person and gender. It is
generally known that the order matters. Tense and various forms of aspect
are independent of each other, so that I take them to consist of indepen-
dent features or operators, stacked above the proposition. For instance, bare
infinitivals are generally assumed to be tenseless (a), yet, according to one
hypothesis (Felser, 1999, §2.6), they do have progressive forms (b):
(289) a. Erebus saw Charon leave
b. Erebus saw Charon leaving
The fact that bare infinitivals do not inflect for the perfect or tense pro-
vides further support for the ordering of the V features (tense/aspect), so that
we can readily classify them as clausal complements lacking [+perfect] and
[+tense], headed by an aspectual element containing [+progressive](Felser,
1999, §3.4), and presumably residing in the defective T (ibid., §3.6). Note
that a radically different LLF structure emerges if by d-marking the comple-
ment clause is given a non-aspectual reading:
(290) a. Erebus saw Charon leaving
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b. Erebus saw Charon’s leaving
Furthermore, it is assumed here that all strong features must be inflected.
This, together with the assumption that all affixes are strong inflected fea-
tures, entails that there cannot exist ‘stranded affixes’.
The present proposal maintains the original minimalist hypothesis that
agreement is explained by implementing a local, static relation Agree, in this
case between an element at the LLF level and the properties of its feature
vector. What is different in my proposal, however, is that auxiliaries (dummy
participles) are not part of the narrow syntax, but emerge as late as at Mor-
phology. Hence they are not syntactic heads, nor do they have projections.
In fact, they do not exist at the LLF level but emerge for the purpose of
inflection. I thus predict that they are closely attached to their host element
(i.e., to the element the inflectional features of which they implement), or to
another position in a sentence readable at this stage of derivation (such as at
the end of the sentence), forming a highly integrated or ‘fused whole’ with
their hosts.
For instance, I have suggested that the argument structures of Romance
faire causatives behave as if they correspond to a single predicate at the
lexico-logical form, given the fact that there are some well-known compli-
cations concerning the distribution of certain grammatical participles: for
example, the verbal complex faire + V seems to consist of two fused verbs.
However, this can be explained if we assume that faire is a particle created
as a ‘last resort,’ comparable to auxiliaries.
Grammatical particles like copulae are created when a constituent itself
cannot inflect for a strong feature. In faire + V causatives, it is the causative
particle faire which, like other grammatical extensions, inflects for tense,
number and gender. The predicate itself appears in an infinite form, which
is some kind of verbal form not inflected for tense. Thus we may speculate
whether, for some reason, the predicate inflects for a strong feature, say
increased adicity at the lexico-logical form, and the morphological component
assumes a grammatical participle, in this case faire, in order to realise the
required strong inflections. It is this participle that inflects for tense as well.
This hypothesis, with its relevant visible structure, is illustrated below:
(291) a. on a [ ( fait sortir ) Jean de sa chamber ]
b. elle a [ fait ( faire sauter ) le point a` son fils ]
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The verb has undergone an “extension” in terms of the grammatical par-
ticiple faire that ought to take all inflections: it is then not present at the
LLF level. Indeed, this is just the case. In example (b), this process has been
applied twice: the sentence means ‘She had her son make the bridge blow
up.’ If this hypothesis is correct, then the faire participle is to be categorized
as an ‘auxiliary verb,’ comparable to grammatical participles such as perfec-
tive auxiliary have (see Aissen, 1974b, 1979, §6.2). Note, however, that the
faire participle is not a syntactic head, nor does it have its own projection
at the LLF level - indeed, there is no such constituent at LLF. It is expected
that the infinitive verb and the faire participle form a highly integrated or
‘fused constituent’ in syntactic terms. This is indeed what happens in the
case of Romance faire causatives (§4.4). How integrated the hosts and their
auxiliaries are depends on Morphology: they are not totally integrated since
some elements can intervene.
In order to test this hypothesis further, we would need a more accurate
theory stipulating which linguistic phenomena are to be explained by relying
upon LLF properties, and which emerge as a consequence of the syntactic
derivation/interpretation of the expressions. There are, nevertheless, several
phenomena that certainly belong to the LLF domain and which can be used
as a diagnostic test for the present hypothesis.
One such phenomenon is the formation of interrogatives, which involves
the replacing of an element at the A-position or predicate position with a
wh-element or a variable. The notion that dummy auxiliaries are not rep-
resented at the LLF level thus gains more support from the fact that they
cannot be replaced by wh-elements, or appear as answers to interrogatives.
Other evidence, more direct perhaps, concerns the fact that LLF is motivated
semantically, whereas most dummy auxiliaries are what their name implies,
that is, semantically ‘dummy.’ When they do appear to carry some meaning,
it does not seem to be intrinsic to these elementt’s themselves, but depends
on some other constituent in the LLF representation, such as aspect or tense.
Thirdly, on the descriptive level, auxiliaries really do seem to be motivated by
the process of inflection, since they gather around the predicate, not around
the arguments. Moreover, they are nearly always homonyms of verbs (e.g.,
be, have), the very lexical elements that can inflect for tense and aspect.
The order of morphological affixes tends to mirror the syntactic domi-
nance hierarchy, in this case encoded in terms of the feature vectors. In
this spirit, we could incorporate Baker’s Mirror Principle into the present
252
theory without invoking the notion of rising and adjunction. According to
Baker’s theory, hitherto adapted to many versions of the minimalist theory,
the difference is explained by relying on the properties of the transforma-
tional process, where the head verb (X0) rises to incorporate the functional
heads, picking up or checking/deleting the morphological affixes along the
way. The strongest form of such a theory would stipultae that morphology is
actually a strict mirror image of the syntactic hierarchy. This is what Baker
assumes. The guiding idea is the Mirror Principle:
(292) (Mirror Principle.) Morphological derivations must directly reflect
syntactic derivations.(Baker, 1985, 1988)
The Mirror Principle imposes a strict order on morphological inflection
(/derivation). In the present case, morphological affixes and their order are
linked directly with the ordering of agreement features in the ψ set of the
constituents: the order in the ψ-set happens to be a perfect mirror of the
syntactic dominance hierarchy. In other words, we could assume a strict
mirroring principle at the level of linking as well:
(293) (Mirror Principle*.) Morphological processes must directly reflect the
order of agreement features in the ψ sets (i.e., hierarchical structure
at the lexico-logical level).
It is also true that Baker’s Mirror Principle does not appear to hold in
its strictest form. Nothing forces strict hierarchical mirroring in the order of
inflectional affixes, although this hierarchical information is still present in
the feature vectors and, as we have seen, means that order is crucial.
Baker’s theory of syntactic head incorporation is motivated by a wealth of
data concerning Noun Incorporation, in which part of the phonological con-
tent of the noun (an argument) is attached to its verb (predicate), leaving be-
hind either an empty position, some phonological material, or a copy (Chom-
sky, 1995, p. 202-205). It appears that any of the predicate’s arguments can
be incorporated in this way, although considerable language-specific varia-
tion exists. Agglutinative languages use this technique by default. Although
I will not discuss this phenomenon here in detail, it does not present an obsta-
cle against excluding the transformational explanation of incorporation, nor
does it present a forceful case for transformational analysis. In the present
case the required relations (Agree) are already there, with much of the spirit
in place as well, namely, that this may indicate that being sensitive only to
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the φ-features of arguments is just a morphological option, not a requirement
- some languages use no features at all (Chinese) and some use richer ma-
terial (Agglutinative). This is in agreement with the minimalist thesis that
variation among languages is explained by relying upon Morphology.
I will now turn to how these assumptions concerning Morphology work
in connection with causatives, taking some aspects of Tarascan (a Mexican
Indian language) causative morphology as a detailed case under study (all of
the examples and analyses are from Maldonado & Nava, 2001, and all of the
page numbers refer to that paper). I chose this language because its causative
morphology is particularly rich, resembling that of Finnish, thus given the
present assumptions, the richer and more productive the morphology, the
more transparent the evidence it might bring to bear upon narrow syntax.
Tarascan has, first of all, several basic causative morphemes (I will omit
one here). The most basic one is -ku, which introduces an agentive partic-
ipant having “direct contact” with the patient. Hence it turns intransitives
and statives into transitives and actives. According to the present theory, -ku
encodes an increase in valency when the process is morphologically produc-
tive. Its resources are exploited when it is used once, following which other
suffixes take over (more on this below). Another causative morpheme is -ka,
which behaves, in this context, like -ku, except that it involves, “in the vast
majority of cases,” a “higher degree of causation entering thus the domain
of indirect causation,” such that “the causer’s initiation and the causee’s ac-
tivity and volition are more transparent” (p. 167). From a syntactic point
of view, -ku resembles -ka; thus it, too, encodes the increase in valency. Yet
we need some input to Morphology in order to decide which of the endings
is actually used. One criterion would be the lexical element itself, requiring
-ra in the case of some lexical elements, -ka in the case of others, the dis-
tinction being controlled by some pragmatic condition or other. In this case,
this does not suffice, since the same verb might take either ending. On the
other hand, both suffixes might simply be ambiguous between the two typical
readings, as indeed is often the case (p. 168). In that case, no additional
input to Morphology is needed, both readings being available. However, it
seems from the analysis given in Maldonado and Nava that, although the
ending -ta is ambiguous between more direct and more indirect readings, -ku
is not. Thus, the locus of the difference could be in the θ-theory and its overt
syntactic realization, which is consistent with the pragmatic differences cited
above: the role of the Agent and the Patient changes, in a typical case, in
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agreement with the change in suffix.
When -ra is applied to a transitive verb, an indirect causative construc-
tion emerges (pp. 168-169). A transitive verb already has two arguments,
and when the third is introduced, a genuine indirect causative results, ac-
cording to the present theory. Much the same is true of ditransitive verbs (p.
169). Thus, -ra encodes the increase of valency up to four arguments. The
productivity of Tarascan causatives does not end here, however. When the
resources provided by -ra or -ku are exhausted, the morphological component
uses the new specific ending -tara, again as a means of encoding increased
valency. From a theoretical point of view, this suffix is completely produc-
tive, allowing for double suffix forms such as -tara tara, although of course
such forms are rarely used.
Several comments on this scheme are in order. First, although morphol-
ogy encodes valency, there is no one-to-one mapping from the former to the
latter, since the addition of specific morphemes, and hence the number and
nature of these morphemes, depend on the level at which lexical causatives, or
lexical transitives, occur. What is expressed by the morphological causative
might well be lexicalized, and vice versa (e.g., let die - kill). The level of
lexicalization thus becomes an important notion in Morphology, a level from
which productive morphology begins to expand the resources of language in
coding valency. Thus, it makes a lot of sense in the present case to focus on
the pragmatic conditions involved in the process of lexicalization, setting up
the “lexical level” with respect to the valency of predicates.
Secondly, as Tarascan causative morphology is fairly rich, I take it to
represent a near “pure case” of the implementation of valency increase at
the LLF level. Thus, in other languages in which morphological resources
are more limited, these restrictions are to be coded into the morphological
component and whatever pragmatic or sui generis morphological or mor-
phophonological principles might be in operation. The reason for arriving
at this hypothesis is that I have followed the ideology of minimalist theory,
which attempts to locate variation among languages into the morphological
component rather than the narrow syntax. Such properties are apparently
easier to learn, although this does not mean that the morphological compo-
nent does not operate according to some universal principles and primitives,
such as the putative rule [279].
To summarize, I have assumed that the morphological resources of a lan-
guage, or languages, are highly constrained, and that much of the explanation
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constructed in terms of lexical semantic features could, and perhaps should,
be explained by relying upon these constraints. The constraints, in turn,
might reflect more pragmatic principles and properties, hence knowledge of
the world. Agreement was explained by reducing the relation of Agree to
relations between a constituent and elements in its feature vector.
6.5 Types of empty categories
I have encountered an argument purporting to show that certain binding
theoretical considerations favor the biclausal analysis of causatives. In some
cases, the causee in a causative construction was demonstrated to have ‘sub-
ject properties.’ Although I have argued that these subject properties could
be due to d-marking, it was left open as how to explain the curious binding
properties in connection with such structures. This requires a sketch of how
the theory of empty elements can be reformulated in terms of LLF. Such
a redefinition is provided in this section, together with a discussion of core
cases of data. However, this is not intended by any means to provide a com-
plete study of empty elements: it demonstrates how the basic data can be
explained by relying upon LLF properties and rules of linking. Moreover, I
will not go into great detail about the formulation of the ECP principle in
this context.
According to standard GB theory (Chomsky, 1981, 1982), NPs are of two
features, [+pronominal] and [+anaphor]. Their distribution was regulated
by the following binding conditions:
A. An anaphor is bound in a local domain
B. A pronominal is free in a local domain
C. An r-expression (-anaphor -pronominal) is free
An element α could bind element β just in the case in which α is in an
A-position, α c-commands β and α and β are coindexed. The notion of “local
domain” appearing in the binding conditions A-C can be defined in terms of
the governing category, as follows: α is a governing category for β if and
only if α is the minimal category (the smallest NP or IP) containing β, α is
the governor of β, and the SUBJECT is accessible to β. “SUBJECT” refers
to AGR, and it is “accessible” if their co-indexation (reference borrowing)
does not violate any grammatical principles. These constitute jointly what
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Chomsky (1986a) defined as the “complete functional complex.” Suppose
that there is a fourth class of NPs that are both pronominal and anaphoric.
This creates contradictory requirements, since such an element satisfies both
binding condition A and binding condition B, both being free and bound
in terms of governing category. However, such an element can appear in
positions in which it is not governed, and this characterisation seems to
apply to the empty pronominal PRO that, then, seems both anaphoric and
pronominal. Thus we can actually deduce the distribution of PRO.
Let us look these properties from the perspective of the present proposal.
According to linking rule [51], if two constituents have identical indices, then
only the other can be interpreted syntactically. Let us assume that this
is the c-commanding element. The surviving c-commanding index is called
an “antecedent” of the deleted one. In essence, this means that I will try to
resurrect the old idea of Equi transformation, which deletes nominal elements
under identity, thus all its problems are inherited here as well. Neverthelss,
I think it is, in part, the correct idea. The deleted category is called an
empty category (EC) or a gap. Then the following relations hold between
the antecedents and the corresponding gaps:
(i) a gap must have an antecedent at the lexico-logical form, oth-
erwise EC is not licensed at all;
(ii) the antecedent must c-command the gap at the lexico-logical
form.
This seems descriptively correct, so that the basic properties of empty
elements can be deduced from [51]. If this proposal is close to the truth, then,
as Zwart put it, “Anaphoricity is not a lexical property of certain expressions,
but a feature that arises in a certain syntactic context,” so that “anaphoricity
is a property acquired in the course of derivation, rather than a lexical feature
which is present from the outset” (Zwart, 2002, p. 274). My proposal differs
from Zwart’s, however, in that I do not assume that the anaphor must be
merged with its associate, and agrees with the more standard treatment in
that it resembles the copy/deletion theory of traces.
What happens when a synonymous element is deleted by this operation?
It seems that at least three mechanisms are in operation, depending upon
how close the antecedent is with respect to the empty category (binding
conditions A-C above). In other words, omitting traces, sometimes EC is
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PRO, sometimes a reflexive anaphor, and sometimes a pronoun. In other
words
(294) (1) The antecedent of a reflexive must be found inside the same full
projection (the same “complete functional complex” in terms of bind-
ing conditions A-B), (2) the antecedent of PRO must not be found
from the same full projection, not beyond two full projections, and it
must be dominated by a full projection (a node labelled FP), (3) a
pronoun otherwise.
Reflexives and pronouns are “pure φ-features,”meaning that the deletion
leaves the Agr labels and the φ-features intact. At this point, I regard these
conditions as merely stipulations without explanation, and return to the mat-
ter at the end of this section. I will first show how these rules work on the
descriptive level, beginning with the distribution of reflexives.
Consider (295).
(295) *Erebusi loves Erebusi
Here we should apply [51]; given that [294](1) is satisfied, Erebus must be
replaced with a reflexive, Erebus loves himself (reflexives are affixed to the
verb in some languages, Lidz, 1996). This is shown in (296).
(296) VP
Erebusi V
′
Erebusi
himself
V0
℘ love
The LLF contains two instances of Erebus, whereas the syntactic link-
ing converts the lower Erebus into a reflexive. This is an extension of the
idea that syntactic linking is not “complete”: elements with identical formal
properties (Erebus - Erebus in (295)) or identical L-vectors cannot be linked
syntactically.
On the other hand, *himselfi loves Erebusi is ungrammatical due to (ii).
For the same reasons, Erebus believes Charon’s description of herself is gram-
matical, but *Erebus believes Charon’s description of himself is not. The
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latter can, however, be generated as Erebusi believes Charon’s description of
himi. On the other hand, *Erebus believes that himself is intelligent violates
condition [294](1).
Now consider *Erebusi wants Erebusi to kill Charon. This again violates
[51], but this time [294](2) is satisfied so that Erebus is replaced by a gap,
resulting in Erebus wants to kill Charon, as shown in (297).
(297) TP
T VP
Erebusi V
′
VP
Erebusi
PRO
V
′
Charon V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ want
For the same reason, *Erebus wants him to kill Charon is ungrammati-
cal. PRO loves Charon is ungrammatical, since it violates (ii): there is no
antecedent for PRO, but why can it not appear in the place of the object,
*Erebusi kills PROi? The reason, in this case, is that there is no boundary
of full projection between PRO and its antecedent, thus condition [294](2) is
not satisfied. PRO must also be dominated by FP.
Consider, then, the subject of a finite clause. Here, too, PRO cannot
appear, as is shown by the ungrammaticality of *Erebus thinks that loves
Charon. There are two full projections between the PRO and its antecedent,
hence [294](2) is again not satisfied. Rather, [294](3) is satisfied so that we
predict the appearance of the pronominal, Erebus thinks that he loves Charon.
Finally, to take a slightly more complex case, consider Erebus arrived PRO
exhausted. Here again, [294](2) is satisfied, (1) and (3) are not, hence the
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ungrammaticality of *Erebus arrived him exhausted, *Erebus arrived himself
exhausted.
The elements mentioned in [294] actually appear in virtual complemen-
tary distribution, as predicted by [294], showing that empty categories have
an“underlying essence”(identical indices) with various surface manifestations
(Chomsky, 1982, p. 34).
Note that by “reflexive” I do not mean “reflexive anaphors” in the widest,
cross-linguistic sense, and rather refer to a narrow subset of reflexives, most
closely those of morphologically complex anaphors (e.g., the SELF-anaphors
of Reinhart & Rauland, 1993). This rule does not explain the distribution of
empty pronouns (pro), but they seem to fall under some rule that differs from
[294] in many fundamental ways. Moreover, the distribution of pronouns falls
into an“elsewhere” category here, which is descriptively too general since suc
distribution is more limited in that, rule [294] only prevents the antecedent
of a pronoun being too close. It appears that the distribution of pronouns
is also controlled by a mixture of discourse-oriented factors (cf. Chierchia,
1995).
There are cases in which a PRO may have several antecedents, as in
Erebus needs Charon to kill James. Both Erebus and Charon satisfy [294](2),
thus the sentence is automatically ambiguous, as shown in (298).
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(298) TP
T VP
Erebusi V
′
Charonj V
′
VP
PROi,j V
′
James V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ need
However, *Erebus needs to kill James is not possible, since condition
[294](2) is not satisfied, assuming that PRO is not the argument of need.
Rather, [294](1) is satisfied to generate Erebus needs himself to kill James.
For the same reason, *Erebus needs Charoni to kill PROi is not grammatical,
but Erebus needs Charonii to kill herselfii [294](1) is.
Many structures involve several empty categories, such as Erebus wonders
whether to kill himself. There is no problem here, given the stated conditions
for covert pronouns at lexico-logical form. Thus, in the above example, Ere-
bus appears three times at LLF. In each case [51] is applied, resulting in the
correct expression (PRO for the subject Erebus, a reflexive for the object
Erebus). The correct surface form is generated thereby, as shown in (299).
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(299) TP
T VP
Erebusi V
′
VP
Erebusi
PRO
V
′
Erebus
himself
V0
℘ kill
V0
℘ wonder
As these examples show, the generalisation of [51] with [294] is descrip-
tively sound: lexico-logical forms are linked with the basic properties of empty
elements. Reversing the reasoning, we might thus hope to use [51] with [294]
as a diagnostic property for detecting the boundaries of full projections at
the lexico-logical form. Consider the interpretation of the pronoun in the
following examples:
(300) a. Erebus thinks he’s smart
b. Erebus thinks highly of him
c. Erebus considers him intelligent
In (300)(a) the pronoun could have Erebus as its antecedent, a reading
which is only possible in (b-c) if the pronoun is reflexive. This suggests that
the pronoun in (b-c) is closer to the subject than in example (a). In the
case of (300)(b), the pronoun and the subject clearly occupy the same full
projection, think highly being a single complex predicate. In (a), the pronoun
occupies a different full projection, which is shown by the fact that an overt
complementizer is possible (Erebus thinks that he’s smart). Why is him inside
the same full matrix projection as the subject in (c), even though it is clearly
the thematic subject of the embedded sentence? The reason is to so with
restructuring: it moves to the matrix clause, showing that deletion takes
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place after restructuring, thus making it a very ‘deep’ property of language.
On the other hand, the pronoun in (a) does not rise, since restructuring does
not cross T boundaries.
Consider Erebusi believes Charon’s description of himi once more. The
fact that the embedded clausal nominal contains a pronoun (him) indicates
that there is a boundary of two full projections between him and Erebus.
Much the same is true of Erebus and Charon, since we have Erebusi believes
hisi description of Charon and Erebusi believes hisi description of himselfi.
Again, a pronoun appears. Thus, there must be one ‘invisible’ full projection
α, a fact that is supported by the corresponding tensed sentential counter-
part Erebus believes that Charon describes him:
Erebus believes [FP α [FP his description of Charon ] ]
The existence of α is relevant to the analysis of derived nominals (cf.
Chomsky, 1970). Clearly, we are assuming here that they have a “senten-
tial source”: whereas Erebus’s describing of Charon represents an abstract
proposition, we must assume that Erebus’s description of Charon involves
events, as clearly is the case if semantic intuitions are to be trusted. Then
α should be taken as an operator, such as T or a determiner, which turns
an intensional entity into an extensional one. However, more work is needed
here, somewhat independently of the properties of empty pronouns.
The sentence the book whichi you filed without PRO reading ti is a more
complex example. Given that the distribution of pronouns is used to diagnose
the structural distance at the LLF level, this entails that there must be one,
but not two, full projection(s) between PRO and you. (The gap t produced
by the wh-constituent (or wh-operator) is not discussed here due to the lack
of a theory of wh-constituents.)
The theory of empty elements interacts with other components of gram-
mar. Care must be taken in separating the passive rule, resulting from the
insertion of a vacuous argument, from the rule concerning deletion of ele-
ments due to identical indices. Empty categories or ‘gaps’ result from [294]
when two arguments have the same index; a passive is created in accordance
with [51] when the vacuous argument and the object have the same feature
vector. The following is a minimal pair in this respect:
(301) a. Erebus expected to hurt himself
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b. Erebus was expected to hurt himself
At the lexico-logical form:
(302) a. Erebusi expected [ Erebusi to hurt Erebusi ]
b. v expect [ Erebusi to hurt Erebusi ]
The gap in (301)(a) results from [294](2), and in (b) it is due to the
appearance of the vacuous argument and there is no deletion due to [294](2).
In both cases I predict the appearance of the reflexive himself in accordance
with [294](1). In the GB theory, this difference is diagnosed by the property
that the antecedent of PRO assumes an independent thematic role, whereas
the antecedent of the passive trace (ti in Erebusi was expected ti to hurt
himself ) does not assume such a role. This feature is a direct consequence
of the present rules, since in (a) Erebus occupies two positions at the lexico-
logical form with potentially differing thematic roles, one being deleted at
the syntactic interpretation, whereas in (b) Erebus occupies only one position
with one corresponding one thematic role assigned to it.
Some verbs, such as seem, to take a vacuous argument inherently as their
subject. This difference is visible in minimal pairs such as:
(303) a. your friends hoped to finish the meeting happy
b. your friends seemed to finish the meeting happy
In the terminology of GB theory, your friends have two thematic roles
in (a), and with only one in (b). In both cases, happy modifies the surface
subject your friends, an interpretation that is lacking in your friends hoped
the meeting would finish happy (from Chomsky, 1995, pp. 38-39). To take a
slightly more complex example, consider the following sentences:
(304) a. one translator each was expected to be assigned to the visiting
diplomats
b. one translator each hoped to be assigned to the visiting diplomats
Sentence (304a) contains two passive clauses, and hence two vacuous ar-
guments. Semantically, and hence in its lexico-logical form, the subject one
translator each is the object of assign: ‘v expect v assign one translator each
(to the visiting. . .).’ Then through passivization and restructuring, one
translator each perlocates up into the structure. In (b), one translator each
is also the subject of the matrix clause: one translator each expect (v assign
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one translator each (to the visiting...)).’ The embedded v is deleted due to
the identical L-vector, but the embedded one translator each is deleted due to
identical index with [294]. Thus, in the framework of GB theory, one trans-
lator each was expected tt’ to be assigned t to the visiting diplomats and one
translator each hoped PRO to be assigned t to the visiting diplomats (Chom-
sky, 1995, p. 39). Assuming that the embedded clause is tensed, [294](3)
is applied instead of [294](2), resulting in one translator each hoped that he
would be assigned to the visiting diplomats. This is similar in meaning to
(304b), a consequence of the rules given so far. What are completely analo-
gous to (304a) are sentences such as Erebus seems to have been expected to
leave.
Rule [294](2) regulating the distribution of PRO interacts with the rule on
restructuring in a somewhat complex manner. Suppose restructuring takes
effect after the creation of the gap. This produces Erebus wants PRO to die,
PRO rising. Assume that Erebus is replaced with v at the lexico-logical form
while the whole construction is embedded as an argument in a larger struc-
ture, such as . . . is awful. Then v and PRO have identical feature vectors
deriving [to want to die] is awful. This indicates that PRO may“rise” as well
(in the sense of rising via linking, not in the GB theoretical sense), creating
sentences with the “quasi-agentive”PRO. For identical reasons, inserting the
overt impersonal pronoun one instead of v in these constructions predicts
d-marking, as in for one to want to die is awful, since otherwise the pronoun
would not pass [51].
Suppos, however, that we apply restructuring first. Then [294](1) applies
instead of [294](2), the antecedent existing inside the same full projection
due to restructuring: Jonni wants Erebusi [FP to die], linked with
(305) Erebus wants himself to die
Embedding this structure inside . . . is awful results in the deletion
of either one of the Erebus constituents due to [51], since they would both
have an identical L-vector - hence the ungrammaticality of *Erebus to want
himself to die is awful, a violation that can be corrected by d-marking the
whole constituents in order to derive Erebus’s wanting himself to die is awful.
Pertinent to this issue is also the difference between ECM and control
structures. If a predicate does not allow a direct object, it would not tolerate
restructuring, as in the case the verb try :
(306) a. Erebus tried him to leave
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b. Erebus tried himself to leave
Then in (306), the embedded argument is simply deleted, fixing its mean-
ing to be synonymous with the matrix subject due to some property of “re-
coverability.” The verb believe behaves exactly the opposite way due to the
fact that it allows accusative objects. The interesting fact is that it does not
tolerate embedded PRO subjects in English, although in French the opposite
is true. This is predictable if we assume that restructuring is implemented
before [294], which gives independent evidence that it is so (e.g., binding in
Erebusi seems to himselfi to be stupid). Otherwise PRO would be possible,
the embedded subject remaining in a suitable position when [294] applies.
Discussion on so-called long-distance reflexives, backward binding and
logophoric anaphors is postponed to another occasion (see Huang, 2000, for
a review). Quantificational expressions are subject to other conditions, as
their “formal identity” does not guarantee synonymy, as shown below:
(307) a. every hippie loves every hippie
b. every hippie loves himself
These are nonsynonymous, so that (b) could not have resulted from (a)
by the application of [294]. Much the same is true of the so-called “donkey
anaphora,” illustrated in (308a-b):
(308) a. every man who owns a donkey beats a donkey
b. every man who owns a donkey beats it
Again, (b) could not have arisen by virtue of [294] since these sentences are
not synonymous. Since synonymy is a precondition for [294] at the LLF level,
something else must be going on here. What is pertinent to this discussion
is the fact, shown by this data, that the notion of “formal index” codes the
meaning of the lexical element inside the language faculty involves complex-
ities related to quantificational expressions: a man is not synonymous with
a man, since they may denote different men, although they are identical in
their surface properties. Another problem with the “formal index” account is
that complex antecedents can and normally do license anaphors. This shows
that it is not just the meaning (index), but it is also the formal structure that
counts in applying [51] and [294]. These matters require further clarification,
which is not attempted here (see also Fodor, 1975, 124-147, for arguments
against the present proposal involving structures with quantifiers).
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In previous chapters I have examined dative subject constructions of var-
ious types, showing that, even if the dative subjects does not appear (ar-
guably) in the topmost position at the LLF level, they can still bind and
control. This is a matter of how to apply the [294](A) clause internally when
there are several possible antecedents. Among these, the choice of a possible
one must thus be based on semantic properties such as aspectual prominence
(semantic subjecthood) and the ability to“control”the situation (causatives).
I have shown in this section how the binding theory could be modified
slightly so as to formulate binding conditions at the LLF level as it was de-
fined in this study. The material is part of the ongoing project of seeking ev-
idence to support the atomistic theory by demonstrating that these assump-
tions do not present insuperable barriers when dealing with new data. This
discussion on the binding theory also supplies the discussion on causatives
in section 4.5 , in which I argued that the binding properties of anaphors in
causative constructions do not inevitably lead into a biclausal explanation of
them.
If there was a leading idea in the GB theory, aside from the formulation
of the P&P-framework, it was the assumption that various locality relations
between movement and binding could be unified under ECP or some related
principle. Much work that was done in that period, and much of that work
which is still carried to the minimalist framework, is understandable from
that perspective. I believe this is one of the dimensions on which my pro-
posal differ most. There is no ECP, no unifying locality condition present.
Consider various phenomena having to do with empty categories and thus
falling under the putative ECP. Restructuring is strictly cyclic, but not mo-
tivated independently by any kind of ECP: it is just as local movement as
possible. Passives and raising constructions emerge naturally without any
help from independent ECP, and their locality, e.g. clause-boundedness, re-
lates directly to the assumptions which are used to deduce them. The locality
properties of binding were, so far, only stipulated, and long-distance move-
ment has not been explained in this study, yet it, too, seems to fall under
different set of assumptions. Derivational and inflectional morphology was
explained without movement, hence they fall naturally out of the scope of
ECP: locality was captured by introducing a notion of ψ-vector. It thus looks
as if all that was gained in terms of ECP has been replaced only by a diverse
set of stipulations.
Yet, it is not impossible that general principles among all these stipula-
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tions could be found. I think they have certain similarities to suggest that
we still miss important generalizations. Many rules refer to the notion of
full projection, which is crucial in constructing the LLF representations. For
instance, the relation between PRO and its antecedent closely resembles the
notion of ψ-vector: both are restricted by two full projcetions. Single full
projections are important in applying the rule [34] as well as the rule of
replacing synonymous constituents with reflexives. Restructuring, again a
highly local rule, originates from the same position where PRO can occur.
Why does the notion of full projection occur in these definitions? Note that
well-formed LLF representations must be full projections, so that this con-
dition might, and indeed is expected to interact with the construction of
the feature vectors somehow. One might speculate that feature vectors are
constructed in “phases” (VP, CP) corresponding to full projections at LLF.
Since such phases are “local,” so are many syntactic rules which are sensitive
to feature vectors. On the other hand, I simply do not know whether this
is the correct line to pursue at all, and the question must be left to another
occasion.
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